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Software development and evolution are highly distributed processes that involve a multitude 
of supporting tools and resources. Application programming interfaces are commonly used by 
software developers to reduce development cost and complexity by reusing code developed by 
third-parties or published by the open source community. However, these application 
programming interfaces have also introduced new challenges to the Software Engineering 
community (e.g., software vulnerabilities, API incompatibilities, and software license violations) 
that not only extend beyond the traditional boundaries of individual projects but also involve 
different software artifacts. As a result, there is the need for a technology-independent 
representation of software dependency semantics and the ability to seamlessly integrate this 
representation with knowledge from other software artifacts.  
The Semantic Web and its supporting technology stack have been widely promoted to model, 
integrate, and support interoperability among heterogeneous data sources. This dissertation takes 
advantage of the Semantic Web and its enabling technology stack for knowledge modeling and 
integration. The thesis introduces five major contributions: (1) We present a formal Software 
Build System Ontology – SBSON, which captures concepts and properties for software build and 
dependency management systems. This formal knowledge representation allows us to take 
advantage of Semantic Web inference services forming the basis for a more flexibility API 
dependency analysis compared to traditional proprietary analysis approaches. (2) We conducted 
a user survey which involved 53 open source developers to allow us to gain insights on how 
actual developers manage API breaking changes. (3) We introduced a novel approach which 
integrates our SBSON model with knowledge about source code usage and changes within the 
Maven ecosystem to support API consumers and producers in managing (assessing and 
minimizing) the impacts of breaking changes. (4) A Security Vulnerability Analysis Framework 
iv 
 
(SV-AF) is introduced, which integrates builds system, source code, versioning system, and 
vulnerability ontologies to trace and assess the impact of security vulnerabilities across project 
boundaries. (5) Finally, we introduce an Ontological Trustworthiness Assessment Model 
(OntTAM). OntTAM is an integration of our build, source code, vulnerability and license 
ontologies which supports a holistic analysis and assessment of quality attributes related to the 
trustworthiness of libraries and APIs in open source systems.  
Several case studies are presented to illustrate the applicability and flexibility of our 
modelling approach, demonstrating that our knowledge modeling approach can seamlessly 
integrate and reuse knowledge extracted from existing build and dependency management 
systems with other existing heterogeneous data sources found in the software engineering 
domain. As part of our case studies, we also demonstrate how this unified knowledge model can 



















First and foremost, all praises to God for blessing, protecting, and guiding me throughout my 
studies. I could never have accomplished this without my faith. 
A heartfelt thanks goes to my supervisor, Dr. Juergen Rilling, for having given me such an 
opportunity. Dr. Rilling did more than just advising: his continuous support, patience, 
motivation, and immense knowledge pushed me beyond my boundaries and shaped me, both as a 
person and a researcher. Throughout this journey, Dr. Rilling was always available to openly 
discuss new research ideas, ask challenging questions, and therefore elevate this work to the best 
it can be. His unique personality as a supervisor and friend is the main reason behind the success 
of this research. 
I also extend my thanks to members of the examining committee including Dr. Nikolaos 
Tsantalis, Dr. Ferhat Khendek, Dr. Dhrubajyoti Goswami, and Dr. Giuliano Antoniol (External), 
whose work and valuable feedback expanded my horizon and helped me discover new research 
opportunities that significantly improved my research. 
My gratitude also goes to Ambient Software Evolution Group members at Concordia 
University: Dr. Sultan Alqahtani, Dr. Rabe Abdalkareem, SayedHassan Khatoonabadi, Chris 
Forbes, Parisa Moslehi, and Yasaman Sarlati. A special thanks to two unique friends and 
colleagues, Dr. Sultan Alqahtani and Parisa Moslehi, who were there during the past years to 
discuss and share research ideas and challenges. Our discussions led to new published work and 
more research opportunities. 
Above all, I thank all the members of my family. First and foremost, I want to thank my 
parents, Victor and Joyce Eghan, who generously and wholeheartedly gave me their 
unconditional love and endless support throughout these years. I am grateful for your trust and 
confidence in me and for giving me the freedom to pursue my dreams. Last, but definitely most 
prominently, I thank my wife, Betty, for her unwavering love and encouragement during the 
pursuit of my studies. Thank you for always believing in me, and for reminding me to endure 





Table of Contents 
 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... xi 
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. xiv 
List of Acronyms ......................................................................................................................... xv 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Our Thesis ..................................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Summary of Research Contributions ............................................................................................ 3 
1.3 Related Publications ...................................................................................................................... 5 
1.4 Thesis Organization ...................................................................................................................... 5 
2 Motivation .............................................................................................................................. 7 
3 Background and Related Work ......................................................................................... 12 
3.1 The Semantic Web in a Nutshell ................................................................................................. 12 
3.2 Ontologies in Software Engineering ........................................................................................... 15 
3.3 Mining Software Repositories (MSR) ........................................................................................ 17 
3.4 Build Systems and Dependency Management ............................................................................ 19 
3.5 Chapter Summary ....................................................................................................................... 23 
4 A Unified Ontology-based Modeling Approach for Software Build and Dependency 
Repositories ................................................................................................................................. 24 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 24 
4.2 Software Build System ONtology (SBSON): Knowledge Modeling and Engineering .............. 25 
4.2.1 Step 1: Acquisition of Dependency Semantics ................................................................... 28 
4.2.2 Step 2: Initial System-Specific Ontologies ......................................................................... 29 
4.2.3 Step 3: Ontology Abstraction and Refinement ................................................................... 31 
4.2.4 Step 4: Ontology Population ............................................................................................... 40 
4.2.5 Step 5: Ontology Evolution ................................................................................................. 40 
4.3 Chapter Summary ....................................................................................................................... 41 
5 A Semantic Web Enabled Approach for the Early Detection of API Breaking Change 
Impacts ......................................................................................................................................... 42 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 42 
5.2 Background ................................................................................................................................. 44 
5.2.1 API Usage and Breaking Changes ...................................................................................... 44 
viii 
 
5.2.2 Software Evolution ONtologies (SEON) ............................................................................ 45 
5.3 A User Survey on the Impact of API Breaking Changes ............................................................ 46 
5.3.1 How often do developers experience breaking changes?.................................................... 47 
5.3.2 What features would developers need for identifying and managing the impacts of 
breaking changes? ............................................................................................................................... 48 
5.4 Modeling the Impact of API Breaking Changes ......................................................................... 49 
5.4.1 Modeling and Integration of the Source Code Ontology .................................................... 49 
5.4.2 Knowledge Inferencing and Reasoning .............................................................................. 51 
5.5 Case Study .................................................................................................................................. 53 
5.5.1 Dataset Description ............................................................................................................. 53 
5.5.2 Results ................................................................................................................................. 54 
5.6 Related Work .............................................................................................................................. 61 
5.6.1 API Usage ........................................................................................................................... 61 
5.6.2 Impact of API Breaking Changes ....................................................................................... 62 
5.7 Chapter Summary ....................................................................................................................... 62 
6 Recovering Semantic Traceability Links between APIs and Security Vulnerabilities . 64 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 64 
6.1.1 Motivating Example ............................................................................................................ 65 
6.2 Background ................................................................................................................................. 67 
6.2.1 Security Vulnerability Databases ........................................................................................ 67 
6.2.2 Vulnerability Detection Techniques ................................................................................... 68 
6.2.3 The SEcurity Vulnerability ONTology (SEVONT) ........................................................... 69 
6.3 SV-AF: Security Vulnerability Analysis Framework ................................................................. 71 
6.3.1 Ontology Alignment ........................................................................................................... 71 
6.3.2 Knowledge Inferencing and Reasoning .............................................................................. 76 
6.4 Case Studies ................................................................................................................................ 78 
6.4.1 Case Study Data .................................................................................................................. 78 
6.4.2 Case Study 1: Identifying vulnerable projects in Maven Repository .................................. 79 
6.4.3 Case Study 2: Identifying open source components that are directly and indirectly 
dependent on vulnerable components. ................................................................................................ 83 
6.4.4 Case Study 3: API-level vulnerability impact analysis for CVE-2015-0227 ...................... 85 
6.5 Discussion and Related Work ..................................................................................................... 92 
6.5.1 Comparison Against Existing Tools ................................................................................... 92 
ix 
 
6.5.2 Threats to Validity .............................................................................................................. 94 
6.5.3 Related Work in Tracking Known Security Vulnerabilities ............................................... 96 
6.6 Chapter Summary ....................................................................................................................... 97 
7 API Trustworthiness: An Ontological Approach for Software Library Adoption ....... 98 
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 98 
7.1.1 Motivating Example .......................................................................................................... 100 
7.2 Background ............................................................................................................................... 102 
7.2.1 Open Source Licenses ....................................................................................................... 102 
7.2.2 License Violations............................................................................................................. 103 
7.2.3 The MARKOS License Ontology ..................................................................................... 103 
7.2.4 Evolvable Quality Assessment Metamodel (SE-EQUAM) .............................................. 104 
7.3 Ontology-based Trustworthiness Assessment Model (OntTAM) ............................................. 107 
7.3.1 Artifact Selection .............................................................................................................. 109 
7.3.2 Model and Model Adjustment .......................................................................................... 109 
7.3.3 Measures and Metrics ....................................................................................................... 115 
7.3.4 Assessment Process........................................................................................................... 118 
7.4 Case Study ................................................................................................................................ 121 
7.4.1 Study Setup ....................................................................................................................... 121 
7.4.2 Identifying and Measuring Software Security Vulnerabilities .......................................... 123 
7.4.3 Identifying and Measuring License Violations ................................................................. 126 
7.4.4 Identifying and Measuring API Breaking Changes .......................................................... 132 
7.4.5 Assessment Process........................................................................................................... 137 
7.5 Discussion and Related Work ................................................................................................... 142 
7.5.1 Threats to Validity ............................................................................................................ 142 
7.5.2 Related Work .................................................................................................................... 143 
7.6 Chapter Summary ..................................................................................................................... 147 
8 Conclusions and Future Work ......................................................................................... 149 
8.1 Contributions ............................................................................................................................. 149 
8.2 Future Work .............................................................................................................................. 152 
8.2.1 Current Limitations ........................................................................................................... 152 
8.2.2 Opportunities for Future Research .................................................................................... 153 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 156 
Appendix A: Referenced Ontologies ....................................................................................... 170 
x 
 





List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: An overview of the thesis content .............................................................................................. 6 
Figure 2.1: Overview of motivating scenario #1 .......................................................................................... 9 
Figure 2.2: Overview of motivating scenario #2 - Integrating build information and knowledge from 
heterogeneous software repositories ........................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 3.1: Semantic web architecture in layers ......................................................................................... 13 
Figure 3.2: State of the LOD cloud ............................................................................................................. 15 
Figure 4.1: An overview of our knowledge modeling methodology. ......................................................... 26 
Figure 4.2: An overview of the different ontology abstraction layers in SBSON. ..................................... 27 
Figure 4.3: Overview of individual system-specific ontologies for the analyzed systems. ........................ 29 
Figure 4.4: Example of syntax and structural differences between Maven (left) and Gradle (right) 
dependency definitions ............................................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 4.5: An illustration of (a) generic dependency between two releases, and (b) how property 
reification pattern is adopted in modeling dependency links ...................................................................... 32 
Figure 4.6: (a) The OrderedList Ontology, (b) how we model the order of project releases with the 
OrderedList Ontology, and (c) an illustrative example of a project and its ordered releases. .................... 33 
Figure 4.7: Concepts used to model and reason on dependency version ranges ........................................ 34 
Figure 4.8: Transitive exclusion at per-dependency scope ......................................................................... 35 
Figure 4.9: Concepts used to model and reason on dependency exclusion ................................................ 35 
Figure 4.10: Inferring DirectDependencyOn based on an “exact” version range ....................................... 37 
Figure 4.11: Inferring DirectDependencyOn based on a “lower than” version range ................................ 37 
Figure 4.12: Inferring DirectDependencyOn based on a “greater than” version range .............................. 38 
Figure 4.13: Inferring hasTransitiveDependencyOn in the absence of exclusions ..................................... 38 
Figure 4.14: Inferring hasTransitiveDependencyOn in the presence of exclusions ................................... 38 
Figure 4.15: Overview of the concepts and (object) properties in the unified SBSON family of ontologies
 .................................................................................................................................................................... 39 
Figure 4.16: Anatomy of the URI of a generated triple .............................................................................. 40 
Figure 5.1: The hidden complexity of breaking changes due to transitive dependencies ........................... 43 
Figure 5.2: Overview of the SEON pyramid of ontologies [34] ................................................................. 45 
Figure 5.3: Ontologies and concepts involved in API change impact analysis .......................................... 50 
Figure 5.4: SPARQL query returning transitive method calls .................................................................... 52 
Figure 5.5: Hierarchy of code properties .................................................................................................... 52 
Figure 5.6: Query illustrating the dependsOn subsumption inference ........................................................ 53 
Figure 5.7: Overview of approach for breaking change impact analysis .................................................... 55 
Figure 5.8: SPARQL query to identify API usage in client projects .......................................................... 55 
Figure 5.9: SPARQL query identifying the use of multiple versions of the ASM library in projects ........ 57 
Figure 5.10: SPARQL query to identify transitive usage of API elements impacted by breaking changes57 
Figure 5.11: Illustrative example of a client project using different versions of the same API .................. 58 
Figure 5.12: Distribution of client dependencies and their usage of incompatible ASM APIs .................. 59 
Figure 5.13: Tracing the issue reported in DocBleach (issue #1) ............................................................... 61 
xii 
 
Figure 6.1: Integrating code and build information with knowledge from other originally heterogeneous 
resources ..................................................................................................................................................... 66 
Figure 6.2: Overview of the SEVONT ontologies ...................................................................................... 70 
Figure 6.3: Overview of the integrated SBSON, SEON, and SEVONT ontologies ................................... 71 
Figure 6.4: SV-AF knowledge base similarity graphs ................................................................................ 72 
Figure 6.5: PSL rule identifying similar projects with the same name ....................................................... 73 
Figure 6.6: PSL rule identifying similar projects with the same name and version ................................... 73 
Figure 6.7: SV-AF’s weighted similarity modeling .................................................................................... 74 
Figure 6.8: SWRL rules for aligning SEON and SEVONT when a commit message contains a 
vulnerability reference ................................................................................................................................ 75 
Figure 6.9: SWRL rules for aligning SEON and SEVONT when a vulnerability patch contains a commit 
reference ...................................................................................................................................................... 75 
Figure 6.10: The SV-AF ontology concepts involved in API-level vulnerability impact analysis ............. 77 
Figure 6.11: SPARQL query returning vulnerable projects based on the owl:sameAs inference .............. 78 
Figure 6.12: PSL SameProject Rules .......................................................................................................... 80 
Figure 6.13:PSL SBSON-SEVONT similarity inference results ................................................................ 81 
Figure 6.14: Inferred project dependencies in SBSON ............................................................................... 84 
Figure 6.15: Geronimo-jetty6-javaee5 using 5 vulnerable projects (level 1 dependencies) ....................... 85 
Figure 6.16: Extracting patch relevant information from NVD and commit messages .............................. 88 
Figure 6.17: Diff output for WSS4J r1619358 and r1619359 .................................................................... 88 
Figure 6.18: Inferred links between vulnerabilites.owl, code.owl, and versioning.owl ............................. 89 
Figure 6.19: Query to retrieve vulnerable code fragments across project boundaries ................................ 89 
Figure 6.20: Class diagram for our modified package ................................................................................ 91 
Figure 7.1: Motivating Example – How OntTAM can assist developers in trust assessment .................. 101 
Figure 7.2: Generic structure of quality assessment models [160] ........................................................... 105 
Figure 7.3: SE-EQUAM ontology meta-model reuse to instantiate a domain model ontology (OntEQAM) 
[9] .............................................................................................................................................................. 106 
Figure 7.4: SE-EQUAM Process to instantiate evolvability model .......................................................... 107 
Figure 7.5: The Software Trustworthiness Ontology Hierarchy ............................................................... 108 
Figure 7.6: Reuse of the SE-QUAM meta-model to instantiate the OntTAM domain model ontology ... 111 
Figure 7.7: An example defining the associated trustworthiness concepts and measures for a sample 
project ....................................................................................................................................................... 112 
Figure 7.8: Integrating OntTAM ontology into SV-AF model and reusing SE-QUAM concepts ........... 114 
Figure 7.9: Categories of license violations .............................................................................................. 117 
Figure 7.10: Fuzzy Assessment Process Steps .......................................................................................... 119 
Figure 7.11: WVD measure fuzzy scale and Weight Fuzzy Scale for WVD measure ............................. 120 
Figure 7.12: Overview of case study setup process .................................................................................. 122 
Figure 7.13: Rules to infer the direct WVD measure ................................................................................ 123 
Figure 7.14: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of vulnerable code entities in a project ....... 124 
Figure 7.15: SPARQL query for inferring the vulnerable code entities used by different dependent 
projects ...................................................................................................................................................... 124 
Figure 7.16: SPARQL query for inferring inherited WVD measures in clients’ projects ........................ 125 
Figure 7.17: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of simple license violations ........................ 127 
Figure 7.18: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of transitive license violations .................... 127 
xiii 
 
Figure 7.19: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of compound license violations .................. 128 
Figure 7.20: License distribution in the Maven repository ....................................................................... 128 
Figure 7.21: Most Popular Type 1 License Violation Pairs ...................................................................... 130 
Figure 7.22: Most Popular Type 2 License Violation Pairs ...................................................................... 130 
Figure 7.23: Most Popular Type 3 License Violation Pairs ...................................................................... 130 
Figure 7.24: SWRL rules to infer the BCD measure ................................................................................ 133 
Figure 7.25: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of breaking changes in a project ................. 133 
Figure 7.26: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of non-breaking changes in a project .......... 134 
Figure 7.27: SPARQL query for inferring the direct BCI measure in a project ....................................... 134 
Figure 7.28: SPARQL query for inferring the indirect BCI measure in a project .................................... 135 
Figure 7.29: An example of a reported bug showing how a breaking change in the ASM library impacts 
Orbit and its dependent projects................................................................................................................ 136 
Figure 7.30: Distribution of breaking changes and their impacts in the analyzed ASM libraries and 
dependencies ............................................................................................................................................. 137 
Figure 7.31: Overview of relations in the semantic OntTAM domain model .......................................... 137 
Figure 7.32: Sample FCL file for defining the fuzzy WVD measure ....................................................... 138 
Figure 7.33: Sample FCL file for inferring the fuzzy scores for the WVD measure ................................ 139 
Figure 7.34: Sample FCL file for integrating the LVC and WVD fuzzy scores for the Impact attribute . 140 




List of Tables 
Table 3.1: Examples of Software Repositories ........................................................................................... 18 
Table 4.1: Overview of the 3 studied build and dependency management systems ................................... 28 
Table 4.2: General statistics of the Maven Central repository .................................................................... 29 
Table 4.3: Syntax differences for defining dependency version ranges ..................................................... 30 
Table 5.1: Background of survey participants ............................................................................................ 47 
Table 5.2: Report on breaking changes experienced by developers ........................................................... 48 
Table 5.3: Summary of Maven dataset ....................................................................................................... 53 
Table 5.4: Summary of ASM dataset .......................................................................................................... 54 
Table 5.5: Summary of External and Internal Usage of selected ASM APIs ............................................. 56 
Table 5.6: Results of potentially impacted Client Projects ......................................................................... 59 
Table 5.7: Identified potential breaking changes ........................................................................................ 60 
Table 6.1: Example of Derby versions and their dependent projects in Maven ......................................... 66 
Table 6.2: Maven Repository statistics ....................................................................................................... 78 
Table 6.3: NVD database statistics ............................................................................................................. 78 
Table 6.4: Subject systems and sizes for transitive dependencies analysis ................................................ 79 
Table 6.5: Example of a linked SBSON-SEVONT vulnerability ............................................................... 81 
Table 6.6: Critical Vulnerabilities for Android Project .............................................................................. 82 
Table 6.7: Weighted owl:sameAs link evaluation ...................................................................................... 83 
Table 6.8: Summary of transitive dependencies on vulnerable components .............................................. 84 
Table 6.9: Case Study #3 Results................................................................................................................ 90 
Table 6.10: Results of Direct and Indirect Usage of the Vulnerable “Wssecurityutil.Verifysignedelement” 
Method ........................................................................................................................................................ 91 
Table 6.11: Comparison of Analysis Results .............................................................................................. 93 
Table 6.12: Dataset size evaluation ............................................................................................................. 95 
Table 7.1: Ten common open source licenses and their traits .................................................................. 102 
Table 7.2: Permissions defined in the MARKOS ontology. ..................................................................... 104 
Table 7.3: Overview of selected case study projects ................................................................................ 122 
Table 7.4: Vulnerability densities of selected projects ............................................................................. 126 
Table 7.5: Clients who switched from a vulnerable API in later release .................................................. 126 
Table 7.6: Totals for each type of violation found by querying the data store ......................................... 129 
Table 7.7: Licence Violation Counts in selected projects ......................................................................... 132 
Table 7.8: Overview of selected trustworthiness measure scores for our case study projects .................. 141 
Table 7.9: Example of inferred trustworthiness scores at sub-factor level ............................................... 141 





List of Acronyms 
API Application Programming Interface 
BCD Breaking Change Density 
BCI Breaking Change Impact 
CVE Common Vulnerabilities Exposure 
CWE Common Weakness Enumeration 
DL Description Logic 
LOVC Lines of Vulnerable Code 
LVC License Violation Count  
MARKOS The MARKet for Open Source license ontology 
MSR Mining Software Repositories 
NVD National Vulnerability Database 
OMG The Object Management Group 
OntTAM ONTology-based Trustworthiness Assessment Model 
OSS Open Source Software 
OWA Open World Assumption 
OWASP The Open Web Application Security Project 
OWL The Web Ontology Language 
PSL Probabilistic Soft Logic 
RDF Resource Description Framework 
RDFS The RDF Schema 
SBSON The Software Build System Ontology   
SE Software Engineering 
SE-EQUAM The Evolvable Quality Metamodel  
SEON The Software Engineering Ontologies  
SEVONT The Security Vulnerability Ontology 
SOCON The Source Code Ontology 
SPARQL A Simple Protocol and RDF Query Language  
SV-AF Security Vulnerability Analysis Framework 
SW The Semantic Web 
SWRL Semantic Web Rule Language 




Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Traditional software development processes, with their focus on closed architectures and 
platform-dependent software, restrict potential code reuse across project and organizational 
boundaries. With the introduction of the Internet, these restrictions have been removed, allowing 
for global access, online collaboration, information sharing, and internationalization of the 
software industry [1]. Software development and maintenance tasks can now be shared amongst 
team members working across and outside organizational boundaries. Code reuse through 
resources such as software libraries, components, services, design patterns, and frameworks 
published on the Internet has become an essential aspect allowing developers to reuse and share 
artifacts among developers and organizations. According to Mileva [2], “most of today’s 
software projects heavily depend on the usage of external libraries.” This use of libraries allows 
software developers to take advantage of features provided by Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs) without having to reinvent the wheel [3], [4].  
Automated dependency management environments have been introduced to further simplify 
the integration and reuse of external libraries during development. Developers no longer have to 
manually manage internal and external libraries their projects depend on. Build systems and 
dependency management tools automatically download and manage all required dependent 
components (including transitive dependencies), automatically update dependencies to their 
latest versions, and perform necessary dependency mediation (conflict resolution) when multiple 
versions of a dependency are encountered. Among the most commonly used open source build 







Existing research has demonstrated how mining knowledge captured in these build 
repositories can be used to enhance software tasks such as identifying inconsistencies in license 
compliance  [5], predicting build changes [6], [7], identifying build clones [8], and automatic 
library recommendation and migration [2].  
Common to these approaches is that they use build and dependency repositories as 
information silos, which are not directly integrated and linked with other software repositories 
and therefore limiting their ability to share and reuse these analysis results for future analysis 
(both by humans and machines).  
 Furthermore, while existing software analysis and dependency approaches perform well in 
analyzing individual project contexts, the collaborative nature of today’s software development 
requires new types of analysis and knowledge modeling approaches to address these global 
software engineering challenges. These challenges extend beyond the boundaries of individual 
projects due to dependency relationships among software projects and complete software 
ecosystems. There is the need for a technology-independent representation of software 
dependency semantics and the ability to seamlessly integrate such a representation with 
knowledge from other software artifacts.  
In our research, we introduce a novel approach which takes advantage of the Semantic Web 
(SW) and its technology stack (e.g., ontologies, Linked Data, reasoning services) to establish a 
unified knowledge representation of build and dependency repositories. Based on this SW 
enabled representation, we can now further extend this knowledge base by integrating other 
(heterogeneous) resources to form the basis for a novel, flexible global impact analysis approach. 
Such a global impact analysis approach can provide both producers and consumers of software 
libraries with additional insights and guide them during the evolution of their libraries. Much of 
the flexibility of our approach is based on the use of inference services to reason upon 
knowledge that is explicit and implicit captured in the knowledge base. 
1.1 Our Thesis 
Despite the existing role of project dependency repositories and build system dependency 
management features, little is known on how this software dependency information can be 
integrated with other software-related knowledge to improve software development processes. 




A technology-independent representation of software dependency semantics, seamlessly 
integrated with other software artifacts, is needed to truly leverage project dependency 
information in software tasks. 
 
To validate our thesis, we propose a knowledge modeling approach that supports the 
integration of heterogeneous knowledge resources such as software dependency, source code, 
vulnerability, and license information. On top of this knowledge model, we developed a set of 
applications that analyze the impact of code reuse through APIs, within a traditional project 
scope but also in a more global scope, across project boundaries.  
1.2 Summary of Research Contributions 
In this thesis, we make the following contributions:  
• We conducted a survey involving 53 open source developers to gain insights on how they 
manage API breaking changes. 
• Based on the survey results, we present a formal unified ontological model (SBSON, 
Software Build System ONtology) which captures concepts and properties for software 
build systems (Chapter 4). This formal knowledge representation allows us to take 
advantage of inference services provided by the SW, forming the basis for a more 
flexibility API dependency analysis compared to traditional proprietary analysis 
approaches. 
• We introduced a novel approach to support API consumers and producers in managing 
(assessing and minimizing) the impacts of breaking changes. (Chapter 5). The main 
contributions of this approach are: 
o We use our knowledge model to identify the potential impact of breaking changes 
across project boundaries to support library consumers and producers in managing 
API breaking changes, by taking advantage of SW reasoning services. 
o We present a case study to demonstrate the applicability and flexibility of our 




• We developed a Security Vulnerability Analysis Framework (SV-AF) to support 
evidence-based vulnerability detection (Chapter 6). The main contributions of this 
framework are: 
o Integration of different ontologies such as builds systems ontologies, source code 
ontologies, version systems ontologies, and vulnerabilities ontologies. 
o Applying ontologies alignment using Probabilistic Soft Logic (PSL) to establish 
weighted links between ontologies. 
o Performed case studies to illustrate the applicability of the presented approach in 
tracing and assessing the impact of security vulnerabilities across project 
boundaries. 
• We introduce a novel Ontological Trustworthiness Assessment Model (OntTAM), an 
extension of the previous generic SE-EQUAM software assessment model [9] (Chapter 
7). OntTAM is an integration of our build, source code, vulnerability and license 
ontologies which supports the automated analysis and assessment of quality attributes 
related to the trustworthiness of libraries and APIs in open source systems. The main 
contributions of this assessment model are: 
o We extend the MARKOS license ontology [10] with semantic rules for three 
categories of license violations. 
o We introduce new trustworthiness measures, which measure API breaking 
changes, security vulnerabilities, and license violations.  
o We perform several case studies to illustrate how our approach provides 
developers with additional insights on the potential impact of reused libraries and 
APIs on the quality and trustworthiness of their project. 






1.3 Related Publications 
Earlier versions of the work completed in this thesis have been published in the following 
papers:  
1- E. E. Eghan, S. S. Alqahtani, C. Forbes and J. Rilling, "API trustworthiness: an 
ontological approach for software library adoption," Software Quality Journal, 2019. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11219-018-9428-4.  
2- S. S. Alqahtani, E. E. Eghan and J. Rilling, "Recovering Semantic Traceability Links 
between APIs and Security Vulnerabilities: An Ontological Modeling Approach," 2017 
IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation (ICST), 
Tokyo, 2017, pp. 80-91.  
3- S. S. Alqahtani, E. E. Eghan and J. Rilling, "SV-AF — A Security Vulnerability 
Analysis Framework," 2016 IEEE 27th International Symposium on Software Reliability 
Engineering (ISSRE), Ottawa, ON, 2016, pp. 219-229.   
4- S. S. Alqahtani, E. E. Eghan and J. Rilling, “Tracing known security vulnerabilities in 
software repositories – A Semantic Web enabled modeling approach”, Science of 
Computer Programming, Volume 121, 2016, pp. 153-175.  
1.4 Thesis Organization 
In what follows, we provide an overview of the thesis structure. Figure 1.1 summarizes the 
main sections of the thesis and their content, which are: In Chapter 2, we will discuss the 
motivation for the research presented in this thesis. Chapter 3 covers background and related 
work, including the SW technologies used for our knowledge model construction, mining 
software repositories (MSR), and dependency management with build systems. The chapter also 
covers existing works relevant to each of these topics. Chapter 4 describes the approach used to 
create our unified representation of build and dependency repositories. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
demonstrate how our unified model integrates knowledge from other software artifacts for 
flexible global software analysis. The conclusions and some promising avenues for future work 
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Chapter 2  
2 Motivation 
Although the reuse of third-party libraries provides developers with gains in productivity by 
not having to re-implement already existing functionality, new technical and organizational 
challenges arise from this form of code reuse [11]. Some of these challenges identified in 
existing work include, but are not limited to, the following: 
• choosing the most relevant library among several alternatives [12], [13], 
• how to use features provided by these libraries [13], [14], 
• cost of migrating to a new library [15], [16], 
• maintenance costs due to breaking changes [17]–[19], 
• impact of security vulnerabilities and bugs [20], [21], 
• incompatible software licenses [5], [22], and 
• unmaintained or outdated libraries [20], [23]. 
To address these challenges, existing approaches analyze the knowledge within software 
related repositories such as dependency repositories (e.g., Maven Central, npm), source code 
repositories (e.g., GitHub 4 ), vulnerability databases (e.g., NVD 5 ), and Q&A forums (e.g., 
StackOverflow). However, as mentioned in the introduction, most of these approaches treat these 
repositories as information silos and lack the ability to integrate their analysis results with 
existing knowledge, to make their analysis shareable and reusable for future analysis (both by 
humans and machines).  
The motivation of this research is to establish a unified machine and human-readable 
representation that captures build and dependency information as well as knowledge from other 
software artifacts, to allow for a seamless knowledge integration across resource boundaries. 






these knowledge resources have remained into information hubs. Some of the key characteristics 
of such information hubs include the provision for standardized knowledge representation, cross-
artifact analysis, and the reuse and sharing of analysis result across artifact and project 
boundaries.  
The following motivating scenarios illustrate how such an integrated knowledge modeling 
approach not only allows for knowledge integration but can also provide the basis for novel 
types of software analytics.  
 
Scenario #1: Bi-directional dependency analysis. Current build tools provide support for 
automatic dependency management; a project needs only to specify the third-party libraries it 
directly depends on, and the build tool automatically includes any required transitive dependent 
components. However, as shown in Figure 2.1(a), such dependency analysis only supports 
project-specific dependency trees based on unidirectional dependencies. While unidirectional 
dependency models work well for managing build dependencies, they are limited in their 
expressiveness and therefore restrict further reasoning upon the modeled information. For 
example, Maven’s native support for impact analysis allows a developer to identify all the 
components used by his project, which is illustrated in Fig. 2.1(a). In this example, a component 
C depends on components D and E. However, given Maven’s existing dependency model it 
would be impossible for an API producer to identify which projects depend (either directly or 
indirectly) on his API. A user study we conducted with open source developers indicated that 
library producers make better choices regarding breaking changes when they know the 
popularity of a library and how client projects use its APIs. Details of this user study can be 
found in section 5.3. 
Using SW and its supporting technology stack, we can mine and model the dependencies of 
several projects to create a “global” bi-directional dependency graph (Figure 2.1(b)). As the 
figure illustrates, based on this enrich knowledge model, library producers can now easily 
identify all components which depend (directly or indirectly) on their libraries. For example, the 
developers of component C can identify components A, F, and G as clients which will be 





Figure 2.1: Overview of motivating scenario #1 
 
Scenario #2: Supporting cross-artifact analysis. Many software analysis tasks extend 
beyond the source code and involve other software artifacts. For example, analysis tasks such as 
license violation detection and vulnerability impact analysis integrate knowledge from source 
code, license files, and vulnerability databases. While existing approaches and tools aim to 
support such types of analysis using project dependencies (e.g., VersionEye6, SourceClear7, 
OWASP-DC8). These approaches base their analysis on the existing knowledge representation 
(e.g., uni-directional dependencies for build management tools) of each individual knowledge 
sources, therefore treating them as information silos, which limits the analysis they can perform 
on the available knowledge. 
In contrast, our approach takes advantage of SW and its supporting technologies to establish 
traceability through a global project knowledge graph. This graph integrates concept and facts 
from other software knowledge models, while supporting the inference of new knowledge and 
making analysis results an integrated part of the knowledge model. For example, in Figure 2.2, a 
 
6 https://www.versioneye.com/  
7 https://www.sourceclear.com/  


































traceability link is established between the two project E instances in the vulnerability and 
dependency models. We can now infer that projects C, A, F, and G are potentially vulnerable due 
to their transitive dependence on project E. Further, project A can be identified to introduce a 




Figure 2.2: Overview of motivating scenario #2 - Integrating build information and knowledge 
from heterogeneous software repositories 
 
As illustrated by the two scenarios, taking advantage of SW provides us not only with the 
ability to integrate distributed knowledge resources but also supports the Open World 
Assumption9 (OWA), which must hold when modeling and analyzing these resources to be able 
to deal safely with incomplete data.  That is, the lack of information cannot be used to infer 
further knowledge, which is in contrast to most existing source code analysis approaches which 
are based on the closed world assumption [24]. For example, in Figure 2.2, we do not have any 
established traceability link between project F’s instance in the dependency model and the 
 




































vulnerability model. This does not mean project F has no security vulnerabilities; we cannot infer 
that fact at the moment. Also, using the Semantic Web, we can not only safely deal with 
incomplete data, but also support incremental knowledge population and take advantage of 
inference services provided by SW [25], [26] 
One of the objectives of our approach is to provide links and inferences between existing 
knowledge resources and seamlessly integrate analysis results, to allow other analysis task to 
reuse already available results. For example, results of a vulnerability analysis can become an 
integrated (explicit) part of project related knowledge; other services can now reuse such results 
as part of their analysis without re-executing the initial vulnerability analysis.  
Before introducing in detail our contributions, we will discuss some background relevant to 





Chapter 3  
3 Background and Related Work 
The work presented in this research combines different areas of Software Engineering (SE), 
including build systems and dependency management, MSR, and knowledge modeling. In this 
chapter, we provide a brief overview of core techniques, terminologies, and existing efforts in 
these fields that are related to our research. If you are already familiar with these concepts, you 
can safely move on to the next chapter as cross-references are provided throughout the thesis, 
whenever specific background information is required.  
3.1 The Semantic Web in a Nutshell 
Berners-Lee et al. define the Semantic Web as “an extension of the Web, in which 
information is given well-defined meaning, enabling computers and people to work in 
cooperation” [27]. In a Semantic Web, data can be processed by computers as well as by 
humans, including inferring new relationships among pieces of data. For machines to understand 
and reason about knowledge, this knowledge needs to be represented in a well-defined, machine-
readable language.  
The Semantic Web makes use of a set of technologies, frameworks, and notations defined by 
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) to be able to provide such formal description of 
concepts, terms, and relationships within a given knowledge domain. The Semantic Web is built 
around the central concept known as Ontology. Ontologies provide a formal and explicit way to 
specify concepts and relationships in a domain of discourse. They are a standardized platform for 
sharing vocabulary and knowledge to automate access and ease of use. Classes (and subclasses) 
are used to model concepts in ontologies, with properties modeling the attributes of such 
concepts.  
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the complete Semantic Web architecture and technology 
stack. The first (bottom) layer, URI, and Unicode are essential features of the existing WWW. 
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Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) allow to uniquely identify resources (e.g., documents) with 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) being a subset of URI.  The usage of URIs is essential for a 
distributed internet system as it provides understandable identification of all resources. XML is a 
general-purpose markup language for documents containing structured information and provides 
with its XML namespace and XML schema definitions a common syntax used by the Semantic 
Web.  
 
Figure 3.1: Semantic web architecture in layers 
 
The Semantic Web uses the Resource Description Framework (RDF) as its underlying data 
model to formalize the meta-data as subject-predicate-object triples, which are stored in triple-
stores. Triple-stores are Database Management Systems (DBMS) which model RDF data as a 
graph where nodes (subject, object) are connected through edges (predicates). An RDF Schema 
(RDFS) is combined with the formal semantics within RDF to allow for a standardized 
description of taxonomies and other ontological constructs. RDFS defines a simple modeling 
language on top of RDF which includes classes, “is-a relationships” between classes and 
between properties, and domain/range restrictions for properties. RDFS can be used to describe 
taxonomies of classes and properties and use them to create lightweight ontologies. 
More detailed ontologies can be created through the use of the Web Ontology Language 
(OWL). OWL is derived from description logics (such as conjunction and disjunction, 
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existentially and universally quantified variables), is syntactically embedded into RDF, so like 
RDFS, it provides additional standardized vocabulary. OWL comes in three forms - OWL Lite 
for taxonomies and simple constraints, OWL DL for full description logic support, and OWL 
Full for maximum expressiveness and syntactic freedom of RDF. RDFS and OWL have a set of 
defined semantics used for reasoning within ontologies and knowledge bases described using 
these languages. Standardized rule languages (e.g., Rule Interchange Format (RIF) and Semantic 
Web Rule Language (SWRL)) provide rules beyond the constructs available in RDFS and OWL. 
With these rule and logic constructs, a reasoning module can make logical inferences and derive 
knowledge that was previously only implicit in the data. Using OWL for the Semantic Web 
implies that an application could invoke such a reasoning module and acquire inferred 
knowledge rather than only retrieve data [28]. For querying RDF data as well as RDFS and 
OWL ontologies with knowledge bases, a Simple Protocol and RDF Query Language 
(SPARQL) is available. Since both RDFS and OWL are built on RDF, SPARQL can be used for 
querying ontologies and knowledge bases directly as well. SPARQL is a query language for 
RDF which attempts to match patterns in the RDF graph to find solutions [29]. 
In the Semantic Stack, it is expected that all semantics and rules will be executed at the layers 
below Proof and the result will be used to prove deductions. Formal proof together with trusted 
inputs for the proof will mean that the results can be trusted. For reliable inputs, cryptography 
means are to be used, such as digital signatures for verification of the origin of the sources. On 
top of this technology stack, is end-user interfaces and application that take advantage of the 
Semantic Web infrastructure. 
 
Linked data [30], [31] is a by-product of the Semantic Web. It was introduced to ease data 
sharing and integration in distributed environments and be superior to XML-based approaches 
[32], [33]. Linked data is mainly about publishing structured data in RDF using URIs rather than 
focusing on the ontological level or inferencing. Linked Data best practices have led to the 
extension of the Web with a global data space which allows for connecting data from diverse 
domains, such as online communities, statistical and scientific data. Linked data enables both 
humans and machines to interpret data for mining, searching, and analysis purposes. Each entity 
in the domain of discourse must have a unique identifier (UID) in the form of a URI (Uniform 
Resource Identifier). Linked data mandates that URLs are de-referenceable to make information 
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inter-linkable and online. That is, clients (i.e., humans and machines) must be able to fetch 
resource-related data via its URL (with the http:// prefix). Using an HTTP header, a client 
specifies the desired output format: HTML or RDF/XML.  
 
Figure 3.2: State of the LOD cloud10   
3.2 Ontologies in Software Engineering 
Representing software in terms of knowledge rather than data, ontologies provide a better 
support for representing the semantics of software [27] compared to relational databases where 
sharing and reuse of schemata are not natively supported.  Semantic Web meta-models are 
extensible, allowing the addition of new knowledge without affecting existing knowledge. 
Unlike relational databases, where extending the schema becomes a time-consuming operation, 
often affecting a complete database (e.g., changing a foreign key index type might require 





identified by [34], are that the Semantic Web makes relations and their meaning explicit. 
Relational databases lack a consistent method for obtaining the semantics of a relation and 
therefore, a query can join any two table columns, if their datatypes match – there is no 
interpretation of the meaning of the relation performed. As a result, relational databases are not 
machine-interpretable, and the inference of knowledge (explicit or implicit) requires human 
interaction. Also, linking data is a vital property of the Semantic Web, with resources identified 
by their Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). These URIs, allow for consistent identification of 
the same resource across various knowledge resources. This contrasts with relational databases 
where resources are local and not universal, therefore restricting the ability of relational 
databases to establish resource links outside their local schema.  
Given the current diversity in technologies and software development processes, produced 
software artifacts are often disconnected from each other. With the rate at which software project 
artifacts become available in (online) repositories, a common issue faced by programmers is the 
need to locate knowledge relevant to their specific development task. While the MSR community 
has made significant progress in analyzing individual repositories by introducing proprietary 
mining techniques, the MSR community has yet to address the issue of seamless integrating 
these knowledge resources [34]. Several approaches to establish taxonomies for software 
engineering through ontologies have been presented recently to describe domain knowledge of 
developers, source code, and other software artifacts. The common goal of these approaches is to 
foster reuse and support the automatic inference of new knowledge. 
For example, in requirement engineering, ontologies have been used to support requirement 
management [35], traceability [36], and use case management [37]. In the software testing 
domain, KITSS [38] is a knowledge-based system that can assist in converting a semi-formal test 
case specification into an executable test script. For the software maintenance domain, 
Ankolekar et al. [39] provide an ontology to model software, developers, and bugs. The authors 
developed a prototype Semantic Web based system, Dhruv, which provides an enhanced 
semantic interface to bug resolution messages and recommends related software objects and 
artifacts for the OSS community. Ontologies have also been used to describe the functionality of 
components using a knowledge representation formalism that allows more convenient and 
powerful querying. For example, the KOntoR [40] system stores semantic descriptions of 
components in a knowledge base and supports the semantic querying of this knowledge. In [41], 
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Jin et al. discuss an ontological approach of service sharing among program comprehension 
tools. Hyland-Wood et al. [42] proposed an OWL ontology of software engineering concepts, 
including classes, tests, metrics, and requirements. Bertoa et al. [43] focused on software 
measurement. Witte et al. [44] used text mining and static code analysis to map documentation to 
source code in RDF for software maintenance purposes.  Yu et al. [45] also represented static 
source code information using an OWL ontology and used SWRL rules to infer common bugs in 
the source code.  
Several researchers have described software evolution artifacts extracted from existing 
software repositories as OWL ontologies. Their approaches integrate different artifact sources to 
facilitate everyday repository mining activities. Kiefer et al. presented EvoOnt [46], an 
integration of a code ontology model, a bug ontology model, and a version ontology model used 
to detect bad code smells and extract data for visualizing changes in code over time. Iqbal et al. 
presented their Linked Data Driven Software Development (LD2SD) methodology [47] to 
provide RDF-based access to JIRA bug trackers, Subversion, developer blogs, and project 
mailing lists. Wursch et al. presented SEON [34], a family of ontologies that describe many 
different facets of a software’s lifecycle. SEON is unique in that it comprises of multiple 
abstraction layers.  
Like SEON, our approach organizes ontologies in consecutive layers of abstractions with 
clear representational purpose. We also extend existing source code ontologies and introduce a 
taxonomy for describing dependency management semantics. Due to the uniform RDF format 
used by these approaches, we can envision interesting interactions among our semantics-aware 
analysis and ontologies introduced by others. Such extensions could lead to an entirely new 
family of software analysis services or at least simplify the implementation of existing ones. 
3.3 Mining Software Repositories (MSR)  
A software repository commonly refers to a persistent storage location where artifacts related 
to software projects and their development lifecycle are stored. Such repositories are used to 
record daily interactions between the stakeholders, as well as the evolutionary changes to various 
software artifacts. Mining Software Repositories (MSR) is a field of software engineering 
research which aims to analyze and provide additional insights in the data stored in these 
software repositories. The main goal of MSR is to make use of historical data in these 
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repositories and transform it to become actionable data that can support various decision-making 
processes during software development [48]–[51].  Research has shown the importance of MSR 
in software development decision making in several areas including bug identification and 
prediction [52], [53], understanding team dynamics [54], [55], improving user experience [56], 
and code reuse [57]. Table 3.1 provides a general overview of SW repositories and how the MSR 
community uses these repositories to mine them to derive actionable facts. 
Table 3.1: Examples of Software Repositories 
Repository Description Example MSR applications 
Source code 
repositories 
These repositories archive the source code for 
a large number of projects. Sourceforge11 and 
GitHub are examples of such large code 
repositories. 
Source code differencing and analysis [58] 
Factors for successful software reuse [59] 
Inter-project collaboration [60], [61] 
Bug/Issue 
repositories 
These repositories track the resolution history 
of bug reports or feature requests that are 
reported by users and developers of large 
software projects. Bugzilla 12  and Jira 13  are 
examples of bug repositories 
Relationship between bugs/features [62] 
Automated bug assignment [63] 
Archived 
communications 
These repositories track discussions about 
various aspects of a software project 
throughout its lifetime. Mailing lists, emails, 
IRC chats, and instant messages are examples 
of archived communications about a project 
Why developers join and leave a project [54]  
Immigration in open source systems [55] 
Version Control These repositories record the development 
history of a project. They track all the changes 
to the source code along with meta-data about 
each change, e.g., the name of the developer 
who performed the change, the time the 
change was performed and a short message 
describing the change. Source control 
repositories are the most commonly available 
and used repository in software projects. 
GitHub and BitBucket 14  are examples of 
version control repositories which are used in 
practice 
Change prediction [64]–[66] 
Call-usage patterns [67], [68] 
Change patterns [69] 
Characteristics of different types of changes 
[70] 
Incomplete refactoring [71] 
Code search [72]  




13 https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira  







These repositories allow developers to get 
help with their code by posting questions and 
answering each other’s questions. They keep 
track of all questions and answers, as well as 
meta-data about users and votes. 
StackOverflow and CodeProject 15  are 
examples of programming Q&A repositories. 
Predicting how long a question will remain 
unsolved [74]  
Finding a good code example [75] 
Study on personality traits of Q&A users [76]  
Developer interactions (Wang, Lo, and Jiang 
2013; Barua, Thomas, and Hassan 2014) 
 
3.4 Build Systems and Dependency Management 
Build systems transform the source code of a software system into deliverables. There are 
several build technologies available for developers, and they adopt different design paradigms 
[79]. The four most common build paradigms as defined by [80] are: 
i. Low-level technologies. These require explicitly defined dependencies between each 
input and output file (e.g., Make16, Ant17). 
ii. Abstraction-based technologies. These use high-level abstractions to automatically 
generate low-level build specifications; this addresses the portability flaw faced by 
platform-specific low-level technologies (e.g., CMake18). 
iii. Framework-driven technologies. These favor build conventions over configuration. 
Such build technologies assume that if projects abide by these conventions, then build 
behavior can be inferred automatically (e.g., Maven). 
iv. Dependency management technologies. These support the three above paradigms by 
automatically managing external API dependencies. This offers the advantage of 
users no longer needing to manually install all required versions of libraries (e.g., 
Ivy19). 
Despite the different design paradigms, all build systems capture the build process – a 
process by which software can be incrementally rebuilt, allowing developers to focus on making 
source code changes rather than having to worry about managing a project’s build dependencies. 
Build processes can be split into four steps [79]. First, a set of user or environment features is 
 
15 https://www.codeproject.com/  
16 https://www.gnu.org/software/make/ 
17 https://ant.apache.org/  
18 https://cmake.org/  
19 https://ant.apache.org/ivy/  
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selected during the configuration step. Next, the construction step executes the compiler; code 
transformation commands that produce deliverables are executed in an order such that 
dependencies among them are not violated. The certification step follows automatically 
executing tests to ensure that the produced deliverables have not regressed. Finally, the 
packaging step bundles certified deliverables together with required libraries, documentation, 
and data files. These steps and information on all needed dependencies are defined in one or 
multiple build files and stored in specialized build repositories to facilitate reuse and sharing. 
The most popularly used build repositories for open source projects include Maven Central, npm, 
PyPi20, and RubyGems. 
Since transforming source code into a usable artifact is the main goal of build systems, 
source code evolution may act as a catalyst to the evolution and maintenance of build systems. 
Adams et al. [81], [82] and Godfrey et al. [83] studied the static evolution of the Linux kernel 
build system, which is implemented using make. They found that the Linux kernel build system 
is growing exponentially in terms of the Build Lines of Code (BLOC). Furthermore, the build 
and source code appear to grow together or shrink together, suggesting that source code and 
build system co-evolve. McIntosh et al. [84] further show that this co-evolution imposes an 
overhead on the development process. They examine how frequently source code changes 
require build changes and the proportion of developers responsible for build maintenance. Their 
results indicate that build changes induce more churn on the build system than source code 
changes induce on the source code. Furthermore, build maintenance yields up to a 27% overhead 
on source code development and a 44% overhead on test development, with up to 79% of source 
code developers and 89% of test code developers significantly being impacted by build 
maintenance. 
Although source code and build systems co-evolve together, due to the complex nature of 
build systems, it is still difficult to identify when source code changes require accompanying 
build changes (build co-changes). McIntosh et al. [6] mined random forest classifiers from 
historical data using language-agnostic and language-specific code change characteristics to 
explain when code-accompanying build changes are necessary. Their results suggest that most 
C++ build changes and at least the code-related Java build changes can indeed be predicted using 
 
20 https://pypi.org/  
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characteristics of corresponding changes to source and test code. Xia et al. [7] also propose an 
approach which predicts when such build co-changes are necessary. Their approach, however, 
also considers the “cold-start” problem for new projects when there exists only a limited number 
of changes which can be mined. They use training data from other projects to predict build co-
changes in a new project (transfer learning).  
Beyond the study of build evolution and maintenance, several researchers have demonstrated 
how mining build repositories can benefit a variety of software tasks such as: identifying license 
compliance inconsistencies; identifying build cloning; and automatic library recommendation 
and migration. In [5], the authors proposes an approach to construct and analyze the system calls 
that occur at build-time to study license violations. A concrete build dependency graph is created 
by tracing OS calls made by the build tools during execution. This makes it easy to identify 
which source files are being used, which external components are called and how the code and 
components are combined. Through labeling each source file node in the graph with its 
corresponding license, license violations can be identified. 
McIntosh et al. [8] study how much cloning occurs in build systems and whether these clones 
are affected by technology choices. They gauge cloning rates in build systems by collecting and 
analyzing a benchmark comprising 3,872 build systems. Their results reveal that build systems 
tend to have higher cloning rates than other software artifacts, and recent build technologies are 
often more prone to cloning, especially the configuration details like API dependencies, 
compared to older technologies. 
Another interesting application of build system knowledge is in automatic library 
recommendation and migration. With the growing rate at which third-party libraries are reused, 
dependency management has become a feature adopted in most current build systems. However, 
they lack support for library recommendations that would guide developers in selecting which 
library (and its version) to be used. Mileva et al. [2] propose an approach which uses historic 
trends of library usages within the Maven Central repository to recommend the most commonly 
used library as the most suitable to adopt. Teyton et al. [16] mine the Maven Central repository 
to build migration graphs for different categories of libraries. With these graphs, one can quickly 
identify which libraries are the best candidates to migrate to. When recommending library 
adoptions and migrations, backward compatibility becomes a very desirable trait. One way to 
inform library users of the level of compatibility of a library is through its version number – a 
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major.minor.patch versioning scheme suggested by semantic versioning21. Raemaekers et al. 
[85] analyze a dataset of 150,000 Maven libraries to determine if these versioning numbering 
rules are adhered to. Their results show that there has been only a marginal increase in the 
adoption of this scheme over time. The impact of not adopting these versioning rules is 
highlighted by their results; a third of all releases introduce at least one breaking change. The 
authors concluded that version numbers currently do not provide developers with enough 
information on the stability of library interfaces. 
As discussed earlier, build systems are an essential part of software systems. Among others, 
they control variability and manage configurations, deciding which files and features to include 
in the compiled product. Many tools have been introduced to extract this configuration 
knowledge to analyze and maintain highly configurable systems. However, with the increasing 
number of configuration options and complexity of build systems, build scripts become also 
more complex; making it harder to understand, analyze and maintain a build system. In this 
section, we discuss related research approaches which focus on the extraction and analysis of 
configuration in build systems in terms of file presence conditions and conditional parameters. 
Most of the reviewed analysis approaches are dynamic; they derive their analysis data from 
the execution of the build scripts. For example, van der Burg et al. [5] dynamically detect which 
files are included in a build to check license compatibility, Metamorphosis [86] dynamically 
analyzes build system to migrate them, and MkFault [87] combines runtime information with 
some structural analysis to localize build faults. However, such dynamic approaches can only 
analyze file presence conditions of one configuration at a time. While a dynamic analysis which 
involves the execution of all possible configurations would yield accurate variability 
information, such an approach does not scale. 
Alternatively, researchers have also applied different types of static analysis on build files. 
SYMake [88] uses symbolic execution to conservatively analyze all possible executions of a 
Makefile. This approach produces a symbolic dependency graph, which represents all possible 
build rules and dependencies among targets and prerequisites, as well as recipe commands. This 
approach can be used to detect different types of errors in Makefiles and help to build refactoring 





option once. Their approach is simple due to its sampling nature, but incomplete; it cannot 
recover complex conditions with several disjunctions and negations. Using a different strategy, 
both Berger et al. [90] and Nadi and Holt [91] have tried to statically approximate file presence 
conditions by detecting specific patterns in build scripts used in Linux’s Kbuild infrastructure. 
These approaches achieve relatively high precision for the Linux kernel but are unable to cope 
with build files (or parts thereof) that do not follow these patterns. [92] work builds on SYMake; 
they are specifically interested in extracting variability information in terms of file presence 
conditions and conditional parameters. In their approach, the authors’ use symbolic execution 
which does not rely on sampling or specific patterns. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we provided background information for core technologies and concepts used 
in our research and reviewed the existing research in these areas. We will frequently refer to this 
chapter in subsequent chapters.  
In the next chapter, we discuss in more detail the knowledge engineering process we applied 
to create our unified ontological representation for build and dependency management semantics. 
This unified representation provides us with the foundation for our seamless integration of 





Chapter 4  
4 A Unified Ontology-based Modeling 
Approach for Software Build and 
Dependency Repositories 
 
As mentioned before, the overall goal of this thesis is to introduce a novel semantic software 
build and dependency knowledge model, which allows for knowledge integration with other 
software artifacts and supports novel knowledge-driven dependency analysis services. More 
specifically, we introduce an ontology for the domain of build and dependency management 
systems which supports reasoning and inferencing of new knowledge. In addition, the 
expressiveness and flexibility of our ontology allows for knowledge reuse and sharing, and a 
seamless integration of build dependency knowledge into existing SE development tasks.  
In this chapter, we explain the knowledge engineering methodology which we applied to the 
construction of our unified knowledge model and the design decisions we made to address some 
of the open research challenges identified in our research motivation (Chapter 2). 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Section 3.4, build systems adopt different design paradigms, structures, and 
syntax to transform source code using user-defined build processes. Common to these build 
systems is a set of core semantics. One of the main objectives of this research is to abstract and 
formally model the domain of build and dependency management in a technology-independent 
representation. In this chapter we introduce a semi-automated approach for the development of a 
software build dependency domain ontology, which is based on the discovery, reuse, and 
integration of knowledge from existing build repositories. More specifically, our methodology 
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takes advantage of SW technologies to provide a standardized and unified representation of build 
dependency semantics. The proposed model adheres to the following design criteria proposed by 
[93], [94]. 
• Unambiguous Semantics. The primary motivation for using ontologies over other 
modeling approaches is to enrich information with semantics. The absence of clear 
semantics may lead otherwise to diverging interpretations of intended meaning. 
Formalism, through defining concepts with logical axioms, is the means to this end. 
To the best of our knowledge, there exists currently no semantic vocabulary for 
describing build and dependency management systems; the presented knowledge 
model in this thesis is the first formal semantic vocabulary developed for the build 
and dependency management domain. 
• Extendibility. Our model design considers easy extensibility of our ontologies; the 
addition of new concepts does not require the revision of the existing definitions.   
• Reasoning and Inferencing. Our ontology design provides support for basic semantic 
reasoning and inferencing (e.g., RDFS++ reasoning). The model supports different 
types of reasoning within and across the ontology in order to support a seamless 
integration of knowledge resources at different abstraction levels. Instead of building 
our model based on general inferencing, we use lightweight reasoning such as Open 
World Assumption, classification, transitivity and consistency. These, compared to 
general inferencing sustain the scalability and tractability of our model [93]. Details 
of the reasoning capabilities supported by our model can be found in Chapters 5 to 7. 
 
4.2 Software Build System ONtology (SBSON): 
Knowledge Modeling and Engineering 
Different knowledge engineering methodologies have been discussed in the literature (e.g., 
Noy et al. [95], Van der Vet et al. [96], and Uschold et al. [97]. Noy et al. [95], in their 
knowledge-engineering approach for ontology development, proposed the following seven core 
steps: (1) determining the domain and scope of the ontology, (2) considering the reuse of existing 
26 
 
ontologies, (3) enumerating essential terms in the ontology, (4) defining the classes and class 
hierarchy, (5) defining the properties of class-slots, (6) defining the facets of the slots, and (7) 
creating instances. Van der Vet et al. [96] proposed a bottom-up approach for building 
ontologies. Their approach depends on atomism, that is, the idea that objects are composed of 




Figure 4.1: An overview of our knowledge modeling methodology. 
 
Our methodology which consist of five major steps (Figure 4.1), is based on the methodology 
introduced by Noy et al. [95] and a bottom-up knowledge modeling approach similar to the one 
used by Van der Vet et al. [96]. We first perform a manual review of the documentation from 
selected build and dependency management systems and their repository structure to identify and 
extract concepts and properties used by the individual build dependency management systems. 
Next, in Step 2, we manually inspect these extracted concepts and properties for each build 
system to derive an initial version of the corresponding system-specific ontologies. After 
creating these system-specific ontologies, Step 3 uses a bottom-up approach to identify and 
extract shared concepts and attributes from these system-specific ontologies into different layers 
of abstraction (upper ontologies). We then further refined and enriched the initial design of these 
ontologies, by adding additional relations and properties, to have a model semantics which is rich 












































































































































































































































































































populate, in Step 4, these newly created knowledge model with facts from projects published in 
open source build repositories. Finally, during the last step of our methodology, we evolve our 
ontologies with new build and dependency management systems and concepts as they become 
available. 
The outcome of this modeling process is a comprehensive ontology that captures the domain 
of build and dependency knowledge. The final layered model is based on a meta-meta model 
approach (e.g., Object Management Group (OMG)22), where the top layer captures the core 
elements, which are extended and refined throughout the abstraction hierarchy. Figure 4.2 
presents an overview of the different ontology abstraction layers in SBSON. For a complete 
description of these ontologies, we refer the reader to [98]. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: An overview of the different ontology abstraction layers in SBSON. 
 
Within our knowledge hierarchy, the General Concepts layer captures the omnipresent core 
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General Concepts layer and captures concepts that span across several subdomains in our model 
(e.g., vulnerability databases, version control systems, and source code). Concepts within this 
layer are introduced in later chapters when other SE knowledge sources are integrated with 
SBSON. The concepts at the Domain-Specific layer are common to resources in a domain, such 
as software build and dependency concept. Finally, the System-Specific layer’s concepts 
represent knowledge that is specific to a given data source or system and not commonly shared 
across the domain. In Chapters 5 to 8, we discuss in detail how SBSON can be integrated with 
other SE knowledge sources such as source code, version control systems, and vulnerability 
databases. In what follows, we describe in detail the five major knowledge modeling steps which 
we applied in our approach.  
4.2.1 Step 1: Acquisition of Dependency Semantics 
Most build systems are based on a formalized syntax and structure, which can be further 
customized through configurations. With this in mind, we conducted a survey of three (3) 
popular Java build management systems from different vendors which make use of the same 
build repository, Maven Central, to store and resolve project dependencies. We are especially 
interested in finding how different dependency management features are implemented in each 
studied system. An overview of these three systems is provided in Table 4.1 and general 
statistics of the Maven Central repository is provided in Table 4.2. It should be noted that, 
although we only studied systems which utilize the Maven Central repository, our knowledge 
modelling approach provides the flexibility to extend and evolve our ontologies with different 
build systems and repositories. Details of our ontology evolution step can be found in Section 
4.2.5. 
Table 4.1: Overview of the 3 studied build and dependency management systems 
ID Name Vendor 
Default 
repository 







S1 Ivy (with Ant) Apache 
Maven 
Central 
YES YES YES NO Latest version 
S2 Gradle Gradle YES YES YES YES Latest version 





Table 4.2: General statistics of the Maven Central repository 
Repository Identification Scheme # Projects # Releases Snapshot Date 
Maven Central groupID-artifactId-version 279,853 3,687,307 2019-May-07 
 
While the surveyed systems support dependency management features such as transitivity, 
dependency filters (exclusions), and version ranges, only Maven (S3) and Gradle (S2) support 
dependency scopes. Furthermore, because the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is unable to 
differentiate between multiple API versions in a project’s class-path, different conflict resolution 
techniques are used by the analyzed systems. For example, S1 and S2 choose (by default) during 
version conflict resolution always the latest version of a dependency, while S3 automatically 
selects the dependency version closest to the project’s root definition (the version with the least 
transitive depth). 
Among other features supported by these systems are multi-module projects and inheritance 
of dependency configuration from parent projects.   
4.2.2 Step 2: Initial System-Specific Ontologies  
Next, we manually identify and extract dependency related concepts and attribute definitions 
from the schemata and their documentation to create system-specific ontologies for each system. 
Figure 4.3 shows an overview of the three system-specific ontologies we extracted. 
 













































A main challenge we had to deal with during this analysis step was to identify and resolve 
the differences in syntax and structure of similar concepts and properties in the three systems. 
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4 illustrate examples of such representation differences for version ranges 
and dependency definitions. As shown in Table 4.3, different symbols are used by Ivy and 
Maven when defining open and half-open intervals23 for version ranges. For example, Ivy uses 
“]” to declare an open minimum version while Maven uses “(“.  
In the next section, we describe our knowledge modeling approach which we used to remove 
some of this ambiguity while extracting a domain (upper) ontology from the lower level system 
ontologies. 







Exact version 1.0 Same as Ivy Same as Ivy 
all versions greater than 1.0 ]1.0,) (1.0,) Same as Maven 
all versions greater or equal to 1.0 [1.0,) Same as Ivy Same as Ivy 
all versions lower or equal to 2.0 (,2.0] Same as Ivy Same as Ivy 
all versions lower than 2.0 (,2.0[ (,2.0) Same as Maven 
all versions greater than 1.0 and lower than 2.0 ]1.0,2.0[ (1.0,2.0) Same as Maven 
all versions greater than 1.0 and lower or equal to 2.0 ]1.0,2.0] (1.0,2.0] Same as Maven 
all versions greater or equal to 1.0 and lower than 2.0 [1.0,2.0[ [1.0,2.0) Same as Maven 
all versions greater or equal to 1.0 and lower or equal to 2.0 [1.0,2.0] Same as Ivy Same as Ivy 
all revisions starting with '1.0.' (e.g., 1.0.1, 1.0.a) 1.0.+ n/a Same as Ivy 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Example of syntax and structural differences between Maven (left) and Gradle (right) 
dependency definitions 
 
23 Open intervals do not include the declared minimum and maximum allowed versions of a dependency during 
dependency resolution; half-open intervals include only one of the declared range endpoints.  
 
Excluding a transitive dependency
defining a dependency
Scope of a dependency
<dependency>
     <groupId>org.apache.camel</groupId>
     <artifactID>camel-jaxb</artifactId>
     <version>${camel-version}</version>
     <scope>test</scope>
     <exclusions>
          <exclusion>
               <groupId>org.apache.camel</groupId>
               <artifactID>camel-jaxb</artifactId>
          </exclusion>
     </exclusions>
</dependency>
dependencies
     compile( com.example.m:m:1.0    
          exclude group:  org.unwanted   
module:  x 
     }




4.2.3 Step 3: Ontology Abstraction and Refinement 
In this step of our knowledge modeling approach we use the extracted system-specific 
ontologies to abstract a software build-dependency domain ontology. This domain ontology 
promotes knowledge reuse through the identification of shared concepts and properties. It also 
allows for the linking of system-level ontologies with each other via the abstracted shared 
concepts and properties found in the domain ontology. 
 More specifically, this step identifies any concept or property that can be promoted from the 
System-specific to the Domain-specific layer of our knowledge model. For example, concepts 
related to transitive dependencies, dependency filtering, and version ranges can be promoted to 
the Domain-specific layer since they are shared among all three system-specific ontologies. The 
Domain-specific layer not only promotes such reuse of concepts across system level ontologies, 
but also improves traceability among system level ontologies by unifying the overall knowledge 
representation.  
Although the identification of shared concepts can be considered somewhat as a 
straightforward task, reasoning capabilities are important requisites for inferring new knowledge 
and creating traceability links between domain and system-level ontologies. 
In what follows, we describe in detail how we enrich our domain and system-specific 
ontologies with OWL reasoning capabilities (provided by the SW) and existing ontology design 
patterns. More specifically, we describe the modeling of (1) dependency links, (2) order of 
project releases, (3) version ranges, (4) dependency exclusions, and (5) transitive dependencies. 
It should be noted that in order to improve the readability, we use prefixes as substitutes to the 
fully qualified names of our ontologies. The ontology prefixes used in this chapter can be 
dereferenced using the URIs shown in Appendix A. 
4.2.3.1 Modeling Dependency Links 
Problem. As shown in Figure 4.5(a), a defined dependency between any two project releases 
can have additional associated characteristics such as the version range of the dependency and a 
list of excluded transitive dependencies. Since OWL does not natively support the definition of 





Solution. To address this challenge, we adopt the property reification design pattern24.  In the 
following, we illustrate the use of the property reification pattern to model facts about the 
dependency relation between two project releases.  
We introduce the <sbson:DependencyLink> concept to represent the dependency link 
between a source (with the <sbson:hasDependencySource> property) and a target (with the 
<sbson:hasDependencyTarget> property). The <sbson:DependencyLink> concept provides us 
with the flexibility of defining dependency-specific version ranges and exclusions as shown in 
Figure 4.5(b). This reification design approach provides us with an extensible and expressive 
modeling that can capture different characteristics of project dependency links. However, since a 
dependency is now modelled by the <sbson:DependencyLink> class, transitive reasoning on 
dependencies is no longer supported by default. We mitigate this problem by adding custom 
rules (explained in detail in section 4.2.3.5) which deduce transitive reasoning from the 
reification design pattern. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: An illustration of (a) generic dependency between two releases, and (b) how property 
reification pattern is adopted in modeling dependency links 
 
4.2.3.2 Modeling the Order of Project Releases 
Problem. Software libraries use version numbers to uniquely identify their releases. These 
version numbers are assigned in an incremental order to define the order of releases and indicate 
backward compatibility (semantic versioning). In the context of dependency management, 
knowing the order of project releases is necessary for resolving dependencies related to version 















Solution. We address this challenge by reusing the existing OrderedList Ontology25 to model 
projects and the order of their releases. The OrderedList ontology, illustrated in Figure 4.6(a) 
consists of the <olo:OrderedList> and <olo:Slot> concepts. An ordered list is composed of a 
number of slots (using the <olo:slot> property). Items in an ordered list are associated to slots by 
the <olo:item> property and are accessed using the <olo:next> iterator property. Data properties 
such as <olo:length>  and <olo:index> are used to represent the total number of slots in the list 
and the index of each slot respectively.  
Figure 4.6(b) illustrates our extension of the OrderedList ontology which assigns one ordered 
list to each project. The multiple releases of a project are subsequently ordered by assigning them 
as items to slots of the project’s ordered list. Figure 4.6(c) shows an example of a project with 
three ordered releases.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: (a) The OrderedList Ontology, (b) how we model the order of project releases with 
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4.2.3.3 Modeling Version Ranges 
Problem. Manually upgrading dependencies is a tedious work, especially for projects which 
depend on frequently updated libraries. Version ranges are a measure, supported by several build 
and dependency management systems, designed to enable developers to automatically upgrade 
their dependencies without having to adjust the version number in their build file every single 
time a new version of the dependency is released. However, as introduced in Section 4.2.2, build 
and dependency management systems define version ranges with different syntaxes. 
 
Solution. Figure 4.7 shows the integration of concepts from Figures 4.5(b) and 4.6(b) to 
create an effective and flexible model of dependency version ranges in our domain layer. The 
<sbson:VersionRange> concept uses data properties such as <sbson:exactVersion>, 
<sbson:lowerThanVersion>, and <sbson:greaterThanVersion> to represent the version range of a 




Figure 4.7: Concepts used to model and reason on dependency version ranges 
 
4.2.3.4 Modeling Dependency Exclusions (Filtering) 
Problem. Dependency exclusion is a feature provided by most dependency management 
tools as a way of dependency mediation. It enables users to explicitly exclude specific transitive 
dependencies when building a project. Such dependency exclusions can occur at two different 
levels: per-dependency or per-configuration/module. The configuration/module exclusion scope 
makes it possible to exclude a transitive dependency completely from all dependencies during 
the project build phase. The per-dependency scope only excludes a transitive dependency for the 















dependency. Ivy and Gradle provide support for both whiles Maven supports per-dependency 










Figure 4.8: Transitive exclusion at per-dependency scope 
 
Figure 4.8 shows an example of a per-dependency exclusion. Project ‘A’ defines a 
dependency on ‘B’ but excludes the transitive dependency on ‘E’. This means that during the 
build of ‘A’, project ‘E’ would be excluded from the transitive dependencies of ‘B’. When one 
wants to query for all transitive dependencies of ‘A’, the result should be {B, C, and D}. Since 
exclusions are dependency specific, the query results should be project specific. For example, 
querying the transitive dependencies of ‘B’ should give {D and E} because ‘E’ is not excluded in 
any of B’s dependency definitions. 
 
Solution. Like the approach used in modeling dependency version ranges, we again use 
<sbson:DependencyLink> concept from the property reification pattern (see Figure 4.5(b)) to 
define any dependency-level exclusions on projects or releases through the 
<sbson:excludesProject> and <sbson:excludesRelease> properties. Figure 4.9 shows an 
overview of the concepts and relationships involved in this refined model design.  
 








In what follows, we describe how direct and transitive dependencies that can be inferred 
using the dependency version ranges and exclusions design we have presented so far. 
4.2.3.5 Reasoning on Direct and Transitive Dependencies 
Problem. As discussed in Section 4.2.3.3 and 4.2.3.4, traditional build and dependency 
management systems allow developers to specify a version range for direct dependencies and 
exclude unwanted transitive dependencies. This possibility of version ranges and excluded 
transitive dependencies in a project’s definition makes the automatic resolution of direct and 
transitive dependencies a non-trivial task. Our modelling approach, using semantic rules and 
ontology design patterns, offloads much of this challenge (reasoning about dependency 
resolution) to the SW reasoners. However, as introduced in Section 4.2.3.1, modelling 
dependency links as an OWL class instead of a property removes the standard support for 
transitive reasoning on dependencies. 
 
Solution. We introduce custom SWRL rules which take advantage of the scalable reasoning 
services (e.g., RDFS, RDFS++) provided by the SW stack to reason on dependency resolution. 
To distinguish between direct and inferred transitive dependencies, we introduce two new 
properties, <sbson:hasDirectDependencyOn> and <sbson:hasTransitiveDependencyOn>. In what 
follows, we describe in detail the rules we created that allow us to reason on direct dependencies 
based on version ranges, and transitive dependencies. 
Direct Dependency Reasoning. To allow for the automatic resolution of direct dependencies 
in our approach, we define three (3) rules which infer the correct instance of a dependency 
version to assign as the range of the <sbson:hasDirectDependencyOn> property. The rules are 
based on the following version ranges:  exact versions (Figure 4.10), versions lower than a 
specified value (Figure 4.11), and versions greater than a specified value (Figure 4.12). The rules 
take advantage of the ordered list pattern (see Figure 4.6(b)) and the dependency link reification 
pattern (see Figure 4.5(b)) to allow for the inference of the final dependency version to be used. 
Transitive Dependency Reasoning. The goal of this reasoning service is to provide flexible 
and scalable inference of transitive dependencies in the absence or presence of dependency 





hasCar(?p, ?c) → CarlessPerson(?p) are not allowed. Only individuals with an explicit OWL 
axiom stating that they have no car can be safely concluded to be without a car: Person(?p) ^ 
(hasCar = 0)(?p) → CarlessPerson(?p). Therefore, to reason about the absence or presence of 
dependency exclusions, a <sbson:hasNumberOfExclusions> data property is assigned to the 
<sbson:DependencyLink> concept to store the total number of excluded dependencies defined 
for a given project dependency. Using this property, our rules in Figures 4.13 and 4.14 infer 











hasDependencySource(?link, ?release1),  
hasDependencyTarget(?link, ?project2),  
hasVersionRange(?link, ?range),  
exactVersion(?range, ?version),  
hasRelease(?project2, ?release2),  
hasVersionNumber(?release2, ?version) 
→ hasDirectDependencyOn(?release1, ?release2). 


















hasDependencySource(?link, ?release1),  
hasDependencyTarget(?link, ?project2),  
hasVersionRange(?link, ?range),  
lowerThanVersion(?range, ?version),  
hasRelease(?project2, ?release),  
hasVersionNumber(?release, ?version),  
hasOrderedList(?project2, ?list),  
slot(?list, ?slot1),  
slot(?list, ?slot2),  
item(?slot1, ?release), 
item(?slot2, ?release2),   
index(?slot1, ?index1),  
index(?slot2, ?index2),  
swrlb:substract(?index2, ?index1, 1),   
→ hasDirectDependencyOn(?release1, ?release2). 






















hasDependencySource(?link, ?release1),  
hasDependencyTarget(?link, ?project2),  
hasVersionRange(?link, ?range),  
greaterThanVersion(?range, ?version),  
hasRelease(?project2, ?release),  
hasVersionNumber(?release, ?version),  
hasOrderedList(?project2, ?list),  
length(?list, ?len), 
slot(?list, ?slot1),  
slot(?list, ?slot2),  
item(?slot1, ?release), 
item(?slot2, ?release2),   
index(?slot1, ?index1),  
index(?slot2, ?len),  
swrlb:greaterThan(?len, ?index1),   
→ hasDirectDependencyOn(?release1, ?release2). 








hasDependencySource(?link, ?release1),  
hasDependencyTarget(?link, ?release2),  
dependsOn(?release2, ?release3),  
hasNumberOfExclusions(?link, 0)  
→ hasTransitiveDependencyOn (?release1, ?release3). 












hasDependencySource(?l, ?r1),  
hasDependencyTarget(?l, ?r2),  
dependsOn(?r2, ?r3),  
hasNumberOfExclusions(?link, ?exclusions),  
swrlb:greaterThan(?exclusions, 0), 
excludesProject(?l, ?p1),  
hasRelease(?p2, ?r3),  
owl:differentFrom(?p1, ?p2)  
→ hasTransitiveDependencyOn (?r1, ?r3). 
Figure 4.14: Inferring hasTransitiveDependencyOn in the presence of exclusions 
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4.2.3.6 A Unified Knowledge Representation 
The result of our modeling process is SBSON, which describes knowledge from build and 
dependency management systems using different levels of modeling abstraction. Figure 4.15 
shows the core concepts and object properties of our model. It should be noted that data 
properties have been omitted to improve the readability of the figure.  
 
 
Figure 4.15: Overview of the concepts and (object) properties in the unified SBSON family of 
ontologies 
 
A key concept in our knowledge model is the <sbson:BuildRelease> (domain-specific level), 
which is a subclass of the <main:Release> concept (general layer). Build releases model 














































































specific level). These build releases are stored in online build repositories such as Maven 
Central. Multiple releases of a project are ordered using Slots in an <olo:OrderedList> (domain-
spanning level). In our modeling approach, build releases define their dependencies on other 
releases using a <sbson:DependencyLink> (domain-specific level). Special characteristics of a 
dependency link are represented using the <sbson:VersionRange> and 
<sbson:DependencyScope>, both being domain-specific concepts, and the 
<sbson:DependencyType> concept at the system level. Scope of dependencies, as well as the 
dependency types are specific to a build system and are therefore modeled in the individual 
system ontologies. 
4.2.4 Step 4: Ontology Population 
In this step, we describe how the knowledge extracted from the Maven Central Repository is 
automatically transformed into semantic triples based on the RDF framework. The 
transformation and population process relies on the generation of unique, de-referenceable and 
HTTP-resolvable URIs for the resulting triples. 
Figure 4.16 shows an example for a triple that is generated for an instance of a direct project 
dependency. Each generated URI contains a base URI, followed by the SBSON layer, 
knowledge version, and ontology to which that fact belongs. This is followed by the annotation 
ID; the annotation ID identifies whether a given URI represents a semantic type (e.g., 




Figure 4.16: Anatomy of the URI of a generated triple 
4.2.5 Step 5: Ontology Evolution 
The last step of our methodology reflects the fact that that our knowledge modelling 









layer versioning ontology annotation ID
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management systems are included in our knowledge model. The addition of new system-specific 
ontologies can lead to changes in the existing abstracted domain ontology. In addition to the 
inclusion of new concepts and properties to the domain ontology to capture new dependency 
management features and semantics, there is the possibility that existing domain concepts and 
properties will be demoted to the lower layer. As discussed earlier, a key benefit of using 
ontologies is that they are can be extended as relationships and concept matching are easy to add 
to existing ontologies. As a result, ontologies can evolve with the growth of data without 
impacting dependent processes and systems if something goes wrong or needs to be changed. 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we presented an approach for developing an ontology-based knowledge 
model for build and dependency management systems (SBSON). Our approach allows us to 
reconcile and integrate heterogeneous build system facts from several build systems. Our 
knowledge modeling approach takes advantage of OWL reasoning capabilities as well as 
existing ontology design patterns to abstract and reuse concepts across system level ontologies, 
while at the same time improving knowledge integration and reuse.  
In the following chapters we describe how we integrated SBSON with other SE knowledge 
sources (e.g., source code, vulnerability databases, version control, and software licenses) to 
provide a comprehensive, interlinked knowledge base that allows for novel types of analysis 






Chapter 5  
5 A Semantic Web Enabled Approach for 




Global code reuse, through libraries and components developed by third-parties or the open 
source community, has become an essential aspect of today’s software development processes 
[2], [16]. However, as these libraries evolve to accommodate new features, bug fixes, and 
general code improvements, some of these library changes (often referred to as breaking 
changes) may break already established contracts, leading to errors and requiring rework in client 
applications. These library incompatibilities can also cause a ripple effect within a software 
ecosystem, requiring code changes in dependent client projects within the ecosystem to mitigate 
the impacts of these breaking changes.  
For library consumers, analyzing direct dependencies used in a project reveals often only the 
tip of the iceberg; most of the complexity and challenges in analyzing breaking changes are 
caused by transitive dependencies. For example, in Figure 5.1, since P1 (unknown to the 
developer) depends on multiple versions of P2, there is a potential of unexpected runtime failures 
if the versions of P2 are backward-incompatible. Being aware of who and how client projects use 
their API can help library producers make better choices when dealing with breaking changes 
(e.g., API producers of P2 can analyze the potential impact of API changes on clients such as P1 




Figure 5.1: The hidden complexity of breaking changes due to transitive dependencies 
 
Previous studies have shown that breaking changes are frequent, and that many library 
producers and consumers are aware of this fact [99]–[102]. Several solutions have been proposed 
to help mitigate the impact of breaking changes. From a library producer’s perspective, different 
strategies can be adopted to either shift or delay the cost associated with API changes. A study 
by [18] on the Eclipse, Node.js/npm, and R/CRAN ecosystems identified four major strategies: 
maintaining old interfaces, having parallel releases, release planning, and communication with 
users. The strategy adopted by individual ecosystems is dependent on its overall development 
objective and the cost associated with applying a mitigation strategy. For example, in the Eclipse 
community, developers prefer to incur higher cost to maintain Eclipse’s backward-compatibility 
with older releases; developers can extend interfaces by creating new interfaces and deprecate 
older interfaces without having to remove them [18]. However, each mitigation strategy has its 
own challenges, such as incurring additional maintenance overhead or introducing opportunity 
costs (technical debt). Also, the potential impact of a breaking change on library consumers plays 
an important factor when deciding on a mitigation strategy.  
Similarly, different approaches for consumers of software libraries have been introduced to 


































using lexical comparison of method signatures [99], [103]). In case there are differences, 
attempts can be made to reconcile these differences by comparing if the new functionality in a 
library is a code clone of previous functionality [104]; identifying how a library’s use of its API 
has changed [105]; identifying how other developers have migrated their code or test suites to 
accommodate the API change [106]; and using a combination of these techniques [99]. 
Unfortunately, these reconciliation approaches neither allow library producers to assess the 
impacts of a chosen mitigation strategy on their clients, nor do they provide developers of client 
applications with any support in assessing the potential risks and effort involved in their 
migration tasks.  
In our research, we introduce a novel approach to support API consumers in identifying the 
potential impacts of an API change on their product and for API producers in managing 
(assessing) the impacts of breaking changes on other projects or a complete ecosystem. More 
specifically, we take advantage of the Semantic Web and its technology stack (e.g., ontologies, 
reasoning services) to establish a unified knowledge representation that supports the analysis of 
both direct and indirect (transitive) third-party library usage across thousands of open source 
projects. Much of the flexibility of our approach is based on the use of inference services 
provided by the Semantic Web to infer explicit and implicit knowledge from the knowledge 
base. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach in identifying the impact of breaking changes 
on project dependencies and complete ecosystems, we conducted a case study on Java projects 
available in the Maven ecosystem. Nonetheless, it should be noted that our approach is 
independent of the type of dependency management or programming languages being used.  
5.2 Background 
5.2.1 API Usage and Breaking Changes 
Software libraries take advantage of visibility modifiers (e.g., public and protected in Java) to 
provide reusable and extendable APIs to other applications. However, as these software libraries 
evolve, changes made to their APIs might impact many external clients. Such changes are 
classified into breaking and non-breaking changes [107] as follows:  
• Breaking changes break backward compatibility through removal or modification of API 
elements. Consequently, clients may face compilation errors after updating. Common 
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examples include removal of classes or methods, visibility loss (e.g., public to private), 
and changes to a method’s return type or parameters. 
• Non-breaking changes preserve compatibility among interfaces and usually involve the 
addition of new functionalities to the library. Examples include visibility gain (e.g., 
private to public) and deprecated method removal. 
Although performing a change to a library might be a straightforward task, resulting breaking 
changes can have a significant ripple effect on client projects depending on how the changed API 
is used throughout their project. Certain API usages expose client projects to API changes more 
than others [108]. Wu et al. [108] categorized API usages into API-injection usages and local 
usages. API-injection usages occur when a library’s API becomes part of a client project through 
inheritance, interface implementation, and using reference types as method return types or 
parameter types. For local API usages a library’s API is used within the body of a method. As a 
result, such breaking changes in a library’s API will require changes to any client method that 
directly or transitively uses a modified API. 
5.2.2 Software Evolution ONtologies (SEON) 
 
Figure 5.2: Overview of the SEON pyramid of ontologies [34] 
 
The Software Evolution Ontologies (SEON), introduced by [34], provides a shared taxonomy 
of important software engineering concepts and demonstrates how software evolution knowledge 
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can be adequately represented by means of ontologies. SEON establishes a shared taxonomy for 
explicitly describing relationships among artifacts, and for linking data such as code structures, 
issues (change requests), bugs, and basically any changes made to a system over time. SEON is 
constructed following a bottom-up approach which iteratively abstracts concepts found in 
common software evolution analysis and tools into different layers. Figure 5.2 presents an 
overview of the different layers of SEON.  
 
5.3 A User Survey on the Impact of API Breaking 
Changes 
Prior work on API breaking changes has examined different migration techniques available 
to API consumers (e.g., [103]–[106]).  However, these existing techniques do not address how 
consumers can assess the risk or effort involved when selecting a migration technique or how 
producers can analyze potential impacts of their library changes on a global software ecosystem. 
To gain a better understanding on how API consumers and producers currently deal with the 
impact of breaking changes, we conducted a survey involving open source developers. Survey 
participants were identified by mining developer emails from publicly available projects hosted 
on Maven and GitHub. We manually cleaned the list of emails to ensure that it did not contain 
any educational or organizational emails. We sent an invitation to 1000 randomly selected 
participants from the collected e-mail addresses and received a total of 54 responses, i.e., an 
acceptable response rate of 5.4%, which is in line with response rates reported by other software 
engineering surveys [109]). From, these 54 responses, we excluded one response from our further 
analysis, due to the explicit request of the survey participant, leaving us with 53 survey 
participants. 
 
Survey Design: We designed an online survey that included four main parts. First, we asked 
questions related to a participant’s background and experience. We also asked participants about 
their preferred development ecosystems, the roles they play within it, and their experience with 
breaking changes as either client or producer of software libraries (Table 5.1). Finally, we 
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solicited their views on features which they would consider essential in helping developers to 
identify and manage the impacts of breaking changes. 
Of the 53 survey participants, 42 participants had more than 5 years of development 
experience, 10 respondents had between 1 to 5 years, and 1 responder had less than 1 year of 
experience. 23 participants identified Maven as their preferred ecosystem, 11 participants 
selected NPM, 7 participants chose PyPi, 2 selected Packagist, and 10 participants listed other 
ecosystems.  
As for their role in these ecosystems, 24 participants identified themselves as core 
contributors of software libraries, 22 participants as consumers of libraries, and the remaining 7 
participants have contributed patches to open source libraries. Overall, the participants are quite 
experienced in software development and the use of open source libraries/packages. 
 






# Ecosystem Role # 
< 1 
1 – 2 
2 – 5 




























5.3.1 How often do developers experience breaking changes? 
We asked developers to share their experience on how they have been affected in the past by 
breaking changes (Table 5.2). For direct breaking changes, 55.1% of the participants indicated 
they experience them several times a year and 2% of the participants deal with them several 
times a month. The remaining 42.8% indicated that they were rarely or never exposed to direct 
breaking changes. In a second question, we asked the participants regarding breaking changes 
within transitive dependencies. Among the survey participants, 55.1% have been exposed to 
breaking changes due to transitive dependencies, 12.2% of responders were never impacted, and 
the remaining 32.7% were unsure. 
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Table 5.2: Report on breaking changes experienced by developers 






Several times a month 
Several times a year  















We further asked the participants to describe in an open-ended question, how they discovered 
that a breaking change occurred in their project. 19 out of the 53 participants responded to this 
question. Failing tests and builds (31.6%) and runtime exceptions (26.3%) were the most 
common indicators used for detecting breaking changes caused by transitive dependencies. In 
some cases, the impacts of the breaking changes were only discovered when an application was 
already in production. For example, participant P48 stated that: “We had to update a transitive 
dependency pulled in by some library due to a security vulnerability. After the update, PDF and 
other document formats indexing stopped working. We realized that only in production and took 
some debugging to discover and fix the cause. A unit test was written alongside the fix in order 
to mitigate a possible reoccurrence”. 
5.3.2 What features would developers need for identifying and 
managing the impacts of breaking changes? 
We further asked participants what features they would find useful in helping them to 
identify and manage the impact of these changes. Responses from API consumers show that 
better support for the impact analysis of breaking changes is needed. Among the most striking 
responses are the following statements by participants P17 and P22, describing the need to 
provide better support for API consumers: P17 said, “… I'd like to see that I'm using the 
incompatible interfaces”, and P22 “Version compatibility. Whenever a new library is added to an 
existing system, developers don't know about the impact caused by this library with the other 
libraries which are already in the system […]”. API producers such as participant P11 stated: 
“Prevent releases from making to production unless confirmed by software owners that it's safe.” 
Overall, the responses from our survey participants indicate that developers would like to see 
additional tool support for detecting and analyzing the impact of breaking changes, which leads 
us to formulate the following research questions: 
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• RQ1: For library developers, can knowledge on how their APIs are used by client 
projects be useful for the selection of a breaking change mitigation strategy? 
• RQ2: Can our approach identify incompatibilities within transitive library dependencies 
which might lead to unexpected runtime behavior? 
5.4 Modeling the Impact of API Breaking Changes 
5.4.1 Modeling and Integration of the Source Code Ontology 
A fundamental premise of the Semantic Web is its ability to share and extend existing 
knowledge. Our knowledge modeling approach builds upon this premise by reusing and 
extending existing software engineering ontologies introduced in [34].  
Since some of our proposed API impact analysis requires access to source code information, 
we introduced our Source COde ONtologies (SOCON) which is an extension of SEON’s 
domain-level source code ontology [34]. SOCON introduces additional concepts and properties 
to model API breaking changes and their impact. In addition, we introduced the 
<code:containsCodeEntity> property, and its inverse <code:foundInRelease> property, to link 
project releases in SBSON to their internal code elements in SEON. Using an ontological 
knowledge representation for both build repositories and source code allows for a seamless 
semantic integration of both knowledge resources. In addition, it allows us to take advantage of 
reasoning services provided by the Semantic Web to infer new knowledge. In what follows, we 
present in more details our knowledge model and how this model takes advantage of the 
Semantic Web inference services. 
Figure 5.3 summarizes the main concepts and object properties, found in the four abstraction 
layers of our model used for the impact analysis of API breaking changes. It should be noted that 
data properties have been omitted to improve the readability of the figure. Also, we use prefixes 
as substitutes to the fully qualified names of our ontologies (the prefixes can be dereferenced 




Figure 5.3: Ontologies and concepts involved in API change impact analysis 
 
An important concept in our knowledge model is the <sbson:BuildRelease> concept (located 
at the domain-level of our SBSON ontology), which is a subclass of the Release concept found in 
the general SBSON ontology layer. <sbson:BuildRelease> models distributed releases of 
software projects, where a build release isReleaseOf a <sbson:BuildProject>, and models that a 
project can have several releases. <sbson:BuildRelease> defines its dependencies on other 
releases using <sbson:DependencyLink>. Stakeholders, such as Developers, distribute new 
releases which can lead to <code:ApiChanges>.  
An API change can either be a <code:BreakingChange> or a <code:NonBreakingChange>. 
API changes are detected by comparing <code:CodeEntity> individuals using the 
<code:priorAPI> and <code:currentAPI> relations. Code changes are captured at different entity 






















































































contains all API changes which coexist due to a dependency between API elements. 
Furthermore, our domain level ontology for source code includes a <code:Visibility> concept. In 
most object-oriented programming languages, there exists a mechanism for information-hiding 
exists to control the access to parts of the code (e.g., in Java public, default, protected, and 
private are used to specify the visibility of methods and fields). These visibility modifiers are 
defined in the system-specific (Java) ontology since the semantics of visibility modifiers might 
vary among programming languages. For a complete description of our ontologies, we refer the 
reader to [98]. 
5.4.2 Knowledge Inferencing and Reasoning 
As previously mentioned, the Semantic Web stack provides support for scalable inference on 
big data through its reasoning services (e.g., RDFS, RDFS++). In our work, we take advantage 
of these reasoning services to support different types of dependency analysis and to infer new 
knowledge. In addition, these reasoning services in combination with user-defined queries, allow 
us to replace traditionally proprietary graph and tree traversal implementations used by existing 
analysis tools. In what follows, we describe in more detail how our knowledge model supports 
transitivity and subsumption reasoning.  
 
 Transitive closure inference: In mathematics, the transitive closure of a binary relation R 
on a set X is the smallest relation on X that contains R and is transitive27. For example, if X is a 
set of class methods and x R y, then method x invokes method y. The transitive closure of R on 
X is therefore the relation R+ such that x R+ y, reflecting that method x can call method y 
through several indirect method invocations. Such transitive dependencies can be expressed in 
OWL through the <owl:TransitiveProperty> construct, which we use to define 
<code:invokesMethod> as a transitive property. This transitive property allows us to retrieve a 















  ?method rdf:type code:Method. 
  ?method code:invokesMethod <subjectMethodURI> option(transitive). 
} 
Figure 5.4: SPARQL query returning transitive method calls 
 
Subsumption inference: Another essential aspect of our ontology design is its support for 
subsumption hierarchies between its concepts [110]. For example, a <code:Method> or 
<code:Class> is a sub-concept of <code:CodeEntity>. Subsumption hierarchies add significant 
power to ontologies [33] by comparing the syntactic structure of concept descriptions. Given a 
set of concepts C, the goal of the inference engine is to discover all subsumption relationships 
among pairs of concepts in C.  More formally, we can denote that concept c1 is a sub-concept of 
c2 by c1 ⊆ c2. Subsumption is directional [110]: if c1 ⊆ c2, then c2 !⊆ c1 unless c1 and c2 are 
synonyms.  Similar subsumption can be inferred from OWL properties that can subsume each 
other.  
In our modeling approach, we support subsumption reasoning by creating a hierarchy of 
object properties that capture source code dependencies (Figure 5.5).  
 
Figure 5.5: Hierarchy of code properties 
 
Using the SPARQL query (Figure 5.6), which combines the property hierarchy with 


























  ?entity rdf:type code:CodeEntity. 
  ?entity main:dependsOn <subjectEntityURI> option(transitive). 
} 
Figure 5.6: Query illustrating the dependsOn subsumption inference 
5.5 Case Study 
The overall objective of this section is to illustrate the applicability and flexibility of our 
knowledge model. More specifically, we show how are approach can help both library 
developers and consumers in identifying the impacts of breaking changes within and across 
project boundaries.  
5.5.1 Dataset Description 
For our case study, we take advantage of the Maven ecosystem as our primary dataset, since 
the repository hosts many popular and widely used open source libraries. The Maven repository, 
like other repositories used by build management tools, includes structured dependency and 
version information, which are required for performing API change and usage analysis.  
More specifically, for identifying the impacts of breaking changes, we selected the ASM28 
library, a Java bytecode manipulation library, which is hosted on Maven. We selected ASM for 
our case study, since the library underwent a radical redesign from release 3.X to 4.0. As part of 
this redesign, Release 4.0 introduced several breaking changes (e.g., interfaces were changed to 
abstract classes, breaking previous 3.X API versions). Table 5.3 and 5.4 summarize the details of 
our Maven and ASM datasets.  
Table 5.3: Summary of Maven dataset 







Table 5.4: Summary of ASM dataset 
ASM Project # Releases # Unique Dependencies 
ASM 3.X and older 20 364 
ASM 4.X and newer 13 848 
5.5.2 Results 
In what follows, we report on the results of our case study, which includes for each research 
question, the motivation, the approach being used, and our findings.  
 
RQ1: For library developers, can knowledge on how their APIs are used by client projects 
be useful for the selection of a breaking change mitigation strategy? 
Motivation: As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, library producers adopt different 
strategies to either shift or delay the cost associated with making API changes. For library 
producers to decide on a mitigation strategy, they have to be able to determine the potential 
impact of their API changes on other projects. In particular, since some breaking API changes 
(e.g., interface implementation, inheritance, and using reference types as return or parameter 
types) require a significant effort from API consumers to modify their application design and 
implementation. To reduce the potential impact of these API changes for consumers, library 
producers should be aware of the use of their API in client programs. Being aware of such 
potential impacts of API changes on client systems can guide API producers in selecting an 
appropriate mitigation strategy that reduces the potential impact of such changes to consumer 
systems.  
 
Approach: Figure 5.7 shows the overall methodology we used for our case study, which 
includes extracting and populating facts for breaking changes between different ASM releases 
(using VTracker29), source code of ASM releases and their dependencies, and the complete 
dependency information of the Maven repository. Using the subsumption inference (see Section 
5.4.2), we can now identify how client projects use the changed ASM APIs. We use the query in 














SELECT ?client ?clientEntity ?usageType 
WHERE { 
  ?client main:containsFile ?clientFile. 
  ?clientFile code:containsCodeEntity ?clientEntity. 
  ?clientEntity ?usageType <subjectAPI>. 
} 
Figure 5.8: SPARQL query to identify API usage in client projects 
 
Findings and Discussion: Table 5.5 summarizes the client usages (internal and external) of 
selected ASM APIs for which we identified breaking changes. As our results show, interface 
implementation and class inheritance are among the most common types of API usage types in 
client projects. In contrast, library producers used their own libraries mostly as return types. This 
highlights that library producers and consumers not only use APIs differently, but also selecting 
a breaking change mitigation approach based on the internal API usage is often not enough. As 
the case study illustrates, our modeling approach supports both internal and cross-project 
breaking change and API usage analysis. This additional insight on potential global impacts of 
breaking API changes, can guide API producers to determine potential mitigation strategies (e.g., 
deprecation) and therefore, maintaining their API’s value proposition – the reuse of 








Table 5.5: Summary of External and Internal Usage of selected ASM APIs 







Implement interface 86 6 
Return type 0 24 
ClassAdapter 
Inherit class 44 0 
Return type 0 24 
MethodVisitor 
Implement interface 4 4 
Return type 0 47 
MethodAdapter 
Inherit class 2 0 
Return type 0 47 
 
RQ2: Can our approach identify incompatibilities within transitive library dependencies 
which might lead to unexpected runtime behavior? 
Motivation: As introduced in Section 4.2.1, different build and dependency management 
systems adopt different conflict resolution techniques to deal with multiple versions of a 
dependency in a project. For example, Maven chooses the version of the dependency closest to 
the root of the dependency tree. However, this type of conflict mediation, can lead to potential 
runtime failures, which are not identified during the build or compilation process. Being able to 
identify the use of changed APIs across transitive dependencies allows library consumers to 
avoid some of these unexpected runtime failures. 
 
Approach: As described in Section 5.4.1, the concepts <code:CodeEntity> and 
<code:BreakingCodeChange> are used to represent source code syntax and its semantics. 
<sbson:DependencyLink> using the <sbson:hasDependencyType>, 
<sbson:hasDependencyScope>, and <sbson:hasDependencyExclusion> properties capture the 
dependency between two software libraries. Based on this representation, developers can now 
use (user and predefined) SPARQL queries to analyze whether their application is exposed to 
potential direct and indirect breaking changes. For example, the query in Figure 5.9 identifies all 
projects that are dependent (either direct or transitive) on different versions of the ASM library.  
Although ASM versions may contain binary incompatibilities, the inclusion of these APIs in 
a client project’s build might not automatically result in breaking changes. For these changes to 
become breaking changes, an incompatible API must be invoked. For our analysis, we create 
therefore a static, global call graph to determine if a changed API is (potentially) called by the 











SELECT ?project ?asm1 ?asm2 
WHERE { 
  <…/build.owl#org.ow2.asm:asm> main:hasRelease ?asm1.  
  <…/build.owl#org.ow2.asm:asm> main:hasRelease ?asm2. 
  ?project build:hasDirectDependencyOn ?asm1. 
  ?project build:hasTransitiveDependencyOn ?asm2. 
  FILTER(?asm1 != ?asm2). 
} 



























SELECT ?client ?clientAPIEntity2 ?dependency ?dependencyAPIEntity 
WHERE { 
  #identify use of breaking change entity in client and dependency 
  ?client code:containsCodeEntity ?clientAPIEntity1; code:containsCodeEntity ?clientAPIEntity2. 
  ?clientAPIEntity1 main:dependsOn ?currentAPIElement. 
  ?dependency code:containsCodeEntity ?dependencyAPIEntity. 
  ?dependencyAPIEntity main:dependsOn ?priorAPIElement. 
  ?clientAPIEntity2 main:dependsOn ?dependencyAPIEntity. 
  { 
    SELECT ?client, ?dependency ?asm1, ?asm2 
    WHERE { 
       <…/build.owl#org.ow2.asm:asm> main:hasRelease ?asm1; main:hasRelease ?asm2. 
     ?client build:hasDirectDependencyOn ?asm1; build: hasDirectDependencyOn ?dependency. 
     ?dependency build: hasDirectDependencyOn ?asm2. 
     #Identify ASM releases for which breaking changes have been populated in the KB 
     ?breakingChange a code:BreakingCodeChange; code:hasPriorAPI ?priorAPIElement. 
 ?breakingChange code:hasCurrentAPI ?currentAPIElement. 
     ?asm1 code:containsCodeEntity ?currentAPIElement.           
     ?asm2 code:containsCodeEntity ?priorAPIElement. 
     FILTER(?asm1 != ?asm2) 
    } 
  } 
} 





Figure 5.11: Illustrative example of a client project using different versions of the same API 
 
In what follows, we refer to a client as all projects which have declared a dependency on any 
ASM 4+ library; dependent refers to projects (directly used by a client) which have a 
dependency to an ASM library version 3.X or older (see Fig. 5.11). The query in Figure 5.10 (an 
extension of Figure 5.9) returns such transitive usages of different API versions within a project. 
The query first identifies two unique ASM releases that contain breaking changes and then 
identifies any usage of these incompatible APIs within client projects and their transitive build 
dependencies.  
 
Findings and Discussion: The boxplots in Figure 5.12 summarize the distribution of 
dependents among clients as well as the usage of potential incompatible APIs within the client 
and dependent projects. Clients, on average, include 5 dependents which may introduce different 
versions of the ASM library as part of their classpath. Our analysis (Figure 5.10) further shows 
that 0.21 of ASM API 4.X functionality is invoked on average by a client and 0.34 of 
functionality from an earlier ASM version (ASM 3.X or earlier) is invoked by a dependent. 
Table 5.6 provides two concrete examples where clients are exposed to potential runtime 
errors due to their indirect use of incompatible ASM API versions. The solr-shade 2.0.0 project 
directly depends on ASM v4.1 and indirectly on ASM v3.1, since lucene-expressions 4.7.1 
which is used by solr-shade 2.0.0, depends on ASM v3.1.  
Using Maven’s built-in conflict mitigation, ASM v3.1 will automatically be excluded from 
the project, and only ASM v4.1 will be included. As a result, an unexpected runtime exception 
will be thrown when the fromExpression method, which indirectly invokes the now excluded 





Figure 5.12: Distribution of client dependencies and their usage of incompatible ASM APIs 
 
Table 5.6: Results of potentially impacted Client Projects 
 
In order to evaluate whether our approach can correctly identify the impact of breaking 
changes, we conducted an additional evaluation. For this study, we used already closed issues, 
which we extracted from GitHub. These issues contain information in their bug description, 
indicating whether a bug was due to a breaking change. For dataset selection, we search GitHub 
for issues that contain certain Java runtime exceptions. These exceptions have previously been 
reported to be frequently caused by breaking changes [111]: ClassNotFoundException, 
NoSuchMethodError, IncompatibleClassChangeError, and NoClassDefFoundError.  
For our dataset, we initially selected the top 800 results (200 results for each keyword), from 
which only 396 issues used Maven as their build and dependency management tool. As part of 
our data cleaning, we manually analyzed these remaining 396 results based on the following two 
processing criteria: (1) we only consider issues that are directly related to breaking changes in 
the project dependencies and (2) only include projects that successfully build using their default 
configurations. After applying this pre-processing, only 10 issues remained in our dataset, which 









are summarized in Table 5.7. For each issue, we downloaded a snapshot of the source code prior 
to the resolution of an issue and applied the same processing steps described earlier in Figure 5.7. 
As our evaluation (Table 5.7) shows, we were able to successfully reproduce and identify the 
reported breaking changes for 4 out of the 10 issues. Figure 5.13 shows an example of a trace 
which we established from the issue to the source code and its dependency hierarchy. For the 
remaining 6 issues, we were unable to identify the breaking changes for various reasons. The 
most common reason was that we did not have access to the required third-party AWS and 
Hadoop services to replicate Issues #2, #3, #5 and #6. Our manual analysis of the remaining two 
issues (Issues #4 and #7) showed that these breaking changes were incorrectly identified since 
they occurred in dependencies used by the Maven plugins. Although, we did not include these 
Maven plugin dependencies in our current analysis, extending our queries to cover these 
dependencies in our analysis is a straightforward task and will be part of our future work.  
The results of our study and evaluation show that our formal knowledge representation 
allows us to take advantage of transitivity and subsumption inference supported by Semantic 
Web reasoners. In addition, it also provides us with flexibility in terms of being able to write 
custom queries that support the analysis of breaking changes across artifacts (e.g., Maven and 
source code) and project boundaries. Such cross-project impact analysis can help library 
consumers in identifying potential binary incompatibility errors that are usually only discovered 
during the execution of their project(s). 
 
Table 5.7: Identified potential breaking changes 
ID Issue URL Identified 
Iss1 docbleach/DocBleach/issues/39 Yes 
Iss2 jenkinsci/artifact-manager-s3-plugin/pull/66 No 
Iss3 locationtech/geowave/issues/1371 No 
Iss4 mulesoft-labs/raml-for-jax-rs/issues/364 No 
Iss5 sakserv/hadoop-mini-clusters/issues/35 No 
Iss6 ShifuML/shifu/issues/504 No 
Iss7 STAMP-project/dspot/issues/424 No 
Iss8 togglz/togglz/issues/282 Yes 
Iss9 VanRoy/spring-data-jest/issues/74 Yes 





Figure 5.13: Tracing the issue reported in DocBleach (issue #1) 
5.6 Related Work 
In this section, we present other works that are closely related to our research. We divide the 
prior work into three main related areas: API usage and identifying the impact of API breaking 
changes in client applications. 
5.6.1 API Usage 
Lammel et al. [112] conducted a large-scale API usage analysis on projects hosted in the 
SourceForge Repository. They observed that less than half of the APIs are used by client 
programs. Wu et al. [108] extended the work of [112] to identify API change types and their 
usage within client projects. Businge et al. [113] studied 512 third-party Eclipse plugins and their 
usages of Eclipse APIs. They observed that 44% of these plugins use internal Eclipse APIs and 
that API usages may have an important impact on upgrading such plugins. While our work is 
inspired by this existing research, our approach differs from the previous work by being based on 
a formal knowledge representation and the use of Semantic Web inference services to identify 
API usage at an inter-project and global scale. 
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5.6.2 Impact of API Breaking Changes 
Change in software systems has been studied, measured, and modeled intensively over the 
years. For example, Cossette et al. have shown that Java libraries “frequently and seriously 
change over time” [114], [115]. Throughout a large body of research, all studied real-world 
systems evolved in unanticipated ways with rippling consequences across modules. Many 
approaches were proposed to support this activity and reduce their costs for client applications.  
Dig and Johnson [116] define a catalog of breaking and non-breaking changes. They 
observed that refactoring accounts for 80% of the changes that break client systems. Raemaekers 
et al. [117] present four stability metrics based on method changes and removals. The authors 
investigate their metrics behavior by performing a historical analysis of stability and impact on 
140 clients of the Apache Commons Library. Xavier et al. [107] conducted an extensive 
empirical study on 317 real-world Java libraries, 9K releases, and 260K client applications to 
investigate the impact of API breaking changes on client applications. They report that only 
2.54% of the clients are potentially impacted, and larger and popular libraries have a higher 
frequency of breaking changes. Decan et al. [118] found that about 1 in every 20 updates to a 
CRAN package was a backward incompatible change, accounting for 41% of the errors in 
released packages that depended on them.  
Complex and changing dependencies are a pain to work with for many developers [119] and 
have led to common expressions like “DLL hell” and “dependency hell.” In our work, we 
address some of these challenges, by extending the scope of the impact analysis for breaking 
changes, to include cross-project and even cross-ecosystem dependency analysis. Our approach 
is also able to detect binary incompatibilities introduced at different transitive levels of library 
dependencies, which may lead otherwise to unexpected runtime behavior. 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
The changing software engineering landscape with its global software development processes 
allows projects and organizations to take advantage of the plethora of features and functionality 
provided by existing third-party libraries. However, similar to other software, these external 




In this chapter, we presented an ontological modeling approach that describes a shared 
taxonomy of object-oriented programming and dependency management concepts. Our approach 
uses multi-layers of abstraction to provide a generic analysis approach and also supports the 
seamless integration of knowledge resources found in the software engineering domain. Given 
the expressiveness of our ontologies, we can take advantage of inference services provided by 
the Semantic Web, to infer additional knowledge that supports novel types of breaking change 
analysis. In this chapter, we discuss how our Semantic Web-enabled cross-project impact 
analysis service that can guide API producer in selecting an appropriate mitigation strategy. We 
also show, that by integrating different knowledge resource, API user can identify potential 
binary incompatibility errors that are usually not discovered during a program compilation and 
build. 
In the next chapter, we present another application of SBSON – an API-level vulnerability 







Chapter 6  
6 Recovering Semantic Traceability 




According to a report in 2012 [120], OSS libraries and frameworks form 88% of the code in 
applications globally. In this context, development teams face a challenge in not only identifying 
and keeping track on which libraries a project and its third-party components depend on, but also 
which version of a particular library is being used by them. Libraries as any other software are 
susceptible to security vulnerabilities, which requires developers to fix or upgrade affected 
versions of a library in a timely fashion to mitigate potential security threats. As the study in 
[120] shows, 26% of these OSS frameworks/libraries suffer from vulnerabilities that often 
remain undiscovered. In 2017, “Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities” was ranked 9th 
in the OWASP Top Ten list of software security flaws [121], with some of the largest 
vulnerability breaches to date have been exploits of known vulnerabilities in components. 
Several approaches have been introduced in the literature [122] to minimize the introduction 
and exploitation of software security vulnerabilities. These approaches fall in two main 
categories. The first category requires organizations to create barriers that prevent developers 
and end-users from performing potential risky actions, e.g., runtime protection. While this 
category can reduce the exposure to vulnerabilities, it does not address the fundamental cause of 
such vulnerabilities. The other category involves techniques that avoid or reduce the introduction 
of potential vulnerabilities already at the development stage, by introducing and applying best 
secure coding practices e.g., black-box testing, and static analysis. Unfortunately, most of these 
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analysis techniques are limited to artifacts created within a project context and do not consider 
the reuse and sharing of third-party components across their own project boundaries in their 
analysis.  
Different specialized Software Vulnerability Databases (SVDBs) (e.g. National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD)30) have been introduced by the Information Security domain to help track 
software vulnerabilities and their potential solutions. These SVDBs were introduced in response 
to the increasing number of software attacks, which are no longer limited to a project but often 
affect millions of computers and hundreds of different systems. These repositories can be 
considered as trusted information silos which are typically not directly linked to other software 
repositories, such as source code repositories containing reported instances of these problems.  
In this chapter, we introduce a novel approach which establishes traceability links between 
security and software databases for automatically tracing source code vulnerabilities at the API 
level across project boundaries. More specifically, we integrate our software build system 
ontology (SBSON) with other our source code and versioning ontology (SEON) and a security 
vulnerability ontology (SEVONT). Based on the standardized knowledge representation 
(ontologies), we are now able to introduce new types of vulnerability analysis at a global scale. 
6.1.1 Motivating Example 
 Existing research on recommending APIs to developers (e.g., [2]) has focused on 
recommending potentially useful APIs to developers to reduce development and testing time. 
For example, in [2], the authors explicitly recommend developers to use an older version of 
Apache Derby (version 10.1.1.0) due to its widespread usage/popularity. However, like any other 
software project, Apache Derby is also susceptible to security vulnerabilities. By recommending 
this particular older version of Derby, the author in [2] actually recommended a version of 
Apache Derby which has two known security vulnerabilities (Table 6.1). These known 
vulnerabilities had already been published in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
repository.  
As shown in this example, the author of the paper was most likely unaware of these reported 
vulnerabilities, with one of the reasons being that this information is not readily available to 





allow for seamless knowledge integration and sharing. Furthermore, by using standardized and 
formal knowledge representation techniques (e.g., Semantic Web and its technology stack), 
novel analysis approaches across knowledge boundaries at both the intra and inter-project level 
can be introduced.  
Table 6.1: Example of Derby versions and their dependent projects in Maven 
Derby version Release Year # vulnerabilities in NVD Direct dependencies in Maven Repository 
10.1.1.0 2005 3 382 
10.5.3.0 2009 1 0 




Figure 6.1: Integrating code and build information with knowledge from other originally 
heterogeneous resources 
  Figure 6.1 shows an illustrative example of an IDE with an open Maven POM 
(ProjectX.pom) and Java file (A.java). In our approach, we extend a developer’s accessible 
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knowledge from local project’s pom and Java files, to knowledge resources outside the current 
project boundaries. Using our knowledge modeling approach, we can now integrate, share and 
reason upon these heterogeneous resources (even at a global scale). In this example, such a 
knowledge base includes project-specific resources (e.g., issue tracker, versioning repositories) 
as well as resources external to the project, such as NVD and Maven build dependencies from 
other projects. Using the reasoning services provided by the Semantic Web, we can now infer 
direct and indirect dependencies for the local project (ProjectX in Figure 6.1). In addition, giving 
the bi-directional links in our modeling approach, we can expand our analysis to answer 
questions like this: Which projects might be directly or indirectly affected by a vulnerable 
component/library? In our example, ProjectX has an indirect dependency on ProjectZ (via 
ProjectY’s transitive dependencies) with ProjectZ being a vulnerable component.  
As our example illustrates, integrating source code information with other knowledge 
resources (e.g., vulnerability and build repositories) can support new types of dependency and 
vulnerability analysis even at a cross-project boundary (global) scale. In addition, analysis results 
can now be made directly available in our knowledge model, to be reused by other analysis tools. 
For example, an existing APIs recommendation tool can now also consider in its 
recommendation if a direct/indirect recommended API may contain a vulnerability. Another 
example would be an automatic notification of developers when an already used API becomes 
exposed to a potential vulnerability.  
 
Note: Earlier versions of this work are published in the IEEE International Conference on 
Software Testing, Verification and Validation (ICST), Tokyo, 2017 [123], the IEEE 27th 
International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), Ottawa, 2016 [124], and 
Science of Computer Programming, Volume 121, 2016 [125].  
 
6.2 Background 
6.2.1 Security Vulnerability Databases 
In the software security domain, a software vulnerability refers to mistakes or facts about the 
security of software, networks, computers or servers. Such vulnerabilities represent security risks 
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to be exploited by hackers to gain access to system information or capabilities [120]. As 
discussed in [126] new software vulnerabilities are often first reported in software repositories 
(e.g., issue trackers, mailing lists) of the affected projects or mentioned on Q&A sites (e.g., 
StackOverflow). A common characteristic of early vulnerability reporting is that information 
about vulnerabilities is dispersed across multiple resources and their descriptions tend to be 
incomplete, inconsistent and informal. Advisory databases (e.g., NVD) were introduced to 
address some of these shortcomings. Their objective is not only to provide a central place for 
reporting vulnerabilities, but also to standardize their reporting. The Common Vulnerabilities 
and Exposures (CVE) 31  dataset creates a publicly available dictionary for vulnerabilities, 
allowing for a more consistent and concise use of security terminology in the software domain. 
Once a new vulnerability is revealed and verified by security experts, this vulnerability and other 
relevant information (e.g., unique identifier, source URL, vendor URL, affected resources and 
related vulnerabilities from the same family group) will be added to the CVE database. The 
source URL refers to the vulnerability (e.g., application vendor, external security advisories) by 
linking directly to the commit that contains the source code for patching or a document that 
describes on how to patch the vulnerability. In addition to the CVE entry, each vulnerability will 
also be classified using the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) 32 database. The CWE, 
therefore, provides a common language to describe software security weaknesses, by classifying 
them based on their reported weaknesses. NVD, CVE, and CWE can all be considering being 
part of a global effort to manage the reporting and classification of known software 
vulnerabilities.  
6.2.2 Vulnerability Detection Techniques 
In the SE domain, vulnerability detection techniques (tools) provide project managers and 
developers with security vulnerability assessments and quantitative insight into the effectiveness 
of a projects’ security controls. The traditional techniques used to audit software projects against 
security vulnerabilities are based on static analysis tools (e.g., FindBugs33) and vulnerability 








Vulnerability scanner tools play a different role than traditional static analysis tools by 
scanning the security vulnerabilities in a software project based on some predefined rules 
(maintained by security engineers). In addition, the vulnerability scanner usually identifies 
project dependencies and checks if there are any known vulnerabilities publicly disclosed in 
existing vulnerability databases (vendor vulnerability database, or third-party database such as 
NVD, SecurityFocus35, etc.). These scanners help to validate the inventory of third-party libraries 
in a project. In what follows we give a detailed example of the OWASP Dependency-Check 
vulnerability scanner tool which we used to evaluate our proposed approach discussed in this 
chapter.  
OWASP Dependency-Check is a vulnerability scanner that analyzes the dependency 
definitions within a project’s build file (e.g., a pom.xml file for Maven projects) and collects a 
set of coordinates called Evidence. There are three types of evidence collected: vendor, product, 
and version. The evidence for each build/dependency manager may vary from one to another. 
For example, the coordinates (evidences) for Java (Maven) are groupId, artifactId, and version. 
Node.js (NPM), Python (PyPi), and Ruby (Ruby Gems) use library name and version as their 
dependency coordinates. Dependency-Check matches these evidences with public data in NVD 
to identify and report the vulnerable libraries to the user.  
6.2.3 The SEcurity Vulnerability ONTology (SEVONT) 
Although several SVDBs have been introduced to address the identification and management 
of software vulnerabilities, software developers fail to take full advantage of these SVDBs due to 
vast amount of security vulnerability data available. The situation is further complicated by the 
fact that these heterogenous SVDBs introduce ambiguity in their datasets, resulting in diverse 
data modeling results. To address these issues, Alqahtani [127] introduced SEVONT (Figure 
6.2), an abstraction hierarchy of software security vulnerabilities analysis ontologies, which 
reconciles and integrates heterogeneous vulnerability data from several SVDBs.  The SEVONT 





• Vulnerability. In software security, a vulnerability refers to a flaw in the system 
which is introduced by reusing vulnerable (external) software components or 
inadvertent coding mistakes by developers (e.g., bad coding practices).  
• Product. Software products are assets of the organization which are a result of a 
software development process (e.g., hardware, artifacts). 
• Attacker. Attackers, either internal or external entities of the system, attack a product 
to perform malicious actions which attempt to break the security of a software system 
or its components.  
• Attack. Attacks are malicious actions designed to compromise the security of a 
system. Security experts analyze these attacks to study the behavior of attackers, 
estimate the cost of attacks, and determine their impact on overall system security.  
• Countermeasure. A countermeasure is a mechanism used to protect a system from 
potential vulnerability attacks (e.g., patch development, encryption/decryption 
enhancement, and updated system security configurations).  
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Figure 6.2: Overview of the SEVONT ontologies 
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6.3 SV-AF: Security Vulnerability Analysis 
Framework 
It is generally accepted that inadvertent programming mistakes can lead to software security 
vulnerabilities and attacks [120]. Mitigating these vulnerabilities can become a major challenge 
for developers, since not only their own source code might contain exploitable code, but also the 
code of third-party APIs or external components used by their system. In what follows we 
introduce a methodology to guide developers in identifying the potential impact of vulnerabilities 
at both the system and global level. Our methodology integrates knowledge from the (1) 
SBSON, (2) SEON and (3) SEVONT ontologies (see Figure 6.3). In what follows, we detail the 
approach used to align these ontologies and the reasoning capabilities provided by this unified 
knowledge representation. It should be noted that in order to improve readability, we use prefixes 
as substitutes to the fully qualified names of our ontologies. The ontology prefixes used in this 
chapter can be dereferenced using the URIs shown in Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Overview of the integrated SBSON, SEON, and SEVONT ontologies 
6.3.1 Ontology Alignment 
For us to take full advantage of the knowledge captured in the SBSON, SEON and SEVONT 
ontologies, we apply ontology alignment techniques to establish traceability links among these 
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ontologies. This linking process requires either shared concepts across knowledge resources or 
identifying semantically identical or similar concepts within the different knowledge sources. 
These links reduce the semantic gap between these ontologies and are essential pre-requisites for 
supporting seamless knowledge integration.  
6.3.1.1 Alignment of the SBSON and SEVONT ontologies 
In our work, ontologies undergoing an alignment are treated as uncertain graphs. In an 
uncertain graph, edges are associated with an uncertainty value which measures the strength of 
connectivity between nodes and/or edges [128]. An uncertain directed graph is defined as 𝐺 =
(𝑉, 𝐸, 𝜔), where 𝑉 is a set of nodes, 𝐸 is a set of edges (x, y), and ω: E → [0, 1] is the weight 
assignment function (e.g., ω(x, y) = 0.3 means the associated value on edge (x, y) is 0.3). 
Uncertainty values are interpreted as probabilities.  
In our model, 𝑉  represents the modeled projects nodes from SBSON and SEVONT, 𝐸 
represents <owl:sameAs> relations (edges) between project instances, and ω: E → [0,1] is the 
weight assignment function. For example, in Figure 6.4, the project instance 𝑉𝑚from SBSON 
graph is similar to vulnerable product instance 𝑉𝑛 from SEVONT graph through <owl:sameAs> 
(ω(e)) edge.  
 
 
Figure 6.4: SV-AF knowledge base similarity graphs 
 
We use the Probabilistic Soft Logic (PSL) framework [129] to establishes weighted links 
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values instead of the traditionally used Boolean values [129]. The resulting probability 
distribution is captured in a graph model, which can then be reasoned upon.  
For example, in Figure 6.5, the rule states that two instances A and B with similar names 
defined in different source ontologies are likely to be similar. “similarID” is a similarity function 
implemented using the Levenshtein similarity metric. Rules in PSL are labeled with non-
negative weights. For example, the weights of the rule in Figure 6.6 indicate that projects with 
the same name and version are more likely to be similar than projects with same names only. 
Using PSL, we establish <owl:sameAs> relations between similar instances found in the two 










type(A, instance) ∧  
type(B, instance) ∧  
name(A,X) ∧  
name(B,Y) ∧  
similarID(X,Y) ∧  
A.source ≠ B.source  
→ similar(A,B)  weight:0.5 












type(A, instance) ∧  
type(B, instance) ∧  
name(A,X) ∧  
name(B,Y) ∧  
similarID(X,Y) ∧  
A.source ≠ B.source  
version(A,Z) ∧  
version(B,K) ∧  
similarID(Z,K) 
→ similar(A,B)  weight:0.8 




In this example, similarity among instance pairs is determined based on the extracted literal 
information such as name, version and vendor. We used the PSL framework classifier to 
compute the similarity weights for the <owl:sameAs> links. For training purposes, we created a 
dataset with manually labeled instance links to train the PSL classifier to establish the weights 
for our pre-defined rules. Derived similarity weights for each instance pair (see Figure 6.7) are 
captured by the domain-spanning <measure:SimilarityMeasure> concept. Given the weighted 
alignment links between the two ontologies, a SPARQL query can now be written, to retrieve the 
vulnerability information from the SEVONT ontology and their corresponding instances in 
















Figure 6.7: SV-AF’s weighted similarity modeling 
 
6.3.1.2 Alignment of the SEON and SEVONT ontologies 
Disclosed vulnerabilities often contain references to patch information, such as explicit 
revisions/commits in which the vulnerability has been fixed. Having this information available, 
we can perform terminology matching to align instances from both data sources. For the 
alignment process, we take advantage of reasoning services provided by the Semantic Web to 
infer implicit relationships between vulnerabilities and commits. More specifically, for the 
alignment, we take advantage of SWRL rules to establish links between vulnerability and 
commit instances. This alignment takes place if any of the two semantic rules are satisfied: 
Rule 1: Vulnerability ID is explicitly mentioned in a commit message (see Figure 6.8).  
Rule 2: Commit/revision ID is explicitly mentioned in the patch reference of a vulnerability 



























→ vulnerabilityFixedIn(?v,?c) ) 
Figure 6.9: SWRL rules for aligning SEON and SEVONT when a vulnerability patch contains a 
commit reference 
 
6.3.1.3 Overview of the integrated ontologies in SV-AF 
The result of this alignment processes is SV-AF, a unified representation that supports impact 
analysis of known vulnerabilities across heterogeneous software repositories. SV-AF provides a 
seamless integration of build dependency, source code, versioning history, and software 
vulnerability concepts and relations across different abstraction layers. The OWL classes and 
object properties used for our API-level vulnerability impact analysis are shown in Figure 6.10 
(data properties have been again omitted to improve readability of the figure).   
The core concepts used for our vulnerability analysis are <sevont:VulnerableRelease>, 
<sbson:BuildRelease>, and <sevont:SecurityPatche>. A <sevont:VulnerableRelease> is a 
software <main:Release> within the NVD database with a known <sevont:Vulnerability>. A 
<sbson:BuildRelease> is a software release within the Maven ecosystem. Using our ontology 
alignment process, we infer that a given <sevont:VulnerableRelease> is <owl:sameAs> a 
specific <sbson:BuildRelease>. As such, the <sevont:VulnerableRelease> inherits the properties 
of the original <sbson:BuildRelease>, for example, the <sevont:VulnerableRelease> now 
<main:dependsOn> other <sbson:BuildRelease>. Given the support for bi-directional links in our 
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model, a project release can now be identified as being potentially affected by a vulnerability 
when it directly or indirectly reuses a vulnerable release. 
Whenever a <main:Project> is identified to be affected by a vulnerability, a 
<version:Committer> commits a new version of a <version:VersionedFile> containing a 
<sevont:SecurityPatch> through a version system (e.g., SVN). Versioned files are <main:File> 
managed by a version control system. A <sevont:SecurityPatch> corresponds to code changes 
introduced to fix some existing <sevont:VulnerableCode>, which is part of a 
<code:CodeEntity>, such as <code:ComplexType>(i.e., a Class, Interface, Enum, etc.) or a 
<code:Method>. For example, if a class or method is modified during a security patch, then this 
code change can be used to locate the original <sevont:VulnerableCode> individual. The OWL 
classes, <sevont:SecurityPatch> and <sevont:VulnerableCode>, are linked in our model through 
the object property identifies. 
6.3.2 Knowledge Inferencing and Reasoning 
In addition to transitivity and subsumption inferencing provided by our SBSON and SEON 
ontologies (see Section 5.4.2), SV-AF also takes advantage of the inbuilt <owl:sameAs> 
inferencing services to trace APIs and their vulnerabilities across knowledge boundaries. 
The <owl:sameAs> predicate is used to align two concepts from different ontologies. For the 
SBSON-SEVONT alignment process, we create weighted alignment links between the two 
ontologies. These weighted (based on the similarity threshold) links, are used to infer the 
<owl:sameAs> predicate between instances within the ontologies. Simple queries such as the 
SPARQL query in Figure 6.11 can now be executed to take advantage of the <owl:sameAs> 
predicate (if inference is enabled) and retrieve facts across two or more ontologies. Without 
inferencing, the query result set would be empty since SBSON has no triple with any knowledge 
of vulnerabilities (line 5 of Figure 6.11). However, with inference enabled (line 1 of Figure 
6.11), vulnerabilities for releases in SBSON can be identified based on the established 
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define input:same-as “yes” 
SELECT ?vulnerability ?release 
WHERE { 
   ?release rdf:type sbson:BuildRelease. 
   ?release sevont:hasVulnerability ?vulnerability. 
} 
Figure 6.11: SPARQL query returning vulnerable projects based on the owl:sameAs inference 
6.4 Case Studies 
In what follows, we introduce three case studies which we conducted to illustrate the 
applicability of our knowledge modeling approach. For the first case study, we identify project 
releases in the Maven Central repository which contain known security vulnerabilities disclosed 
in the NVD database. The objective of this case study is to evaluate the applicability of our 
alignment process. For the second case study, we illustrate how our semantic rules can identify 
explicit and implicit security vulnerabilities by inferring transitive dependencies across SBSON 
and SEVONT. Finally, the third case study demonstrate the applicability of our modeling 
approach in analyzing API-level security vulnerability impacts across software components. 
6.4.1 Case Study Data 
For the data collection and extraction in our case studies, we rely on two data sources: the 
NVD database and the Maven Central repository. We download the latest version of the Maven 
repository (Table 6.2) and all NVD vulnerability xml feeds from 1990 to 2016 (Table 6.3). For 
case study #1, we used the releases and unique vulnerable products to evaluate the alignment of 
the SBSON and SEVONT ontologies. 
Table 6.2: Maven Repository statistics 
Repository Projects Releases Last Update 
Maven Central 130,895 1,219,731 2016-01-28 16:34:07 UTC 
 
Table 6.3: NVD database statistics 
Repository # unique vulnerabilities # unique vulnerable products Period  




For case study #2, the objective was to identify the potential transitive impact set of some 
vulnerable components on other systems. For this study, we selected five Apache projects (Table 
6.4) which are using the Maven repository for its build management. The main selection criteria 
for these projects was that at least some of their releases contain known vulnerabilities (which 
we had identified in case study #1) and the projects are commonly reused by other projects. 
These five subject systems vary in size (classes and methods) and application domain. Wss4J36 is 
a Java implementation of the primary security standards for Web Services, Httpclient 37  is 
responsible of provides reusable components for client-side authentication, HTTP state 
management, and HTTP connection management. Apache Derby38 is an open source relational 
database implemented entirely in Java, Hibernate Validator39 allows expressing and validating 
application constraints using annotation-based constraints, and Apache OpenJPA 40  is a Java 
persistence project that can be used as a stand-alone plain old Java object (POJO) persistence 
layer or be integrated into any Java EE compliant container. 
Table 6.4: Subject systems and sizes for transitive dependencies analysis 
ID Subject Systems Version 
Size 
Classes Methods 
P1 Wss4J 1.6.16 167 1610 
P2 Httpclient  4.1 209 1180 
P3 Derby  10.1.1.0 967 16354 
P4 Hibernate-validator  4.1.0.Final 325 2642 
P5 Openjpa 1.1.0 1201 18640 
 
6.4.2 Case Study 1: Identifying vulnerable projects in Maven 
Repository 
Objective: The goal of this study is to evaluate the performance of our semantic similarity 










Approach: In order to link these two ontologies (SEVONT and SBSON), we use the PSL 
framework to align project specific information found in both ontologies. We trained PSL using 
a corpus of 524 randomly selected project instance pairs and their manually derived similarity 
links. Next, we executed our PSL alignment rules for this training dataset to train our approach. 
Based on this training, two concept instances, A and B, located in different ontologies 
(¬SameSource) can now be aligned (with a degree of certainty), if both have the same names, 
similar vendors, and same version numbers (PSL rule in Figure 6.12). The SameName, 
SimilarVendor, and SameVersion similarity functions are implemented using the Levenshtein 
distance metric. In this rule, the SameProject(A,B) is given a weight of 0.9 based on results from 
the PSL training set. Figure 6.13 shows the PSL inference results for our training dataset, using 
different weights (ranging from a minimum of 0.04 to a maximum of 0.42) for the 
SameProject(A,B) alignment.  
Using the semantic rule from Figure 6.12, PSL can now perform maximum a posteriori 
(MPE) reasoning [129] to infer the most likely values for a set of propositions and observed 
values for the remaining (evidence) propositions. For a full discussion on MPE reasoning, we 
refer the reader to [129]. The results of the PSL inference is a set of 𝐴 × 𝐵 SameProject weights 
with a [0..1] range; 0 corresponds to two concept instances with no similarity and 1 corresponds 

















¬SameSource(SnA,SnB) ∧  
Name(A,X1) ∧  
Name(B,Y1) ∧  
SameName(X1,Y1) ∧  
Vendor(A,X2) ∧  
Vendor(B,Y2) ∧  
SimilarVendor(X2,Y2) ∧  
Version(A,X3) ∧  
Version(B,Y3) ∧  
SameVersion(X3,Y3) 
⇒ SameProject(A,B)  weight:0.9 





Figure 6.13:PSL SBSON-SEVONT similarity inference results 
 
As part of our knowledge modeling approach, we materialized the inferred semantic instance 
links (<owl:sameAs>) between the SEVONT and SBSON ontology, making this inferred 
knowledge a persistent part of our knowledge model. As part of this materialization process, we 
also add weights for each link, which are the inferred similarity values using the domain 
spanning similarity measure (<measure:SimilarityMeasure>) from our unified knowledge model. 
 
Findings. Our study showed that 0.062% of all Maven projects contain known security 
vulnerabilities that have been reported in the NVD database. An example for such a vulnerability 
is shown in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Example of a linked SBSON-SEVONT vulnerability 
SBSON Fact SEVONT Fact Corresponding Vulnerability 
org.sonatype.nexus:nexus:2.3.1 sonatype:nexus:2.3.1 CVE-2014-0792 
 
Further analysis of our results showed that projects might often suffer not only from one but 
from multiple vulnerabilities. We found that 48.8% of the 750 identified vulnerable project 
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releases suffer from multiple security vulnerabilities, with PostgreSQL 7.4.1 being the most 
vulnerable project in the dataset, containing 25 known vulnerabilities. Having this additional 
insight can guide developers in their system update and upgrade decisions by avoiding the reuse 
of APIs/components with known security vulnerabilities or components that might be prone to 
vulnerabilities.  
For example, in December 2010, Google released its Nexus S smartphone41. The phone was 
originally running on Android 2.3.3 – an Android version that already was exposed to the 
security vulnerability discussed in Table V. While the Nexus S received regular Android OS 
updates up to Android Version 4.2, an actual fix of the reported vulnerability (CVE-2013-4787) 
was only introduced with Android 4.2.2. However, this new Android version was no longer 
supported and distributed for the Nexus S, leaving existing users of the phone susceptible to 
attacks. Our analysis showed that the same vulnerability can affect multiple releases of a product. 
For example, security vulnerability CVE-2013-4787 42  has been reported for five different 
Android versions (Table 6.6). This information can help product maintainers to ensure consistent 
patching and regression testing across product lines or different product versions. 
Table 6.6: Critical Vulnerabilities for Android Project 
Android Version CVE-IDs # of direct dependencies 
com.google.android:android:2.2.1 CVE-2013-4787 360 
com.google.android:android:2.3.1 CVE-2013-4787 176 
com.google.android:android:2.3.3 CVE-2013-4787 351 
com.google.android:android:3.0 CVE-2013-4787 34 
com.google.android:android:4.2 CVE-2013-4787 1 
 
Evaluation: In what follows, we evaluate the accuracy of aligning project instances 
(<owl:sameAs>) between our SBSON and SEVONT ontologies. During the first step of this 
evaluation, we compared using precision, recall and F1 measure, the impact of different 
similarity weight thresholds (w = 0.1, w = 0.2, w = 0.3, and w = 0.4) on the inferred links 
created by the PSL alignment process. Precision is calculated, with true positives being the 
number of project instance pairs correctly classified as similar, while false positives corresponds 






Recall, false negatives correspond to the number of non-similar instance pairs that are incorrectly 
classified as being similar projects. The F1-score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall, 
giving equal weight to both measures.  
Our analysis (Table 6.7) showed that an increase in the similarity threshold from 0.1 (low 
similarity) to 0.4 ((higher similarity) only had a limited effect on the precision (decrease from 
0.98 to 0.75) while recall significantly dropped - down from 0.68 to 0.01.  
Table 6.7: Weighted owl:sameAs link evaluation 
 Precision 
Data Size w=0.0 w=0.1 w=0.2 w=0.3 w=0.4 
500 
0.77 0.88 0.98 0.93 0.75 
Recall 
0.77 0.68 0.30 0.03 0.01 
F1-score 
0.77 0.77 0.46 0.05 0.01 
 
A further manual inspection of the inferred links showed that the low recall for the higher 
threshold values is due to the inconsistent capturing of vendor information within the two 
ontologies. NVD relies on the common name to identify a vendor, whereas Maven uses the fully 
qualified package name as the vendor name. For example, using w=0.0, org.apache.cxf:cxf:3.0.1, 
org.apache.geronim.configs:cxf:3.0.1 and  org.apache.geronimo.plugins:cxf:3.0.1 in SBSON will 
be considered the same instance as apache:cxf:3.0.1 in SEVONT and therefore correctly linked. 
However, using a higher similarity threshold, these instances will no longer be linked. We use 
the similarity weight of w = 0.1 in all subsequent experiments due to its high F1-score. 
6.4.3 Case Study 2: Identifying open source components that are 
directly and indirectly dependent on vulnerable components. 
Objective: In this study we evaluate how our framework can support the analysis of potential 
security vulnerability impacts on dependent software components.  
 
Approach: For this case study, we extend our analysis to include transitive closure 
dependencies (Figure 6.14) that not only identifies components that are directly but also 
indirectly affected by known vulnerabilities. For this impact analysis, we selected 5 open source 
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Java projects (Table 6.4) with known security vulnerabilities. In this case study, we do not 
distinguish if a component uses (calls) a vulnerable component or not.  
Project #1 Project #2 Project #3 Project #ndependsOn dependsOn
Level #1 Level #2
dependsOn
Level #n
Inferred relation Declared relation
dependsOn
 
Figure 6.14: Inferred project dependencies in SBSON 
 
Findings: We now report on results from our transitive dependency analysis, which also 
highlights the benefits of our knowledge modeling approach, its ability to integrate knowledge 
resources while taking advantage of inference services provided by the SW. Given the bi-
directional links in our model between the NVD and the Maven repository, our analysis is no 
longer limited to identifying only direct dependencies on vulnerable components. Instead, given 
a vulnerable component, we can now also provide a more holistic analysis, which can identify all 
projects which directly and indirectly depend on a given vulnerable component. 
Table 6.8 provides a summary of our analysis. It should be noted, that we limited the scope 
of our transitive analysis to only three levels of transitivity, in order to restrict the result set. For 
example, the vulnerable project Hibernate-validator 4.1.0 (P4) has a potential impact set of 3805 
direct dependent projects (level 1) and 128109 dependent projects when we consider an 
additional two levels of transitivity (level 3). 
Table 6.8: Summary of transitive dependencies on vulnerable components 
ID Component Name # Vulnerabilities CVE-IDs 
# Transitive Dependencies 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
P1 Wss4j 1.6.16 2 
CVE-2015-0227 
CVE-2014-3623 
336 639 73 
P2 Httpclient 4.1 2 
CVE-2011-1498 
CVE-2014-3577 
685 4961 41326 




385 37999 66147 
P4 Hibernate-validator 4.1.0.Final 1 CVE-2014-3558 3805 39295 128109 
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Figure 6.15: Geronimo-jetty6-javaee5 using 5 vulnerable projects (level 1 dependencies)  
 
Figure 6.15 illustrates a typical usage scenario for modeling approach. While the Geronimo-
jetty6-javaee5 (version 2.1.1) itself has no known vulnerability reported, the project depends on 
several components (level 1 dependencies) with known security issues (5 Java projects with a 
total of 15 known security vulnerabilities), making also Geronimo-jetty6-javaee5 potentially a 
very vulnerable component. 
6.4.4 Case Study 3: API-level vulnerability impact analysis for CVE-
2015-0227  
Objective: The objective of our third case study is to show how our modeling approach can 
support the analysis and tracing of potential security vulnerability impacts at the API level of 
software components. Furthermore, the study also highlights again the flexibility of our 
modeling approach, in terms of its seamless knowledge and analysis result integration, as well as 




Approach: For the case study, we take advantage of the same-as and transitive inference 
services provided by SV-AF to identify projects that are directly and indirectly affected by 
known security vulnerabilities. In addition, we also take advantage of transitive and subsumption 
inferences applied at the source code level to identify vulnerable APIs and trace their impact to 
external dependencies.  
Case study setting: We use a publicly disclosed vulnerability, which has been reported in the 
NVD repository as CVE-2015-0227 43  and describes the following vulnerability for Apache 
WSS4J: “Apache WSS4J before 1.6.17 and 2.x before 2.0.2 allows remote attackers to bypass 
the requireSignedEncryptedDataElements configuration via a vectors related to ‘wrapping 
attacks’.” This vulnerability affects the management of permissions, privileges and other security 
features that are used to perform access control to Apache WSS4J versions before 1.6.17 and to 
version 2.x before 2.0.2.  
Apache WSS4J is an API which provides a Java implementation of the primary security 
standards for Web Services and is commonly used by projects as an external component. In this 
example, developers using any of the affected Apache WSS4J releases in their project must 
determine if their application is affected by this vulnerability. Existing source code analysis tools 
can identify whether the vulnerable code fragment (e.g., code fragment or variable) which has 
been reported in the NVD vulnerability is used directly within a project. However, they are not 
capable of identifying whether the external libraries used in the developer’s project might have 
been affected by this vulnerability.  
We now discuss how our approach takes advantages of the integrated knowledge from 
originally heterogeneous knowledge resources such as NVD, VCS (for only Apache WSS4J), 
and Maven to determine direct and indirect dependencies of vulnerable components. For this 
analysis, we extract and populate facts from a) NVD: information for the CVE-2015-0227 
vulnerability (including patch references); b.) VCS: source code and commit messages for 
Apache WSS4J (version 1.6.16 and 1.6.17) and c.) Maven repository: all build dependencies on 






Tracing vulnerability patch information to commit. Security databases provide descriptions 
of vulnerabilities, their potential effects, and corresponding patches (if applicable). The objective 
of our study is to establish a traceability link between the unique vulnerability identifier (CVE) 
and the commit which fixes this vulnerability. For establishing these links, we apply a two-step 
process, by first mining the NVD repository for patch links that include a reference to an entry in 
a versioning repository. We then extract all commit logs within the versioning repository that 
have a reference to a CVE-ID. Figure 6.16 shows an example of such a commit log message 
entry: “[CVE-2015-0227] Improving required signed elements detection.”  
 
Identifying vulnerable code fragments in APIs. A vulnerable code fragment corresponds to a 
set of lines of code (LoC), which has been modified to fix a vulnerability [131]. In our approach, 
we use the standard diff command to identify the vulnerable code fragments, by comparing it 
with its unpatched version. Figure 6.17 shows an excerpt of the diff output for 
WSSecurityUtil.java revisions r1619358 and r1619359. We further identify that method 
verifySignedElement contains the vulnerable code fragment. Using the same approach, we can 
now populate any method or class that has been either deleted or modified as part of a 




 (a) Report detail for CVE-2015-0227 from NVD
 (b) A Wss4j bug-fix commit detail for CVE-2015-0227 from SVN
 










     
-    public static void verifySignedElement(Element elem, Document doc, Element securityHeader)
+    public static void verifySignedElement(Element elem, WSDocInfo wsDocInfo)
         throws WSSecurityException {
-        final Element envelope = doc.getDocumentElement();
-        final Set<String> signatureRefIDs = getSignatureReferenceIDs(securityHeader);
             ...
     
old revision
new revision
start line index and number of lines of 
the old, and new revisions
added line is 
preceded by a `+`
deleted line is 
preceded by a `-`
 






















 (a) vulnerabilities.owl (b) code.owl & versioning.owl
















SELECT ?project ?vulnerablecode ?client ?code 
WHERE { 
  ?project rdf:type sbson:BuildRelease. 
  ?project code:containsCodeEntity ?vulnerableCode. 
  ?vulnerableCode  rdf:type sevont:VulnerableCode. 
  ?client code:containsCodeEntity ?code. 
  ?client sbson:hasDirectDependencyOn ?project. 
  ?code main:dependsOn ?vulnerableCode.  
} 
Figure 6.19: Query to retrieve vulnerable code fragments across project boundaries 
 
Given our populated ontologies, we infer a similarity link between instances of a vulnerable 
product (e.g., Apache WSS4J 1.6.16) in SEVONT and SBSON, as well as links between the 
vulnerability patch reference (CVE-2015-0227) and the commit containing the patch (modeled in 
SEON) using the rules in Figures 6.11 and 6.9, respectively. Given these inferred links (Figure 
6.18) and using the SPARQL query in Figure 6.19, we can now further restrict our transitive 
dependency analysis to include only those components that have an actual call dependency to the 
vulnerable source code. 
Findings: Table 6.9 summarizes the results from our third case study, which we performed 
for CVE-2015-0227. We report on the (manually verified) results obtained from executing our 
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SPARQL query (Figure 6.19). Table 6.9 shows that 15 of the 242 crawled dependent projects 
actually use the API from the vulnerable project. This highlights that there are still many systems 
(6.19%) that rely on libraries with known security vulnerabilities. Moreover, 10 of these 15 
dependent projects not only include the API but also actually call the class WSSecurityUtil, 
which contains the vulnerable code. However, it should be noted that for our specific case study, 
none of the projects actually called and executed the vulnerable method (verifySignedElement) 
within the WSSecurityUtil.  
Table 6.9: Case Study #3 Results 
Project 
# Crawled  
Dependencies 
# Actual usage # Vuln. Classes usage # Vuln. Methods usage 
Apache WSS4J 1.6.16 242 15 10 0 
 
To evaluate if our approach is actually capable of correctly identifying calls to vulnerable 
methods, we conducted an additional controlled experiment. For this experiment, we manually 
seeded a method call in Apache CXF-bundle 2.6.15 that invokes the vulnerability in Apache 
WSS4J API. We downloaded the source code for Apache CXF-bundle 2.6.15 and modified its 
org.apache.cxf.ws.security.wss4j.policyhandlers package. Figure 6.20 shows the partial class 
diagram of the modified packages. We modified the includeToken method of the 
AbstractBindingBuilder class to include a direct call to the vulnerable 
WSSecurityUtil.verifySignedElement method. We also added the 
SVAFSymmetricBindingHandler and SVAFAsymmetricBindingHandler to extend 
SymmetricBindingHandler and AsymmetricBindingHandler to be able to see if our approach 
also supports the transitive call dependency analysis correctly. We then re-populate the source 
code ontologies with the new (modified) code facts and invoked the same query we used earlier 
in the case study.  
The results of this query are shown in Table 6.10 and include the classes of our modified 
project that either directly or indirectly invoke the vulnerable method 
WSSecurityUtil.verifySignedElement. For sake of simplicity and readability, we only include 
public and protected methods in the result set. From the reported results, we observed that the 
vulnerability introduced in AbstractBindingBuilder.includeToken propagates through several 
methods. For example, the doSVAFAction method is indirectly affected due to its usage of the 
getSignatureBuilder method. Since SVAFAsymmetricBindingHandler extends 
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AbstractBindingBuilder and overrides the getSignatureBuilder method, the invocation of 
doSVAFAction by test2 is correctly identified as a non-vulnerable method call since it does not 





























Figure 6.20: Class diagram for our modified package 
 










getSignatureBuilder(TokenWrapper, Token, boolean, boolean) 
getSignatureBuilder(TokenWrapper, Token, boolean) 
doSVAFAction() 






6.5 Discussion and Related Work 
6.5.1 Comparison Against Existing Tools 
As part of our evaluation, we further compared our approach against existing tools that detect 
known security vulnerabilities in source code across project boundaries. For this comparison, we 
consider the open source OWASP Dependency-Check (DC) tool and a closed-source tool from 
SAP labs [132]. OWASP DC performs a static dependency analysis to determine if libraries with 
known vulnerabilities are included in an application. During the analysis, the tool collects 
information about the vendor, product, and version. This information is used to identify the 
Common Platform Enumeration (CPE). If a CPE is identified, a listing of associated Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) entries are reported. The SAP tool relies on a dynamic 
source code level analysis to identify if a vulnerable piece of code is either used directly or 
indirectly. The tool uses execution traces which are collected after instrumenting the project code 
including all bundled libraries. Since we did not have direct access to the SAP tool, we replicated 
their experiments to compare our results with the ones reported in [132]. 
Given that the OWASP DC tool does distinguish whether a vulnerable library code is used or 
not, we limit our comparison to: “identify if a project depends on libraries with disclosed 
vulnerabilities independent of the use of the vulnerable source code”. Table 6.11 reports the 
results from our comparison, which include true positives (TP), false negatives (FN), false 
positives (FP), and true negatives (TN). The results show that for CVE-2013-2186, both our 
approach and OWASP DC did not report the vulnerable API. This miss is due to the fact that 
NVD did not include FileUpload 1.2.2 in the list of affected products. The vulnerability, 
however, is reported in several JBoss projects which make use of the DiskFileItem class in 
Apache FileUpload. Our approach currently models only products explicitly mentioned to be 
affected in NVD. OWASP DC reported CVE-2014-9527 as a vulnerability in POI 3.11 Beta 1. A 
manual inspection of the patch showed that the class “org.apache.poi.hslf.HSLFSlideShow” 
contains the patch for the vulnerable code but is not used by “poi-3.11.beta1.jar”. Instead, this 
patch is distributed as part of the POI-HSLF component. For the vulnerability CVE-2013-0248, 
the patch is located in the default configuration file “using.xml” and the comment of the Java 
class “DiskFileItemFactory” (but not any executable code). As a result, the SAP tool does not 
identify the archive as being affected by vulnerable code. 
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Table 6.11: Comparison of Analysis Results 
Vulnerability Library SV-AF SAP tool OWASP DC 
CVE-2014-0050 
Apache FileUpload 1.2.2 
TP TP TP 
CVE-2013-2186 FN TP FN 
CVE-2013-0248 TP FN TP 
CVE-2012-2098 Apache Compress 1.4 TP TP TP 
CVE-2014-3577 Apache HttpClient 4.3 TP TP TP 
CVE-2014-9527 
Apache POI 3.11 Beta 1 
TN TN FP 
CVE-2014-3574 TP TP TP 
CVE-2014-3529 TN TN TN 
 
As our case studies illustrate, our ontology-based knowledge modeling approach (SV-AF) 
can integrate information originating from different heterogeneous knowledge resources. In what 
follows, we discuss how our approach overcomes several challenges identified with both 
OWASP and SAP tools.  
Data integration challenges. Vulnerability and dependency management make use of 
different naming schemes and nomenclatures: There exist many language-dependent approaches 
for referencing entities, making the linking of entities across knowledge resources often a 
difficult task. Consider the following example: Mapping the Spring Core 4.0.3.RELEASE 
between Maven and NVD. Maven GAV identifier represents this component as 
groupId=org.springframework; artifactId=spring-core; version=4.0.3.RELEASE. While the CPE 
for the same component in NVD is: vendor=pivotal; product=spring_framework; version=4.03. 
Such identifier naming inconsistency is difficult to resolve during automatic mapping 
between GAV identifiers in Maven with their corresponding CPE in NVD. For example, the 
vendor in our example should be Pivotal and not springframework.  While a human can easily 
recognize such correct mapping, this is not the case for an automated solution. Both OWASP DC 
and the SAP tool compute the SHA-1 of the archives and perform a lookup in Maven central to 
address this problem. While such a look-up can improve the recall (number of correct mappings 
found), it also introduces many false positives and false negatives, which affects the accuracy of 
these tools. Moreover, both tools are limited in their ability to match vulnerabilities and CPEs, 
making them not only prone to errors but also limit the scope of the analysis to direct 
dependencies. In contrast, our approach addresses these challenges by taking advantage of the 
PSL alignment framework. This eliminates the need for one-to-one assignments and establishes 
weighted links between instances of different modeled ontologies for different data sources. 
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Moreover, our semantic approach takes advantage of semantic reasoning to infer transitive 
dependencies.  
Flexibility. While dynamic run-time information (traces) can improve precision (SAP tool), 
the recall will depend on the quality and coverage achieved by these traces. Furthermore, the 
SAP tool focuses on intra-project analysis, whereas our approach also supports inter-project 
analysis.  As we further show in our case study, by taking advantage of automated reasoning we 
are able to infer sub-properties (subsumption) and transitive closure dependencies, we can 
transform often complex and proprietary source code analysis tasks into simpler and more 
flexible SPARQL queries. For example, the <code:isSubClassOf>, <code:isSubInterfaceOf>, 
<code:invokesMethod>, and <code:invokesConstructor> are all sub-properties of the transitive 
<main:dependsOn> property. As such, a simple query (Figure 6.19), can now identify all code 
entities that transitively depend on a given vulnerable code entity independent of the type, 
method invocations or inherited classes/interfaces (via subsumption). As we have shown in our 
controlled study, vulnerable classes can create a backdoor (e.g., through inheritance) to allow for 
the invocation of vulnerable methods, if these methods are not overridden within the client. With 
the growing popularity of using 3rd-party APIs [133], the risk of such transitive vulnerable 
method invocations increases.  
Information silos challenges. Although both analysis tools, SAP and OWASP DC are 
linking different data sources, these resources remain in both approach information silos. They 
still lack the standardization, knowledge sharing, and analysis result integration required to make 
them true information hubs. In contrast, our approach introduces a unified standardized 
representation using ontologies, which supports seamless knowledge integration, interoperability 
and sharing even on a global scale. The triplestore not only provides persistence of the data but 
also provides scalability and the use unique resource identifiers (URIs), eases the integration 
with other knowledge resources, even at a global scale. 
6.5.2 Threats to Validity 
Internal Validity. An internal threat to the validity is that the experiments rely on our ability 
to mine facts from the Maven Central and NVD repositories to populate our ontologies. A 
common problem with mining software repository is that repositories often contain noise in their 
data due to ambiguity, inconsistency or incompleteness. This threat can be mitigated in our 
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research context, since vulnerabilities published in NVD are manually validated and managed by 
security experts and therefore making this data less prone to noise. Similarly, the Maven 
repository captures dependencies related to a particular build file, while ensuring that the 
dependencies are fully specified and available, eliminating ambiguities and inconsistency at the 
project build.  
Another internal validity threat is that the instance pair matches for our training set were 
manually created and could potential be prone to human errors. In order to mitigate this threat, 
we conducted a cross validation of the annotation, where the links were evaluated by another 
person. Finally, the size of the dataset used to evaluate our approach might not be considered 
large enough. To mitigate this threat, we evaluated our approach on different dataset sizes to 
study the effect of the dataset size on our results. As shown in Table 6.12, we observed an 
average standard deviation between 0.04 and 0.09, for the precision and recall respectively, 
across all data set sizes. As our results show, the size of the dataset has no adverse effect on the 
precision and recall of our approach. 
Table 6.12: Dataset size evaluation 
Data Points 
SV-AF (w=0.1) 
Precision |Distance from σ| Recall |Distance from σ| 
50 0.76 0.11 0.38 0.26 
100 0.87 0.00 0.62 0.02 
150 0.88 0.01 0.69 0.05 
200 0.9 0.03 0.69 0.05 
250 0.89 0.02 0.68 0.04 
300 0.86 0.01 0.63 0.01 
350 0.87 0.00 0.66 0.02 
400 0.87 0.00 0.68 0.04 
450 0.88 0.01 0.67 0.03 
500 0.88 0.01 0.68 0.04 
Avg: 0.87 - 0.64 - 
SD (σ) 0.04 - 0.09 - 
 
Other threats to the mining of these repositories are related to the fact that we only extracted 
vulnerabilities reported from 2010 to 2016 from the NVD database. Given the number of 
vulnerabilities we extracted for this time period form the NVD database, the dataset is large 




External Validity. In terms of external threats to validity, the presented experiments might 
not be generalizable for non-MAVEN projects. This threat can be partially mitigated through our 
modeling approach. Given that our modeling approach is based on different levels of abstraction, 
we also consider and abstract common aspects of the domain of build repositories in our 
knowledge model. We do model the domain of build repositories as a domain of discourse in the 
domain-specific layer of our knowledge model. Another external threat to validity for our 
research is that our evaluation has mainly focused on a quantitative analysis of the results from 
the case studies, limiting our ability to generalize the applicability and validity of the approach. 
In order to mitigate this threat, an additional qualitative analysis has to be performed in the form 
of user studies, which will allow for an evaluation of both, the applicability of the approach and 
the analysis of the result sets from an expert user perspective. 
6.5.3 Related Work in Tracking Known Security Vulnerabilities 
Although several approaches for static vulnerability analysis and detection in source code 
exist (e.g., [132], [134], [135], [136]), there is a lack of tools in identifying and tracking security 
vulnerabilities on a global scale.  Tracking known security vulnerabilities through the Web is 
different from tracking security defects within the source code of projects. Mitropoulos et al. 
[137] and Saini et al. [138] use FindBugs one of the known static analysis tool, to find major 
security defects in Java source codes. The collected information was used in studying the 
evolution of security-related bugs in a project. In comparison, their approach finds security 
defects in the source code, while our finds the usage of known security vulnerabilities in 
software components on a global scale.    
Plate et. al [132] proposed a technique that supports the impact analysis of vulnerabilities 
based on code changes introduced by security fixes. Their approach relies on a dynamic analysis 
to determine if a vulnerable code was executed within a given project. In contrast, while less 
precise, we provide a more holistic approach, which not only considers all possible executions 
but also supports a more general intra and inter-project dependency analysis. We also take 
advantage of semantic reasoning services to infer implicit facts about the vulnerable code usages 
within the system, to support bi-directional dependency analysis – including both impacts to 
external dependencies and vice versa.  
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Nguyen et. al [131] proposed an automated method to identify vulnerable code based on 
older releases of a software system. Their approach scans the code base of each prior version for 
code containing vulnerable code fragments. In contrast, our approach takes advantage of multiple 
knowledge resources, providing a greater flexibility in the analysis. 
Mircea et al. [21] introduce in their Vulnerability Alert Service (VAS) an approach that 
notifies users if a vulnerability is reported for software systems. VAS depends on the OWASP 
Dependency-Check tool.  
Eventually, analyzing software project artifacts on the security detection level has recently 
become a very active area of research. Such analysis has valuable results when it comes to 
finding security-related discussions [139], identifying security/non-security bug reports [140],or 
predicting vulnerable software components [141]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
research has been conducted on creating an infrastructure of semantic linking between identified 
security vulnerabilities in traditional software repositories and the security issues listed in 
software security repositories. 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented SV-AF, a vulnerability analysis framework based on the integration 
of our SBSON ontology and a software vulnerability ontology (SEVONT). SV-AF provides 
developers with an API-level analysis of the impact of vulnerabilities within their projects and 
global dependencies. Using multi-layers of abstraction, our modeling approach can not only 
provide a generic analysis approach but also supports the seamless integration of other 
knowledge resources in the SE domain. This formal knowledge representation allows us to take 
advantage of inference services provided by the SW, providing additional flexibility compared to 
traditional proprietary analysis approaches. 
In the next chapter, we present another application of SBSON – an API trustworthiness 
assessment framework based on the SBSON, SEON, and SEVONT ontologies used in this 
chapter. In addition, the trustworthiness framework in the next chapter also uses an existing 






Chapter 7  
7 API Trustworthiness: An Ontological 
Approach for Software Library 
Adoption 
7.1 Introduction 
Most of today’s software projects increasingly depend on the usage of external libraries, 
which allows software developers to take advantage of features provided by Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs) without having to reinvent the wheel. Unfortunately, even 
though third-party libraries are readily available, developers are faced with new challenges with 
this new form of code reuse, such as being unaware of the existence of libraries, selecting the 
most relevant library among several possible alternatives, and how to use features provided by 
these libraries [14], [142].  
Several software library recommendation approaches have been proposed to address these 
challenges. These approaches fall into two main categories: (1) recommendation systems for 
libraries and APIs based on characteristics such as popularity [133], frequency of migration [16], 
[143], and stability [117], without considering the context of use of these libraries; and (2) 
techniques that take a client’s context into account when recommending libraries (e.g., using the 
history of method usages by developers [144]).  
However, reused software libraries should not only satisfy a client’s functional requirements; 
they must also satisfy non-functional requirements (NFR) such as security, safety, and 
dependability [145], which are critical to the success of software systems. NFRs are often 
referred to as system qualities and can be divided into two main categories: (1) execution 
qualities- qualities which are observable at runtime (e.g., performance and usability); and (2) 
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evolution qualities, such as testability, trustworthiness, maintainability, extensibility, and 
scalability, which are embodied in the static structure of a software system. NFRs often play a 
critical role in the acceptance and trust users will have in a final software product. However, 
assessing and evaluating the trustworthiness of today’s software systems and software 
ecosystems remains a challenge due to issues ranging from a lack of traceability among software 
artifacts to limited tool support.  
Trustworthiness is also a subjective and ubiquitous term since its interpretation depends on 
the assessment context of the stakeholder, which might be different among stakeholders and the 
context of use in which the library is used. Assessment models, therefore, should provide the 
flexibility and customizability to take into account such specific application contexts and the 
particular assessment needs of stakeholders [9].  
In our prior works, we introduced our Software Build System Ontology (SBSON) and 
Security Vulnerabilities Analysis Framework (SV-AF) semantic modeling approaches which 
model the dependencies between OSS libraries and establishes traceability links between 
security and software databases such as build repositories and version control repositories. The 
work in this chapter is a continuation of these previous works. In this chapter, we present our 
Ontology-Based Trustworthiness Assessment Model (OntTAM), an instantiation and extension 
of the SE-EQUAM assessment model [9], for the domain of software library trustworthiness. 
SE-EQUAM is a generic quality assessment model which uses ontologies to model and 
conceptualize quality factors, sub-factors, attributes, measures, weights, and relationships used to 
assess software quality.  
More specifically, we illustrate how OntTAM can be instantiated to take advantage of our 
existing unified knowledge representation of different Software Engineering related knowledge 
resources and support an automated analysis and assessment of trustworthiness quality attributes 
of libraries. We argue that ontologies not only promote and support the conceptual representation 
of knowledge resources in software ecosystems but also let us take advantage of semantic 
reasoning during the assessment of trustworthiness quality factors. Furthermore, our modeling 
approach allows for the customization of the trustworthiness assessment model to reflect specific 
assessment needs while at the same time facilitates the comparison of trustworthiness across 
projects, by defining a standard set of measures and sub-factors. In addition to supporting our 
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existing analysis of the impact of API breaking changes and vulnerabilities, OntTAM supports 
new semantic analysis for software license compatibility. 
Our research is significant for several reasons:  
• We introduce OntTAM, a novel trustworthiness assessment model that takes advantage 
of both, our previous generic SE-EQUAM software assessment model [9] and our unified 
ontological knowledge representation of different SE related knowledge resources [9], 
[123], [124] while supporting the customization of the model to meet a stakeholder’s 
assessment needs. 
• We extend the MARKOS license ontology [10] with semantic rules for three categories 
of license violations. 
• We introduce as part of OntTAM, novel trustworthiness measures, which measure API 
breaking changes, security vulnerabilities, and license violations. These measures take 
advantage of our ontologies and semantic reasoning services to allow for a 
trustworthiness analysis across the boundaries of individual artifacts and projects. 
• We report on a case study that illustrating how our approach can be applied to assess the 
trustworthiness of OSS libraries and discuss the potential impact of these libraries on the 
trustworthiness of the overall system. 
7.1.1 Motivating Example 
In what follows, we introduce a motivating example (Figure 7.1) describing how our fictional 
software developer (Bob), attempts to re-use external libraries while facing several challenges 
during selecting the best library for his project while reducing their negative effect on the 
trustworthiness of his own project. 
Bob is currently developing an application which requires an embedded database. Bob tries 
to reduce his development effort, by searching the Internet for possible third-party libraries and 
components which meet his work context. His search returns Apache Derby44, an open source 
embedded DBMS implemented entirely in Java. However, Bob is faced now with the dilemma of 
deciding upon which version of Derby he should be using – the most recent (Derby version 





recommendations published in the existing research (e.g., Mileva et al. [2]), Bob decides to use 
an older version of Apache Derby (version 10.1.1.0) due to its widespread usage/popularity. 
However, this recommendation results in the reuse of a component, which contains three known 
security vulnerabilities that are already reported in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
(see Table 6.1 in Section 6.1.1). In contrast, the newer version of Derby (version 10.11.1.1) does 
not contain any known vulnerabilities. 
However, this is not the only risk Bob is susceptible to when selecting a library. Derby is 
licensed under the Apache 2 copyright license; for Bob not to introduce any license violation or 
incompatibility, he must make sure that the selected library is compliant with his project license. 
For example, one cannot combine code released under the Apache 2 license with code released 
under the GNU GPL 2 [146]. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Motivating Example – How OntTAM can assist developers in trust assessment 
 
As this example illustrates, several quality-related issues with the reuse of third-party library 
can arise and they are often difficult to discover by the user, since the relevant information is 
spread across multiple knowledge resources. The problem is further exacerbated by the large 
number of additional transitive dependencies which are introduced by these third-party libraries 
and their dependencies. A vulnerability or license violation might not occur directly between 
Bob’s project and the Derby library, but also between Bob’s project and one of the libraries the 
Derby library depends on.  
 

























System Specific Concepts 























Note: An earlier version of the work done in this chapter is accepted for publication in the 
Software Quality Journal, 2019 [147]. 
7.2 Background 
The work presented in this chapter combines different knowledge sources (build and 
dependency repositories, vulnerability databases, source code changes, versioning history, and 
software licenses) and existing models (SE-EQUAM, SEVONT, and MARKOS). In this chapter, 
we provide a brief background on Open Source Software (OSS) licenses and the existing 
MARKOS and SE-EQUAM models we reused. For an overview of the core concepts related to 
build and dependency management, source code changes, or the SEVONT model, we refer the 
reader to Sections 3.4, 5.2.1, and 6.2.3 respectively.  









Apache 2 YES NO NO 
Artistic 2 YES NO NO 
BSD46 – Berkely Software Distribution License YES NO NO 
EPL 1 – Eclipse Public License YES YES YES 
GPL 2 – GNU General Public License YES YES YES 
GPL 3 YES YES YES 
LGPL 2.1 – GNU Lesser General Public License YES YES YES 
LGPL 3 YES YES YES 
MIT – Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
License 
YES NO NO 
MPL 2 – Mozilla Public License YES YES YES 
 
7.2.1 Open Source Licenses 
An OSS license is a legal instrument that allows the creative work (source code) to be used, 
modified and/or shared under defined terms and conditions [148]. OSS licenses are categorized 
as either restrictive or permissive. Restrictive licenses (also known as copyleft licenses) require 
derivative works to be licensed under the same terms. A derivative work is defined as any work 
 
45 “Requires Attribution” generally means posting in your software’s credits, the title of the OSS project, and a copy 
of its license (with the optional posting of the author, and a link to the project’s website). 
46 BSD can refer to a handful of variations on the same license. For the purposes of this work, the common 2-and 3-
clause variants are used. 
103 
 
that stems or is adapted from the original work [149]. An example of a restrictive license is the 
GPL 3. Permissive licenses on the other hand have fewer requirements on derivative works; for 
example, the MIT License only requires author attribution and reproducing the license with the 
disturbed software. Table 7.1 lists the ten most frequent licenses with a summary of their 
pertinent features [150]. 
7.2.2 License Violations 
While dependency management tools have been introduced to automate the downloading and 
importing of libraries into projects, these libraries still originate from various authors and come 
with a plethora of OSS licenses (horizontal increase). One library can utilize another library, 
leading to hierarchies of libraries and license dependencies. All these libraries’ licenses must be 
compatible and compliant with each other. License violations and incompatibilities are an often-
overlooked factor when recommending licenses and therefore can significantly impact the 
trustworthiness of software systems. When incompatible licenses are used together, a license 
violation occurs. A license violation is defined as “the act of making use of a (licensed) work in a 
way that violates the rights expressed by the original creator” [151]. That is, not following the 
legal terms and conditions set out in the source license. Software authors who commit a license 
violation open themselves to the possibility of being sued; sometimes this risk can amount to 
millions of dollars as in the recent case of Oracle v. Google [152]. 
It should be noted that even though the term license violation is used throughout this thesis, a 
definitive violation is only determined as such by judge or jury. Consequently, “potential” is the 
operative word when discussing license violations.  
7.2.3 The MARKOS License Ontology 
In order to find possible license violations, a definition of the rules and permissions 
associated with a license is needed.  In addition, one must outline the allowed and disallowed 
interactions of any two OSS licenses. Fortunately, the MARKOS ontology [10] provides a 
formal vocabulary and a set of rules for helping software developers to analyze open source 
license compatibility issues. Table 7.2 lists the license permissions defined by the MARKOS 
ontology.  
The scope of this research is limited only to the Reciprocity permission type. Reciprocity is 
important to this research because its context is straightforwardly captured by an ontology and 
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easily relatable to the Maven repository of projects. The reciprocity requirement mainly 
influences (but is not the sole requirement for) the definition of license compatibility demarcated 
later in this chapter.  
Table 7.2: Permissions defined in the MARKOS ontology. 
Permission Description Attribution 
Adaptation An OSS license allows the original creative work to be adapted and modified. 
Distribution One can publicly distribute the source code. 
LibraryUsageWithout 
Reciprocity 
Reciprocity means the source code from a derivative project must be released under the 
same license as the derived project for both libraries to be used together. 
PatentGrant Some source code algorithms or processes are patented, and the author agrees to grant 
permission to any downstream user of the source code 
Reproduction One can reproduce or make copies of the source code. 
Sublicensing A user of this source code is permitted (or not) to sublicense the code to anther license 
 
Beyond reciprocity, violations of some of the other permissions are harder to detect because 
they are violated outside of the realm of a Software Engineering context. For example, the 
authors of BusyBox sued Samsung in 2009 [153] and settled in 2010 [154] because Samsung 
was using BusyBox’s FLOSS project without publicly publishing the source code (when 
distributing the software with their hardware). This is a violation of the distribution term of the 
GPL2 (which would equate to the Distribution permission in the MARKOS ontology). This was 
only found by manually checking the physical product (in this case a Samsung television) and 
verifying that the FLOSS was indeed running on the TV hardware. We do not (yet!) have an 
automated way of testing all the physical products in the world. Therefore, in creating a 
definition of license violation, we must combine multiple permissions that are feasible to 
determine. These permissions provide a basis to construct definitions of compatibility, 
incompatibility, and license violations, which will be further described in the next section. 
7.2.4 Evolvable Quality Assessment Metamodel (SE-EQUAM) 
Quality is a widely used term to evaluate the maturity of development processes within an 
organization. Defining quality allows organizations to specify and determine if a product has met 
certain non-functional and functional requirements. However, as Kitchenham [155], [156] states: 
“quality is hard to define, impossible to measure, easy to recognize.” Unlike functional 
requirements, where a single analysis technique (e.g., use case modeling) is sufficient to identify 
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essentially all requirements, the same analysis is not appropriate for all quality requirements. 
Quality, as defined by ISO 9000, is the “degree to which a set of inherent characteristics fulfills 
requirements”, where a requirement is a “need or expectation that is stated, generally implied or 
obligatory” [157]. 
Assessing the evolvability of software systems has been addressed in existing research 
through the introduction of software quality models e.g., McCall [158], ISO/IEC 912647, and 
QUALOSS [159]. These models share a common, while informal (not machine-readable), 











































Figure 7.2: Generic structure of quality assessment models [160] 
 
While these models can assess qualities in a given context, they lack the required formalism 
and semantics to allow them to evolve to meet the modeling requirements of different assessment 
contexts. The ability to adjust to change assessment needs was the main motivation for SE-
EQUAM, an Evolvable QUAlity Meta-model that derives a formal (machine-readable) domain 
model that can adapt to changes in the assessment needs in terms of both: artifacts being assessed 
and their assessment criteria [9]. SE-EQUAM addresses these challenges by taking advantage of 





conceptualize quality factors, sub-factors, attributes, measures, weights, and relationships used to 
assess software quality. Input artifacts for the assessment model are various software artifacts 
such as version control systems and issue trackers; and its outputs, are quality assessment scores 
based on the different assessment criteria. Ontologies not only provide a formal way to represent 
knowledge but also can eliminate ambiguity, enable validation, and provide a consistency-
checking approach [161]. SE-EQUAM uses semantic reasoners to infer hidden relationships 
between domain model attributes. Given its formal representation, SE-EQUAM allows for its 
reuse by simplifying the instantiation of new domain-specific instances of the model. More 
details about the semantic reasoning are provided in [9].  
Figure 7.3 illustrates the reuse and instantiation of our SE-EQAM model. The generic 
syntactic meta-model, which is a generic model that forms the basis for all quality models can be 
instantiated by a domain model (e.g., ISO/IEC 9126). Furthermore, SE-EQUAM allows for a 
semantic mapping between the syntactical meta-model and a semantic ontology meta-model, 
which can then be instantiated as domain model ontology based on user-defined assessment 
criteria. 
 
Figure 7.3: SE-EQUAM ontology meta-model reuse to instantiate a domain model ontology 
(OntEQAM) [9] 
 
The SE-EQUAM Process. The general SE-EQUAM process (Figure 7.4) represents a set of 
tasks and activities which we followed to allow for deriving a generic quality assessment method 
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that can be used to customize and instantiate the generic model to meet a stakeholder’s specific 
quality assessment context.  
The input to the SE-EQUAM process is software artifacts and a set of core quality 
measurements applicable to these artifacts. In the next step, a common ontological representation 
for these artifacts has been established by re-using existing models or customizing existing 
models to meet the requirements of these artifacts. As part of the model adjustment activity, 
quality metrics and measurements included in the core model can be customized and extended to 
reflect a specific model context. The output of this process is an instantiated assessment model, 
which meets specific user and project assessment requirements, by providing a quality 
assessment at both individual artifact and overall product level. Figure 7.4 illustrates the high-
level activities and major tasks involved in the SE-EQUAM instantiation method. 
 
 
Figure 7.4: SE-EQUAM Process to instantiate evolvability model 
 
In the next section, we introduce OntTAM, which illustrates a concrete instantiation of the 
SE-EQUAM process to create a semantically enriched trustworthiness quality assessment model 
for software libraries. 
7.3 Ontology-based Trustworthiness Assessment 
Model (OntTAM) 
OntTAM, an instantiation of the SE-EQUAM [9] ontology meta-model, illustrates how our 
modeling approach can take advantage of the unified ontological representation of both software 
artifacts and the generic SE-EQUAM quality assessment model. OntTAM instantiates a domain-
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the trustworthiness of external libraries. OntTAM reuses SE-EQUAM’s core quality model 
structure, which is based on quality factors, sub-factors, attributes, measures, weights, and 
relationships, and extends them with trustworthiness specific aspects. Inputs to OntTAM are 
knowledge resources such as version control systems, build systems, project license information, 
and security vulnerability information. The output of OntTAM is a trustworthiness assessment 
score for either an individual metric or an aggregation of sub-factors and factors for the overall 
product/library quality. The model thereby takes advantage of the OWL and RDF/RDFS 
semantic reasoning capabilities to infer hidden relationships between domain model attributes 
and to ensure the consistency among these attributes.  
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Figure 7.5: The Software Trustworthiness Ontology Hierarchy 
 
Figure 7.5 provides an overview of the knowledge model framework and its organization in 
terms of ontologies and their abstraction levels. While these ontologies may be derived modeled 
and used independently, a key objective of our approach is the knowledge integration across 
ontology boundaries, using both ontology alignments and semantic linking to create a unified 
ontological knowledge representation.  
In what follows, we present our OntTAM methodology to further demonstrate how we 
instantiate different trustworthiness sub-factors (i.e., security, reliability, and legality), to 
establish a trustworthiness assessment for OSS products (e.g. external libraries). More 
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specifically, we discuss in detail the four major steps involved in instantiating our customized 
OntTAM trustworthiness assessment model (see Figure 7.4): artifact selection, modeling, model 
adjustment, and the assessment process. 
7.3.1 Artifact Selection   
The input to OntTAM are artifacts relevant to the reuse of software libraries within projects. 
These software artifacts can be categorized into endogenous and exogenous data. Endogenous 
data represents data available internally to a software development environment (e.g., software 
artifacts related to versioning systems, issue trackers, software licenses, and build systems). 
Exogenous data refers in our context to data available externally to the software development 
environment (e.g., external vulnerabilities databases). Extracting and populating facts from these 
artifacts are often based on techniques commonly used by the MSR community [64], [162], 
[163]. It should be noted that unstructured or semi-structured information (e.g., vulnerability 
descriptions and license information) often requires several preprocessing steps such as natural 
language analysis (NLP), as well as data cleansing to improve the quality of the data prior to the 
ontology population.  
7.3.2 Model and Model Adjustment 
In this section, we discuss our knowledge modeling process in detail. It should be noted that 
in order to improve readability, we use prefixes as substitutes to the fully qualified names of our 
ontologies. The ontology prefixes used in this chapter can be dereferenced using the URIs shown 
in Appendix A. 
7.3.2.1 Modeling Project Trustworthiness 
Since OntTAM is based on the generic SE-EQUAM model, OntTAM is an extension and 
specialization of our core SE-EQUAM software quality assessment model. OntTAM is extended 
to provide a syntactical trustworthiness quality model that includes and defines a set of sub-
factors, attributes, and metrics required for the assessment of trustworthiness. Many of these 
trustworthiness factors, attributes, and metrics are derived from existing work on trustworthiness 
assessment of open and closed source projects [9], [160]. The OntTAM specific trustworthiness 
assessment is based on the two general quality dimensions, the community, and product 
dimension. The community dimension assesses the adoption of a software product by the 
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community over an extended period, by considering the popularity in terms of downloads, 
rankings, and activity of the development community. The product dimension assesses the 
internal structure of the product and the development processes that impact its reusability which 
is the focus of this paper.  
Figure 7.6 provides an overview of the complete model instantiation process which creates as 
its output a formal (machine-readable) and semantic enriched trustworthiness assessment model. 
The process involves applying both a syntactic and semantic mapping from SE-EQUAM to 
OntTAM. While the syntactical model allows us to answer basic queries such as: What are the 
sub-factors associated with product trustworthiness? The semantic mapping enables the use of 
DL axioms (such as the property chain axiom) to infer new implicit relationships (dashed lines in 
Figure 7.6– semantic OntTAM ontology) from explicitly modeled relationships in OntTAM 






















































Figure 7.7: An example defining the associated trustworthiness concepts and measures for a 
sample project 
Figure 7.7 illustrates the main steps which are applied to associated trustworthiness concepts 
and measures for a sample project (ProjectX): 
1. Define the product and community dimensions.  
<onttam:ProductDimension><rdfs:type><sequam:Dimension> and 
<onttam:CommunityDimension><rdfs:type><sequam:Dimension>.  
2. Define reusability as a factor that is associated with the product dimension. 
<onttam:ProductDimension><sequam:hasFactor><onttam:Reusability> and 
<onttam:Reusability><rdfs:type><sequam:Factor>.  
3. Following the same approach, OntTAM defines reliability as a sub-factor of reusability 
which is associated with the popularity attribute. 
<onttam:Reusability><sequam:hasSubfactor><onttam:Reliability>,  
<onttam:Reliability><rdfs:type><sequam:Subfacor>,  
<onttam:Reliability><sequam:hasAttribute><onttam:Popularity> and  
<onttam:Popularity><rdfs:type><sequam:Attribute>. 
4. Assuming that OntTAM assesses a product’s reusability through the popularity 
trustworthy attribute using the DependencyCount measure, we can now define this as: 





Finally, we enrich OntTAM’s syntactical model to become a semantic model, by establishing 
additional semantic relationships by adding property chain axioms (e.g., 
<sequam:hasDimension> relationship with <sequam:hasSubfactor> and <sequam:hasMeasure>). 
The following are examples of OWL 2 property chain axioms which we added to be able to take 
advantage of RDFS reasoning during the assessment process. 
• Project-related OWL 2 property chain constructs:  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Project :hasFactor) :Factor )  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Project :hasSubfactor) :Subfactor )  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Project :hasAttribute ) :Attribute )  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Project :hasMeasure ) :Measure )  
• Dimension-related OWL 2 property chain constructs:  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Dimension :hasSubfactor) :Subfactor)  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Dimension :hasAttribute ) :Attribute )  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Dimension :hasMeasure ) :Measure )  
• Factor-related OWL 2 property chain constructs:  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Factor :hasAttribute ) :Attribute )  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Factor :hasMeasure ) :Measure )  
• Subfactor-related OWL 2 property chain constructs:  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Subfactor :hasMeasure ) :Measure )  
7.3.2.2 Integration with Other Knowledge Artifacts 
Assessing the overall trustworthiness of a software library requires us not only to instantiate 
OntTAM but also to integrate it with other ontological software knowledge artifacts to be able to 
derive and integrate novel trustworthiness measures. For the integration, we take advantage of 
software artifact ontologies we have created and refined over the years [123], [164], [165] and by 
reusing existing ontologies [34] that model different software artifacts. Figure 7.8 provides an 
overview of the software artifacts and their ontologies which we integrate with OntTAM. These 
artifacts include, but are not limited to, (a) Software Evolution Ontologies (SEON) which model 
software engineering repositories such as source code, version control systems, and issue tracker 
systems, (b) the Build Systems ONtology (SBSON) which captures knowledge about build 
management systems (e.g., Maven), (c) the Software sEcurity Vulnerability Ontologies 
(SEVONT) for modeling software security vulnerability information such as severities, impacts, 
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vulnerabilities types, and patch information found in different vulnerability databases, and (d) 
MARKOS which models software license compatibilities.  
The integration of these heterogeneous knowledge resources allows us to introduce different 
trustworthiness measures related to the reuse of software libraries. More specifically, in this 
research, we introduce the following three trust criteria: API breaking changes, security 
vulnerabilities, and license violations. Figure 7.8 shows the core concepts and object properties, 
distributed across the different abstraction layers of our knowledge modeling framework (Figure 
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Figure 7.8: Integrating OntTAM ontology into SV-AF model and reusing SE-QUAM 
concepts 
Among the core concepts used from these ontologies is the <sbson:BuildRelease> from the 
SBSON build ontology, a subclass of the <main:Release> concept, which allows captures the 
fact that a project can have several releases (including library releases). A release has a 
<markos:License> and defines its dependencies on other releases. Each release contains a set of 
<code:CodeEntity> elements such as <code:Field>, <code:Method>, and <code:Class>. A 
release can be affected by a <sevont:Vulnerability>, leading to the release of a new version 
containing a <sevont:SecurityPatch>. A security patch corresponds to code changes introduced 
to fix some existing <sevont:VulnerableCode>, which is part of a <code:CodeEntity>. For 
115 
 
example, if a class or method is modified during a security patch, then this code change can be 
used to locate the original <sevont:VulnerableCode>. The OWL classes, <sevont:SecurityPatch> 
and <sevont:VulnerableCode>, are linked in our model through an object property. For a 
complete description of the ontologies, how they are built, the alignment processes, and 
reasoning, we refer the reader to Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
All these core concepts have metrics used by the OntTAM assessment process. Measures 
have a unit and are expressed on a scale, e.g. an ordinal or nominal scale. Information about units 
and scales can be used to perform conversions [34]. Many base measures, such as the number of 
lines of vulnerable code (LOVC), number of known vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities severities 
(scores), and number of license violations provide, when viewed in isolation, only limited 
insights. Additional derived measures are needed to support further analysis and assessment of 
software artifacts. These derived measures represent an aggregation of values from different 
subdomains, for example, the number of vulnerabilities per class is an aggregation of measures 
derived from source code and the vulnerability repositories. While the abstract measurement 
concepts are defined in the general upper layer of our integrated model (Figure 7.8), many Base 
Measures (e.g., Size) and Derived Measures (e.g., Weighted Vulnerability Density) are modeled 
in the domain-specific layer.  
7.3.3 Measures and Metrics 
An essential feature of our modeling approach is to allow users to customize the OntTAM 
model through user-defined queries, which might introduce different metrics, ranging from 
simple metrics to semantic rich metrics queries that take advantage of implicit knowledge 
inferred by ontological reasoners. Given our ontology-based modeling approach, these analysis 
results can also be materialized to enrich our knowledge base and to promote reuse of existing 
analysis results. In what follows, we introduce some metrics to be later used for the assessment 
of the trustworthiness of systems. These metrics take not only advantage of our unified 
representation, but also inference services provided by the Semantic Web.  
 
The Weighted Vulnerability Density (WVD) Metric compares software systems (or their 
components) based on severity scores of known vulnerabilities. The objective of WVD is to 
measure the impact of known vulnerabilities on a product’s quality, with the most severe 
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vulnerabilities having the greatest impact. The metric can be applied, for example, to prioritize 
the patching of vulnerabilities based on their severity. To account for both direct and indirect 
impacts of vulnerabilities, we introduce the WVDdirect and WVDinherit measures. Although a 
project can have a WVDdirect score of 0 since no known security vulnerability has been reported 
for the core project, it is still possible that the project is exposed to indirect vulnerability found in 
external (third party) dependencies (components) that are included in the parent project. Such a 
potential security risk will be assessed by the WVDinherit measure. 
 





 (Equation 1) 
where S is the size of the software (in KLOC), 𝑤𝑖 is the weight (severity score) of a known 
vulnerability affecting the system, and 𝑉 is the number of known vulnerabilities in the system.  
 
𝑊𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = ∑ {(
𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖  𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒




 (Equation 2) 
where n is the number of dependencies used by release, and 𝑑𝑖 is the ith dependency. 
 
𝑊𝑉𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) =  𝑊𝑉𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) + 𝑊𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) (Equation 3) 
 
License Violation Count (LVC) is a measure to assess the number of license violations that 
exist within a given project. This measure can indicate potential long-term risks associated with 
intellectual rights violations that exist within a project. A license violation occurs if any of the 
dependent components of a parent project includes components with non-compatible licenses. 
Open source code license violations are often due to the fact that many software developers are 
simply neither aware nor well-versed in open source license compliance. For example, in 2008 
the Free Software Foundation (FSF) claimed that various products sold by Cisco under 
the Linksys brand had violated the licensing terms of many programs on which FSF held the 
copyright48. These FSF programs were under the GNU General Public License, a copyleft license 
which allows users to modify a piece of software as long as the derivative work is under the 

























Type 1 - Simple 
Violations 
Type 2 - Transitive Violations 
Type 3 - Compound 
Violations 
Figure 7.9: Categories of license violations 
 
In this work, we identify three main categories of license violations: simple violations, 
transitive violations, and compound violations (see Figure 7.9). LVCsimple, LVCtransitive, and 
LVCcompound are base measures associated with each category. Details on how license 
violations are identified are presented in Section 7.4.3.  
𝐿𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) =  𝐿𝑉𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) + 𝐿𝑉𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒)  + 𝐿𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 (Equation 4) 
 
Breaking Change Density (BCD) Metric is a normalized measure which represents the 
ratio between breaking and non-breaking API changes that are introduced in a project. API 
changes often occur as a project and its components evolve inconsistently, resulting in 
incompatibilities of APIs and API calls. This measure can be used to determine the stability of an 
API over time – how often do breaking changes occur. The BCD metric can be represented 
formally as follows:  
 
𝐵𝐶𝐷 =  
# 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠
# 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠
 (Equation 5) 
 
Breaking Change Impact (BCI) measures the impact of breaking changes on client 
applications, by assessing a client application and its use of APIs with a changed contract. The 
impact of breaking changes on clients can be both direct and indirect. Details on how we identify 
the impact of breaking changes are presented in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. We introduce two 
measures that capture both direct and indirect breaking changes 
We represent the BCI metrics formally as follows:  
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐶, 𝐷) =  
# 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐷 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐶
# 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐷




𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐶, < 𝐷1, … , 𝐷𝑛 >) =  
# 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 < 𝐷1, … , 𝐷𝑛 >  𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐶
# 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 < 𝐷1, … , 𝐷𝑛 >
 (Equation 7) 
 
where C is the client project, D is the reused library, and <D1, …, Dn> is the set of (direct 
and transitive) different library releases being reused by the client. 
7.3.4 Assessment Process  
Given that stakeholders, with varying contexts, have different assessment needs, our 
OntTAM assessment process allows for the customization of trustworthiness assessment model 
in terms of sub-factors and attributes being assessed as well as the individual weights assigned to 
them. While the default weight for all sub-factors and attributes are equal, users can customize 
these weights to closely match their assessment objective and context. Furthermore, most 
existing assessment approaches rely on crisp boundaries (e.g., based on thresholds) which can 
lead to inaccuracies in the assessment process. It is not always feasible or desirable to use crisp 
values especially when one deals with values which are close to the boundaries. For example, let 
us consider an assessment approach with a vulnerability count threshold of 4. Based on this crisp 
boundary, a project with a reported number of 5 known vulnerabilities will be assessed as being 
non-trustworthy, even if it can be considered almost borderline to being considered trustworthy. 
To further exemplify the problem, using the crisp boundary values, there would not be any 
difference between a project with 5 known vulnerabilities and another project with 100 
vulnerabilities, both projects would be considered equally non-trustworthy. This problem does 
not only occur at the individual measurement level but also at other assessment levels (e.g., sub-
factor, factor). To address this challenge, we apply a fuzzy logic assessment and inference 
approach to eliminate the need for crisp value boundaries.  
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Figure 7.10: Fuzzy Assessment Process Steps 
 
Figure 7.10 shows the set of transformation steps, which are performed during the 
fuzzification of the assessment process, with details of each step discussed in more details 
throughout the section. 
 (1) Measure Calculation: Input to this step are raw values from the populated ontologies. 
Measures are calculated by querying our populated knowledge base for the base and derived 
measures introduced in the previous section (e.g. WVD).  
(2) Fuzzification: The extracted quality measures and weight values are used to create fuzzy 
scales in the fuzzification step. As part of the fuzzification step, fuzzy scales are created for the 
different measures, the assessment weights (provided by stakeholders of the assessment model to 
assign a level of importance to different measures), and the overall assessment result. These 
results are converted to linguistic variables, which are variables whose values are expressed as 
words or sentences (values like e.g., high, not very high, low) [166]. These linguistic variables 
are the building blocks of Fuzzy Logic and become the input for the fuzzification inference 
engine. 
 Figure 7.11 shows an example of a fuzzy scale created for the WVD measure and its 
assessment weights. The x-axis represents the measurement results range and the y-axis the 
membership degree (range is 0-1). The higher the membership value, the stronger the 
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measurement’s relation to its fuzzy result scales. The overlap between boundaries of categories 




Figure 7.11: WVD measure fuzzy scale and Weight Fuzzy Scale for WVD measure 
 
 Since high WVD, LVC, and BCD measures lower the overall quality and trustworthiness 
score of a project, we made the following three assumptions to automate the fuzzy inference 
rules for these measures: (a) in cases when the user-specified weight is high then the individual 
measure score is one level lower, VeryPoor scores will keep their values (e.g., a high weight will 
change an Excellent score to VeryGood); (b) the opposite holds for low weights, which reflects 
that their scores are less relevant to the overall assessment their scores are adjusted by one level 
higher. Excellent scores keep their values; (c) with medium weight, scores keep their values. 
These assumptions reflect the fact that when a measure is of high importance to the assessment 
(high weight), its score should be more sensitive to a low measure value.  
(3) Inference and Assessment: Input for this step is the fuzzified measure and weight values in 
the form of linguistic variables. These linguistic results are now transformed into the final 
assessment score by executing a set of fuzzy inference rules. The de-fuzzification is based on a 
set of fuzzy inference rules, which are expressed in the Fuzzy Control Language (FCL)[167] 
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using the JFuzzyLogic inferencing engine [168].  The inference engine fires the relevant fuzzy 
rules based on the provided input. Firing rules will calculate the final weighted overall 
measurement result which is a combination of all the different measures. Using the Center of 
Gravity (COG) method, considered as one of the most popular de-fuzzification methods [169], 
the overall fuzzy measurement result is de-fuzzified back into a numerical assessment 
measurement results in order to be populated back to the knowledge base. As part of our 
assessment, we create a Fuzzy Control Language (FCL) file for each measure. The complete set 
of FCL files for all measures can be found online49. 
(4) Knowledge Enrichment: This optional step, allows for the integration of the assessment 
results at both the individual attribute, sub-factor and overall assessment level. Our ontological 
representation enables us to seamlessly integrate these assessment results in the knowledge base, 
therefore not only supporting reuse of analysis results but also allowing their use for further 
semantic analysis. 
7.4 Case Study 
In what follows, we illustrate the applicability of our modeling approach to support the 
assessment of trust within OSS software libraries, by highlighting the flexibility of our modeling 
approach, in terms of its seamless knowledge and analysis results integration, as well as the use 
of Semantic Web reasoning services to infer new knowledge (measures). In Section 7.4.1, we 
present the setup for our study, including the selection process for the 4 projects used to illustrate 
our approach; Sections 7.4.2 to 7.4.4, describe how we measure security vulnerabilities, license 
violations, and API breaking changes. Section 7.4.5 describes how these individual identified 
measures can be integrated for a holistic trustworthiness assessment.  
7.4.1 Study Setup 
For the data collection and extraction in our case study (see Figure 7.12), we rely on four 
data sources: the NVD database, GitHub, SVN, and the Maven build repository. We downloaded 
the latest versions of the Maven and NVD repositories – which includes 1,219,731 project 





we limited the assessment scope to 4 projects. The projects were selected based on the following 
criteria: a.) at least some of their releases contained known vulnerabilities, b.) license details 
were provided, c.) releases varied in their major version numbers, and d.) the functionalities 
these products provide are widely reused by other projects (see Table 7.3 for details). The four 
subject systems vary in size (classes and methods) and application domain. Commons 
Fileupload 50  adds file upload capabilities to web applications, CXF WS Security 51  provides 
reusable components for client-side authentication, security, and encryption. Struts52 is an open 
source framework for creating Java web applications, and ASM 53  is a Java bytecode 
manipulation library. We further extract the complete source code and history information of 
these four projects. The extracted facts are then populated in their corresponding ontologies and 
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Figure 7.12: Overview of case study setup process 
 
Table 7.3: Overview of selected case study projects 
Project # Releases analyzed # of Dependencies 
Commons Fileupload 6 68854 
Apache CXF WS Security 5 4570 
Struts 3 3170 










7.4.2 Identifying and Measuring Software Security Vulnerabilities 
Approach. This section introduces some of the rules and queries we used to derive the WVD 
measures (overall, direct, and inherited). These rules are of interest, since they highlight the 
flexibility and power of our modeling approach, allowing users to define and customize their 
own derived measures without the need for any additional proprietary algorithm implementations 
or modeling.   
WVDdirect inference: In order to derive the WVDdirect score for the projects, we define 
rules using the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL), similar to the one shown in Figure 7.13. 
The rule states that, if a project release has a LOC and OverallSeverityScore measure, then the 








hasLOC(?r, ?loc),  
hasOverallSeverityScore(?r, ?score),  
divide(?wvdDirect, ?score, ?loc)  
→ hasDirectWVD(?r, ?wvdDirect) 
Figure 7.13: Rules to infer the direct WVD measure 
WVDinherit inference: For us to be able to infer the WVDinherit measure of a project release, 
we had first to determine the ratio of vulnerable APIs that are reused in a particular release. The 
OntTAM knowledge model not only captures the required information to derive this measure, 
but also includes all semantics to be able to take advantage of the SW reasoners to infer the 
measure value. More specifically, once the required ontologies (e.g., SEVONT, SEON, 
OntTAM) are populated, a SPARQL query can be created to retrieve the number of vulnerable 
API elements in a given release (see Figure 7.14).  
Using Figure 7.15, we can also determine the number of such vulnerable API elements being 
reused in client applications. The SPARQL query (Figure 7.16) exemplifies how we take 
advantage of analysis results from the inference rules in Figure 7.13 to infer the final 
WVDinherit measure for a particular release of a component. For a more detailed description, on 















CONSTRUCT{?release sevont:hasVulnerableCodeCount ?totalVulnerableCodeCount} 
WHERE{ 
   { 
      SELECT ?release count(?vulnerableCode) as ?totalVulnerableCodeCount 
      WHERE{ 
         ?vulnerableCode rdf:type code:VulnerableCode. 
         ?release code:containsCodeEntity ?vulnerableCode 
      }GROUP BY ?release 
   } 
} 




















CONSTRUCT{?link sevont:hasReusedVulnerableCodeCount ?usedVulnerableCodeCount} 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?link count(?vulnerableCode) as ?usedVulnerableCodeCount 
  WHERE { 
   ?link a sbson:DependencyLink. 
   ?link sbson:hasDependencySource ?client; sbson:hasDependencyTarget ?release. 
   ?client code:containsCodeEntity ?codeEntity. 
   ?codeEntity main:dependsOn ?vulnerableCode. 
   { 
      SELECT ?vulnerableCode 
      WHERE { 
         ?vulnerableCode rdf:type code:VulnerableCode. 
         ?release code:containsCodeEntity ?vulnerableCode. 
       } 
    } 
  }GROUP BY ?link 
}} 



















CONSTRUCT{?client sevont:hasInheritWVD ?inheritWVD } 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?client count(?indirectWVD) as ?inheritWVD 
  WHERE { 
   ?link a sbson:DependencyLink. 
   ?link sbson:hasDependencySource ?client; sbson:hasDependencyTarget ?release. 
   ?client sevont:hasReusedVulnerableCodeCount ?usedVulnerableCodeCount. 
   ?release sevont:hasVulnerableCodeCount ?totalVulnerableCodeCount.  
   ?release sevont:hasDirectWVD ?directWVD. 
   BIND((?usedVulnerableCodeCount/?totalVulnerableCodeCount) AS ?vulnerableCodeRatio).  
   BIND((?vulnerableCodeRatio * ?directWVD) AS ?indirectWVD). 
  }  
}} 
Figure 7.16: SPARQL query for inferring inherited WVD measures in clients’ projects 
 
Findings and Discussion. Table 7.4 provides an overview of results from our case study, 
including the number of known vulnerabilities, project size, and WVD scores for selected project 
releases. Using the WVD measure we can now compare two releases of the same project in 
terms of their weighted vulnerability density. For example, based on the WVD measure, we can 
consider Struts 1.2.9 to be more trustworthy than earlier versions of Struts (e.g., version 1.2.4 
and 1.2.8, which have both higher WVD scores). However, the latest version is not always better 
than earlier versions as seen with the analyzed Apache CXF WS Security libraries. Version 2.7.0 
of the CXF WS Security library has a worse WVD compared to its previous versions – two new 
vulnerabilities were introduced in version 2.7.0 in addition to the existing vulnerabilities 
inherited from prior versions.  
We further analyzed the WVD results, to see whether developers migrate their applications to 
library versions which are less vulnerable (e.g., a newer version of the same library with patched 
vulnerabilities). Table 7.5 provides an overview of the number of dependent applications which 
change their build dependency to a more trustworthy release (based on the lower WVD score). 
Our analysis results show that 45.1% client applications which switched their library 
dependencies; out of these, 63.29% switched to a more trustworthy library release. Surprisingly, 
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the remaining 36.71% switched to library releases which are either equal or less trustworthy 
(higher WVD score), even if more trustworthy library versions are available.   
 
Table 7.4: Vulnerability densities of selected projects 
Project # vulnerabilities Aggregated Vuln.  Scores Size (Kloc) WVD 
commons-fileupload 1.0 2 10.8 1.23 8.78 
commons-fileupload 1.1 2 10.8 1.28 8.46 
commons-fileupload 1.2 2 10.8 1.78 6.05 
commons-fileupload 1.2.1 2 10.8 1.97 5.49 
commons-fileupload 1.2.2 2 10.8 2.04 5.31 
commons-fileupload 1.3 1 7.5 2.39 3.14 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.1 4 23.6 18.92 1.25 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.4 4 23.6 21.30 1.11 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.6 5 27.9 23.10 1.21 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.6.3 8 39.4 26.43 1.49 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.7.0 10 49.4 26.43 1.87 
Struts 1.2.4 5 30 24.04 1.25 
Struts 1.2.8 8 49.6 24.61 2.02 
Struts 1.2.9 4 25.7 24.76 1.04 
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29.36% 74.26% 25.74% 
commons-fileupload 1.1 6.28% 58.33% 41.67% 
commons-fileupload 1.2 70.54% 100.00% 0.00% 
commons-fileupload 1.2.1 38.97% 97.55% 2.45% 
commons-fileupload 1.2.2 46.79% 99.99% 0.01% 
commons-fileupload 1.3 40.62% 0.00% 100.00% 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.1 
CVE-2013-0239 
94.93% 100.00% 0.00% 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.4 95.00% 0.23% 99.77% 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.6 95.24% 63.10% 36.90% 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.6.3 98.08% 85.29% 14.71% 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.7.0 92.75% 97.26% 2.74% 
Struts 1.2.4 
CVE-2016-1181 
0.00% n/a n/a 
Struts 1.2.8 44.44% 100.00% 0.00% 
Struts 1.2.9 0.00% n/a n/a 
7.4.3 Identifying and Measuring License Violations 
Approach. License violations originating from external libraries and components can cause a 
major long-term liability for client applications, which can have a negative effect on the use of 
third-party intellectual property and therefore their trustworthiness of these libraries. In our 
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study, we first evaluate if such license violations (non-compliances) occur in general in project 
dependencies managed by the Maven repository. In the second part of our study, we revisit our 4 
projects used in our trustworthiness assessment study, to assess their trustworthiness in terms of 
license violations. For the study, we create SPARQL queries that analyze all dependency 
relationships in the Maven repository and identify three main categories of license violations: 
simple violations, transitive violations, and compound violations (see Section 7.3.3). The queries 
take advantage of both our open source license ontology and the build ontology. Figures 7.17, 











SELECT distinct * 
WHERE { 
 ?link a sbson:DependencyLink. 
  ?link sbson:hasDependencyTarget ?project2.  
  ?link sbson:hasDependencySource ?project1. 
  ?project1 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license1. 
  ?project2 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license2. 
  ?license1 markosCopyright:incompatibleWith ?license2. 
} 
















SELECT distinct * 
WHERE { 
 ?linkA a sbson:DependencyLink. 
  ?linkA sbson:hasDependencyTarget ?project2. 
  ?linkA sbson:hasDependencySource ?project1. 
  ?linkB a sbson:DependencyLink. 
  ?linkB sbson:hasDependencyTarget ?project3. 
  ?linkB sbson:hasDependencySource ?project2. 
  ?project1 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license1. 
  ?project2 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license2. 
  ?project3 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license3. 
  ?license1 markosCopyright:compatibleWith ?license2. 
  ?license2 markosCopyright:compatibleWith ?license3. 
  ?license1 markosCopyright:incompatibleWith ?license3.  
} 


















SELECT distinct * 
WHERE { 
 ?linkA a sbson:DependencyLink. 
  ?linkA sbson:hasDependencyTarget ?project2. 
  ?linkA sbson:hasDependencySource ?project1. 
  ?linkB a sbson:DependencyLink. 
  ?linkB sbson:hasDependencyTarget ?project3. 
  ?linkB sbson:hasDependencySource ?project1. 
  ?project1 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license1. 
  ?project2 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license2. 
  ?project3 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license3. 
  ?license1 markosCopyright:compatibleWith ?license2. 
  ?license1 markosCopyright:compatibleWith ?license3. 
  ?license2 markosCopyright:incompatibleWith ?license3.  
} 
Figure 7.19: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of compound license violations 
 
Findings and Discussion. This section presents and discusses the results which we obtained 
from our license violation experiment using the Maven repository. Figure 7.20 shows the 
distribution of different project licenses across the Maven repository. In Table 7.6, we report on 
the license violations (classified by the type of violation), which we identified in our study of the 
Maven repository.  
 

















Table 7.6: Totals for each type of violation found by querying the data store 
License Violation Types Count 
Type 1 - Simple Violations 131996 
Type 2 - Transitive Violations 288153 
Type 3 - Compound Violations 654964 
 
Our study identified over 131,000 simple violations and numerous transitive license 
violations of different types. We note that Type 3 violations are seemingly the most popular type 
of violation, followed by Type 2, then 1. In what follows, we discuss in more detail some of the 
license violations or incompatibilities which we observed in our study.  
Figures 7.21, 7.22, and 7.23 summarize the most common license violation pairs which 
occurred for all three license violation categories. The most common Type 1 violation which we 
observed is code published under the Apache 2 license being incorporated into GPL 2 licensed 
code. This violation is not surprising for two reasons. First, many software developers are simply 
not aware nor well-versed in open source license compliance, and as these are the two of the 
most popular licenses in the world, this pairing reflects their usage in the wild. Second, there is 
likely some confusion about Apache 2’s compatibility with the GPL. On the GNU website, the 
Free Software Foundation publishes a list of licenses that are compatible with the GPL. This 
page shows Apache 2 in green (meaning compatible), but in the license discussion, the authors 




Figure 7.21: Most Popular Type 1 License Violation Pairs 
 
Figure 7.22: Most Popular Type 2 License Violation Pairs 
 



























0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
EUPL 1.1 ► GPL 3
MPL 1 ► LGPL 2.1
MPL 1.1 ► LGPL 2
AGPL 3 ► GPL 2
Apache 2 ► MPL 1
MPL 1 ► AGPL 3
Artistic 1 ► GPL 3
CPL 1 ► GPL 3
Apache 1.1 ► GPL 2
MPL 1 ► GPL 2
EUPL 1.1 ► Apache 2
MPL 1.1 ► GPL 2
Apache 1.1 ► GPL 3
GPL 3 ► GPL 2
MPL 1.1 ► LGPL 3
MPL 1.1 ► GPL 3
AGPL 3 ► Apache 2
Apache 2 ► MPL 1.1
MPL 1.1 ► AGPL 3
MPL 1.1 ► LGPL 2.1
EPL 1 ► GPL 2
EPL 1 ► GPL 3
GPL 2 ► Apache 2
GPL 3 ► Apache 2
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Apache 2 ► MPL 2 ► MPL 1
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CPL 1 ► Apache 2 ► GPL 3
Apache 2 ► MPL 2 ► GPL 2
Apache 1.1 ► Apache 2 ► GPL 3
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Apache 1.1 + MPL 1 ► Apache 2
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Apache 1.1 + MPL 1.1 ► Apache 2
GPL 2 + Apache 2 ► GPL 3
Apache 2 + GPL 2 ► GPL 3
MPL 1.1 + LGPL 3 ► Apache 2
AGPL 3 + Apache 2 ► GPL 3














A more detailed analysis of the reasons why the number of transitive license violations is 
significantly larger compared to direct violations revealed: (1) Type 1 license 
compatibility/incompatibility are easier to verify/detect. That is, it is much more likely that a 
developer will check for license compliance when only two licenses are involved. (2) Transitive 
violation types, on the other hand, have not been considered in the research community prior to 
this work, and may very well be acceptable or be clearly identifiable as such. For example, the 
European Union Public License (EUPL) explicitly states which licenses it is compatible with. 
This is a known compatibility. Whereas for transitive interactions, the EUPL may then be 
imported into an intermediary project, say a project under the Licence Libre du Québec – 
Réciprocité (LiLiQ-R), which is then imported into a tertiary project under Common 
Development and Distribution License (CDDL). Each step (EUPL to LiLiQ, and LiLiQ to 
CDDL) is known to be compatible. But the EUPL does not explicitly state that it is compatible 
with the CDDL. This chain of licenses may be flagged as a violation by our approach. Yet this 
chain could, in fact, be perfectly lawful (a false-positive, verifiable by a lawyer). Our approach 
will, however, flag such a dependency chain as a potential violation. This triple is neither a 
known compatibility nor known incompatibility and thus is one of the reasons why there are 
more Type 2 violations found.  
Identification of Type 3 violations becomes even more difficult to detect since their detection 
largely depends on how licenses define derivative works and conditions for reusing these 
libraries. Libraries can be used by either including the actual source code or through linking (e.g. 
through a jar file). Linking of a library can be static (compile-time) or dynamic (run-time). For 
example, LGPL requires each project to be an “independent work that stands by itself and 
includes no source code from [the other].” In this scenario, it is perfectly acceptable to combine 
the compiled code, however [170]. So basically, the question is whether a derivative work is 
created or not, when combining dependencies into a new project. Derivative works come into 
play only when the licensed software is copied, distributed, or modified. Additional research is 
needed to further clarify legal and license compliance issue when using these open source 
licenses. However, as can be noted, all three types of violations can exist in projects. Thus, 
simple, transitive, and complex license violations are problems that occur in open source projects 
and can potentially affect the trustworthiness of components and libraries being reused in 
software projects.  
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 In what follows, we report on license violations results which we observed for the selected 4 
projects in our trustworthy study. Table 7.7 provides an overview of the number of license 
violations which we detected in these projects. Only four (4) releases of Commons-Fileupload 
introduced violations in client applications. For the remaining projects, no license violations are 
reported due to the lack of license information in the analyzed client applications. Results, 
although incomplete, confirm our previous claim that violations are problems that occur in open 
source projects.  
 








commons-fileupload 1.0 0 0 0 
commons-fileupload 1.1 0 0 0 
commons-fileupload 1.2 4 0 0 
commons-fileupload 1.2.1 14 0 0 
commons-fileupload 1.2.2 19 0 0 
commons-fileupload 1.3 4 0 0 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.1 0 0 0 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.4 0 0 0 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.6 0 0 0 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.6.3 0 0 0 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.7.0 0 0 0 
Struts 1.2.4 0 0 0 
Struts 1.2.8 0 0 0 
Struts 1.2.9 0 0 0 
 
7.4.4 Identifying and Measuring API Breaking Changes  
Approach. As previously mentioned in our study setup (Section 7.4.1, Figure 7.12), we 
extract the source code and versioning information of the four projects from GitHub and SVN.  
We identify the introduced breaking and non-breaking changes for each successive pair of 
releases of a given project using the VTracker tool. In order to be able to reuse the analysis 
results for further analysis, we take advantage of our ontological knowledge modeling approach 
and extend our knowledge base to include the analysis results. Developers can now access this 
information, using SPARQL queries, to derive potential direct and indirect impacts of breaking 
changes on their client applications. Complete details on how we identify, and model breaking 
changes can be found in Chapter 5. In what follows, we show some of the main rules and queries 




BCD inference: For computing the BCD scores of the projects in our dataset, we define a 
SWRL rule (see Figure 7.24), which infers the BCD score from the breaking and non-breaking 
change counts. Figures 7.25 and 7.26 detail the queries for computing the breaking and non-
breaking change measures of a project.  
 
BCIdirect and BCIindirect inference: The queries in Figures 7.27 and 7.28 take advantage of the 
inference services to derive both the direct and indirect BCI scores from a project and its 
dependencies. The query in Figure 7.28 first identifies two unique releases of the same project 
for which breaking changes have been populated into the triple-store. It then identifies any usage 
of the found binary incompatible APIs within the client. These queries are based on Equations 6 








hasBreakingChangeCount(?r, ?bcc),  
hasNonBreakingChangeCount (?r, ?nbcc),  
divide(?bcd, ?bcc, ?nbcc)  
→ hasBCD(?r, ?bcd) 












CONSTRUCT{?release code:hasBreakingChangeCount ?totalBreakingChanges } 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?release count(?breakingChange) as ?totalBreakingChanges 
  WHERE{ 
    ?breakingChange rdf:type code:BreakingChange. 
    ?breakingChange code:hasCurrentAPI ?api.  
    ?release code:containsCodeEntity ?api.  
  }GROUP BY ?release 
}} 















CONSTRUCT{?release code:hasNonBreakingChangeCount ?totalNonBreakingChanges } 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?release count(?nonbreakingChange) as ?totalNonBreakingChanges 
  WHERE{ 
    ?nonbreakingChange rdf:type code:NonBreakingChange. 
    ?nonbreakingChange code:hasCurrentAPI ?api.  
    ?release code:containsCodeEntity ?api.  
  }GROUP BY ?release 
}} 



















CONSTRUCT{?release code:hasDirectBCI ?directBCI } 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?release ?directBCI 
  WHERE { 
    BIND((?usedBreakingChanges/?bcc) AS ?directBCI). 
    { 
      SELECT ?release count(?breakingApi) as ?usedBreakingChanges ?bcc 
      WHERE{ 
        ?breakingChange rdf:type code:BreakingChange; code:hasCurrentAPI ?breakingApi;  
        ?dependent code:containsCodeEntity ?breakingApi; code:hasBreakingChangeCount ?bcc.  
        ?client code:containsCodeEntity ?api.  
        ?api main:dependsOn ?breakingApi. 
      }GROUP BY ?release 
    } 
  } 
}} 






































CONSTRUCT{?client  code:hasIndirectBCI ?indirectBCI } 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?client ?indirectBCI 
  WHERE { 
    BIND((?usedBreakingChanges/?bcc) AS ?indirectBCI). 
    { 
      SELECT ?client count(?clientAPIEntity) as ?usedBreakingChanges count(?breakingChange) as ?bcc 
      WHERE{ 
        #identify use of breaking change entity in clien 
        ?client code:containsCodeEntity ?clientAPIEntity. 
        {?clientAPIEntity main:dependsOn ?currentAPIElement} UNION  
        {?clientAPIEntity main:dependsOn ?priorAPIElement}. 
        { 
          SELECT ?client, ?dependency ?asm1, ?asm2 
          WHERE { 
            #Identify different releases of the same project for which breaking changes exist 
            ?client sbson:hasBuildDependencyOn ?dependency1; sbson:hasBuildDependencyOn ?dependency2. 
            ?breakingChange a code:BreakingCodeChange. 
            ?breakingChange code:hasPriorAPI ?priorAPIElement; code:hasCurrentAPI ?currentAPIElement. 
            ?dependency1 code:containsCodeEntity ?currentAPIElement. 
            ?dependency2 code:containsCodeEntity ?priorAPIElement. 
            FILTER(?dependency1 != ?dependency2). 
          } 
        }GROUP BY ?client 
      } 
    } 
}} 
Figure 7.28: SPARQL query for inferring the indirect BCI measure in a project 
 
Findings and Discussion. Figure 7.29 shows an example of a bug54 reported in Eclipse 
Orbit55. Orbit depends on ASM, a Java bytecode manipulation library. ASM introduced breaking 
changes in its later releases, such as ClassVisitor being changed from an interface (version 3.X) 
to a class in version 4.0. This change is a major change in the API and therefore breaking the 







Figure 7.29: An example of a reported bug showing how a breaking change in the ASM 
library impacts Orbit and its dependent projects 
  
We also illustrate how our ontology-based API dependency measures can aid developers in 
detecting and dealing with such breaking changes. For the analysis, we extract and populate facts 
about the breaking changes between different versions of ASM releases and the source code of 
all projects which directly depend on ASM releases (8109 dependencies in total). Based on the 
extracted source code and dependency information, the earlier introduced SPARQL queries can 
now be used to identify the potential direct and indirect impacts of ASM breaking changes on 
client applications.  
Figure 7.30 shows the distribution of (a) breaking changes, (b) non- breaking changes, and 
(c) breaking change densities (BCD) across all selected 20 ASM releases. Figure 7.30(d) reports 
on the impact of the ClassVisitor API breaking change on client applications. Furthermore, this 
change can potentially affect, on average, 50 different API elements and as many as 225 API 
elements in a single client application. The reported impact set returned by our approach includes 
clients which reuse the ClassVisitor API either directly (through an implementation of the 












Figure 7.30: Distribution of breaking changes and their impacts in the analyzed ASM 
libraries and dependencies 
7.4.5 Assessment Process 
In the previous sub-sections we described how we identify and measure different attributes of 
trustworthiness by taking advantage of our unified ontological knowledge representation and SW 
reasoning services. The OntTAM assessment process further integrates these scores across 
attributes and sub-factors. For the actual assessment process, we first compute the fuzzy score for 
each measure individually and then aggregate these scores to calculate the attribute, sub-factors, 
factors, and dimension assessment scores. Figure 7.31 gives a complete overview of how the 
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The effect of the fuzzification on the assessment scores typically increases with the 
assessment abstraction levels (e.g., quality dimension scores vs attribute scores). Figures 7.32 
and 7.33 show the rules we used to create the fuzzified score for the WVD measure and Figure 
7.34 provides example rules we used to combine the fuzzified LVC and WVD scores into a score 







































   WVD_Measure: REAL; 




   WVD_Score: REAL; 
END_VAR 
 
FUZZIFY WVD_Measure  
   TERM VERYLOW := (0.0,1.0) (1.04,1.0) (2.11,0.0) ; 
   TERM LOW := (1.90,0.0) (2.975,1.0) (4.14,0.0) ; 
   TERM AVERAGE := (3.73,0.0) (4.91,1.0) (6.17,0.0) ; 
   TERM HIGH := (5.55,0.0) (6.845,1.0) (8.20,0.0) ; 




   TERM LOW := (0.0,1.0) (0.5,1.0) (2.69,0.0) ; 
   TERM MEDIUM := (2.56,0.0) (4.75,1.0) (7.05,0.0) ; 




   TERM VERYPOOR := (6.5,0.0) (7.5,1.0) (9.0,1.0) ; 
   TERM POOR := (5.31,0.0) (6.25,1.0) (7.22,0.0) ; 
   TERM AVERAGE := (4.14,0.0) (5.0,1.0) (5.9,0.0) ; 
   TERM VERYGOOD := (2.95,0.0) (3.75,1.0) (4.6,0.0) ; 
   TERM EXCELLENT := (0.0,1.0) (2.5,1.0) (3.28,0.0) ; 
 
   METHOD : COG; 
END_DEFUZZIFY 





















































RULE 0 : IF WVD_Measure IS VERYLOW AND WVD_Weight IS LOW      THEN   WVD_Score IS 
EXCELLENT ; 
 
RULE 1 : IF WVD_Measure IS VERYLOW AND WVD_Weight IS MEDIUM THEN WVD_Score IS 
EXCELLENT ; 
 
RULE 2 : IF WVD_Measure IS VERYLOW AND WVD_Weight IS HIGH THEN WVD_Score IS 
VERYGOOD ; 
  
RULE 3 : IF WVD_Measure  IS LOW AND WVD_Weight IS LOW THEN WVD_Score IS EXCELLENT ; 
 
RULE 4 : IF WVD_Measure  IS LOW AND WVD_Weight IS MEDIUM THEN WVD_Score IS 
VERYGOOD ; 
   
RULE 5 : IF WVD_Measure  IS LOW AND WVD_Weight IS HIGH THEN WVD_Score IS AVERAGE ; 
  
RULE 6 : IF WVD_Measure  IS AVERAGE AND WVD_Weight IS LOW THEN WVD_Score IS 
VERYGOOD ; 
  
RULE 7 : IF WVD_Measure  IS AVERAGE AND WVD_Weight IS MEDIUM THEN WVD_Score IS 
AVERAGE ; 
  
RULE 8 : IF WVD_Measure  IS AVERAGE AND WVD_Weight IS HIGH THEN WVD_Score IS POOR; 
  
RULE 9 : IF WVD_Measure  IS HIGH AND WVD_Weight IS LOW THEN WVD_Score IS AVERAGE ; 
  
RULE 10 : IF WVD_Measure  IS HIGH AND WVD_Weight IS MEDIUM THEN WVD_Score IS POOR ; 
  
RULE 11 : IF WVD_Measure  IS HIGH AND WVD_Weight IS HIGH THEN WVD_Score IS  
VERYPOOR; 
  
RULE 12 : IF WVD_Measure  IS VERYHIGH AND WVD_Weight IS LOW THEN WVD_Score IS POOR ; 
 
RULE 13 : IF WVD_Measure  IS VERYHIGH AND WVD_Weight IS MEDIUM THEN WVD_Score IS 
VERYPOOR ; 
  






Figure 7.33: Sample FCL file for inferring the fuzzy scores for the WVD measure 
 
Using the property chain axioms, which we explained earlier in Section 7.3.2.1, one can now 
automatically infer trustworthiness scores from the populated measures of any given project. 



























RULEBLOCK IMPACT _SCORE_RULES 
 
RULE 0 : IF LVC_Score IS EXCELLENT AND WVD_Score IS VERYPOOR THEN   IMPACT_Score IS 
AVERAGE ; 
 
RULE 1 : IF LVC_Score IS VERYGOOD AND WVD_Score IS VERYPOOR THEN   IMPACT_Score IS 
POOR ; 
 
RULE 2 : IF LVC_Score IS AVERAGE AND WVD_Score IS VERYPOOR THEN   IMPACT_Score IS 
POOR ; 
 
RULE 3 : IF LVC_Score IS POOR AND WVD_Score IS VERYPOOR THEN   IMPACT_Score IS 
VERYPOOR ; 
 



















Query 1: At sub-factor level 
SELECT distinct ?project ?subfactorScore 
WHERE { 
  ?impactAttribute a onttam:SubFactor.   
  ?project onttam:hasSubfactor ?subfactorAttribute. 










Query 2: At factor level 
SELECT distinct ?project ?factorScore 
WHERE { 
  ?factorAttribute a onttam:Factor.   
  ?project onttam:hasFactor ?factorAttribute. 
  ?factorAttribute onttam:hasScore  ?factorScore.  
} 




Findings and Discussion. Table 7.8 presents a summary of trustworthiness scores, which we 
derived from the three software trustworthiness categories we consider in the scope of this work: 
API breaking changes, security vulnerabilities, and license violations. 
 
Table 7.8: Overview of selected trustworthiness measure scores for our case study projects 
Project 













commons-fileupload 1.0 8.78 VERYPOOR 0 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.1 8.46 VERYPOOR 0 EXCELLENT 2.14 VERYPOOR 
commons-fileupload 1.2 6.05 POOR 4 VERYPOOR 0.64 POOR 
commons-fileupload 1.2.1 5.49 AVERAGE 14 VERYPOOR 0.49 AVERAGE 
commons-fileupload 1.2.2 5.31 AVERAGE 19 VERYPOOR 0.48 AVERAGE 
commons-fileupload 1.3 3.14 VERYGOOD 4 VERYPOOR 0.6 AVERAGE 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.1 1.25 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 0.08 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.4 1.11 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 0.95 VERYPOOR 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.6 1.21 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 0.89 VERYPOOR 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.6.3 1.49 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 0.86 VERYPOOR 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.7.0 1.87 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 0.88 VERYPOOR 
Struts 1.2.4 1.25 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 0.9 VERYPOOR 
Struts 1.2.8 2.02 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 0.44 AVERAGE 
Struts 1.2.9 1.04 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 0.32 VERYGOOD 
 
Table 7.9: Example of inferred trustworthiness scores at sub-factor level 
Project 













commons-fileupload 1.0 5.01 AVERAGE 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.1 5.01 AVERAGE 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.2 5.01 AVERAGE 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.2.1 1.45 EXCELLENT 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.2.2 1.45 EXCELLENT 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.3 3.77 VERYGOOD 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.1 1.45 EXCELLENT 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.4 1.45 EXCELLENT 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.6 1.45 EXCELLENT 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.6.3 1.45 EXCELLENT 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.7.0 1.45 EXCELLENT 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
Struts 1.2.4 1.45 EXCELLENT 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
Struts 1.2.8 1.45 EXCELLENT 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
Struts 1.2.9 1.45 EXCELLENT 1.45 EXCELLENT 0 EXCELLENT 
 
Tables 7.9 and 7.10 report on the results from our queries in Figure 7.35. The results indicate 
that despite the presence of security, licensing, and breaking change concerns, almost all projects 
have excellent trustworthiness scores at the presented sub-factor and factor levels. This is due to 
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how the score categories are distributed over the fuzzy scale. In our work, the categories are 
distributed equally from 0 to maximum measure value recorded in our dataset. For example, the 
maximum WVD measure in our dataset is 11.29, making all WVD measures under 2.95 
excellent. The complete scale distributions for all our measures can be found in the FCL files 
online56. 
 
Table 7.10: Example of inferred trustworthiness scores at factor level 
Project 
Reusability Factor 
Numeric Score Fuzzified Score 
commons-fileupload 1.0 0 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.1 0 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.2 0 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.2.1 1.45 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.2.2 1.45 EXCELLENT 
commons-fileupload 1.3 1.45 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.1 1.45 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.4 1.45 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.6 1.45 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.6.3 1.45 EXCELLENT 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.7.0 1.45 EXCELLENT 
Struts 1.2.4 1.45 EXCELLENT 
Struts 1.2.8 1.45 EXCELLENT 
Struts 1.2.9 1.45 EXCELLENT 
 
It should be noted that the tables above do not report on the final overall trustworthiness 
score since this score would require a particular assessment context and an instantiation of our 
OntTAM assessment model with more measures, attributes, and sub-factors. 
 
7.5 Discussion and Related Work 
7.5.1 Threats to Validity 
7.5.1.1 Internal Threats 
A potential threat to our approach is whether the set of measures we considered in our 
assessment as part of OntTAM evaluation is sufficient to capture reusability as a trustworthiness 





established subset of existing trustworthiness models, such as PAS 754:2014, QualiPSo [171], 
and Boland et. al. [172]. While we only selected a very small subset of these trustworthiness 
attributes, we believe this subset is sufficient to illustrate the applicability of our assessment 
model. In particular, the objective of our study was not to verify the assessment model for its 
completeness but rather to illustrate that OntTAM can be instantiated to a given (user specified) 
assessment context. The study shows that instantiating and extending OntTAM to support other 
requirements including new measures, attributes or sub-factors is a straightforward task.  
7.5.1.2 External Threats 
Definition of license violations and compliance. Given the large number of licenses available 
in the open source community, there exists currently no comprehensive conceptual framework 
describing the dependencies among all these licenses. There is a need for involving both the 
development community and intellectual copyright experts to consolidate and redefine the 
dependencies among the various open source licenses. The objective of our work is to formalize 
and conceptualize license violations as a domain of discourse at the TBox level. Actual license 
dependencies can be inferred once the ontology is populated (ABox) with available license 
dependency information, therefore allowing us to take advantage of ontologies and their ability 
to deal with incremental knowledge population and incomplete knowledge inference.        
7.5.2 Related Work 
7.5.2.1 Library Recommendation and Migration Techniques 
Many third-party libraries are available for download to reduce development time by 
providing access to features ready for use. To help developers take advantage of these libraries, 
several techniques have been proposed that provide automatic library recommendations to 
developers. Common to these approaches is that they rely on criteria such as popularity and 
stability. Some of them even rely on the client’s context (e.g., mining previous usage of libraries) 
for their recommendations. For example, Mileva et al. [133] study the popularity of an API. 
Their approach studies the rate at which dependencies adopt or switch from OSS libraries. Hora 
and Valente [143] build on Mileva’s approach to introduce four distinct API popularity trends: 
fast growth, constant growth, peak growth, and dead growth. Their approach can benefit both 
library developers and clients. For example, library developers can be notified when the 
popularity of their API begins to go down. Raemaekers et al. [117] present four stability metrics 
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that calculate the stability of API interfaces. They demonstrate how the metrics can be used by 
developers in deciding on libraries to reuse. The frequency of the migration of API dependencies 
has also been used to determine the stability of an API by [2], [16], [143]. 
Other techniques exist which recommend various API elements (method calls, blocks of 
code, etc.) of a software library to developers using heuristics that leverage various information 
sources (source code, commit logs, etc.). Thung et al. [142] propose an automated technique, 
which combines association rule mining techniques and collaborative filtering to perform the 
recommendation of libraries. Their approach recommends a number of likely relevant libraries to 
developers of a target project based on the libraries used by other projects. McCarey et al. 
recommend methods of software libraries to a developer by investigating the history of methods 
that have been used in the past [144]. 
In addition, several API documentation and tutorial analysis approaches have been 
introduced to aid developers understand how the features provided by software libraries can be 
correctly utilized (e.g., [173], [174]). 
The above-mentioned techniques rarely consider the impact of reused external libraries on 
the quality of a client’s project. Our work aims to provide developers with an approach to assess 
how much trust can be placed on a recommended software library. Our work can be seen 
complementary to existing library recommendation systems, in terms of extending these existing 
recommendation criteria by making quality in the form of trustworthiness an integrated part of 
the library recommendations.  
7.5.2.2 Software License Violation Identification 
Related studies into identifying software license violations can be categorized into two 
levels: intra-project and inter-project. At the intra-project level, studies aim to identify the 
introduction of license violations introduced by having project files with different licenses. Di 
Penta et al. [175] proposed an approach to automatically track the licensing evolution of systems, 
identifying changes in licenses and copyright years. They found that OSS projects do change 
licenses over time and these changes were not just to new versions of the existing license. 
Sometimes projects who switched licenses altogether had intended and unintended effects on 
downstream users of these projects. As recently as 2015, research has been conducted by Wu et 
al. [176] on the evolution of the licenses specified in the header of each file, with the explicit 
goal of finding license inconsistencies. They categorize the evolution of licenses as a license 
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addition/removal, upgrade/downgrade, or change. These categorizations are then used to judge 
whether the new modification/evolution of the license results in an inconsistency.  
Identifying license violations at the inter-project level requires substantial effort because 
developers typically combine APIs from different libraries to solve problems [177]. Several 
researchers have studied how reuse of source code (through cloning) and software 
components/libraries can lead to the introduction of license violations. Using code clones to 
detect small-scale license violations was touched upon by several researchers. Monden et al. 
[178] introduce three quality metrics for code clone detection. Disappointingly, the authors did 
not find any actual license violations in OSS. License violations were merely used as a 
theoretical use case for their comparative study. The Binary Analysis Tool (BAT) developed by 
Hemel et al. [179] detects code clones of OSS in proprietary binaries for the express purpose of 
finding violations of popular GPL projects. The authors used the comparison of string literals, 
data compression, and binary deltas. Interestingly, BAT does find many true code clones but 
falls short by leaving the verification as a manual process, i.e. whether a code clone is also a 
license violation. 
The work by German and Hassan [180] is the most closely related to our work. The authors 
created a “model to describe licenses and the implications of licenses on the reuse of 
components.” Their model describes what usage scenarios result in a derived work or not. Our 
work builds upon the existing body of knowledge for license violations, by providing the first 
attempt to create a formal representation of the license dependencies. Our approach considers the 
complexity and dependencies of real projects, where multiple licenses are often involved, to 
support the detection of license violations. The advantage of our ontological representation, 
being an integrated part of our unified knowledge model, is the ability to extend and reuse our 
license model for different type of analysis tasks, such as its seamless integration in a 
trustworthiness assessment model. 
7.5.2.3 Quality Models 
Assessing quality to improve the evolution of software systems has been addressed in 
existing research through the introduction of software quality models. These models introduced 
quality dimensions and classified quality factors that affect the development and maintenance of 
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software products. Among the most widely accepted quality assessment model is the ISO 912657 
software quality model standard which defines a quality model via a set of quality characteristics 
and sub-characteristics that were believed to be the more representative and relevant at the time 
of its introduction. As the complexity and vulnerability of software systems  grows as a result of 
their components being increasingly reused across project boundaries and  interconnected 
through networks and communication links, assessing the trustworthiness of systems and their 
components plays an ever-increasing role While security and interoperability are already present 
in the ISO 9126 standard as “sub-factors” of functionality, more recent quality models such as 
the ISO 25000 standard have extended the ISO 9126, by making security and interoperability a 
main quality aspect of the standard.  
In [9], the authors introduced an SE- Evolvable QUality Assessment Meta-model (SE-
EQUAM), a quality assessment model which is both evolvable and reusable. The model 
introduces a set of complementary core requirements necessary for a model to be considered an 
evolvable model: Model Reusability, Knowledge Modeling, Knowledge Population, and 
Knowledge Exploration [9]. In this work, we adopt the model evolvability criteria to derive our 
trustworthiness meta-model that is not only capable of dealing with continuous change (in the 
model) but also allows for its reuse by simplifying the instantiation of new domain model 
instances. 
7.5.2.4 Trustworthiness Models 
Existing work on assessing the trustworthiness of OSS systems, for example, Taibi et. al. 
[181], Larson et. al [182], and Tan et. al [183] have attempted to quantify OSS trustworthiness of 
software systems in situ, but results are limited to artifacts in the development environment; 
external and heterogeneous knowledge sources are not considered in these approaches. Other 
researchers Pfleeger et. al. [184], and Yang et. al. [185] seek to analyze and predict aspects of 
trustworthiness during software development. While other work has focused on introducing new 
evaluation criteria to better capture the nature of OSS’s components, for example, the QualiPSo 
model of OSS trustworthiness [171], and Boland et. al [172] quantify and assess risk based on 
the Structured Assurance Case Model (SACM) [186] to determine software trustworthiness. The 





standardized product comparison across different projects and domains. Most trustworthiness 
assessment models share a generic structure, template, or frame for assessing software security 
quality that corresponds to a hierarchy or tree structure with multiple levels and a set of 
constraints that define the relationship between one level and the next one. However, regardless 
of the kind of components, these syntactic proposals mainly address and mostly focus on the 
evaluation criteria and decision-making phases, setting aside the practical problem of how to 
search for and locate components and to assign suitable information about them [187]. Also, a 
general concern in most of these models is that they rely on the software product and traditional 
software lifecycle artifacts. They do not necessarily consider external resources in their 
assessment such as external vulnerability databases. As a result, there is no consensus on the 
applicability of these trustworthiness models in industrial practice [188]. 
While existing proposals for the creating such meta-modeling assessment models focus on 
adopting one or more of these existing quality models in one standard model, this may result in 
an incomplete or unbalanced assessment, depending on the input. Using a meta-modeling 
approach can address this challenge by quantifying the trustworthiness of software as a 
“product” and specifying a domain model that captures and conceptualizes trustworthiness. A 
domain model is a conceptualization of a problem domain in terms of its entities, properties, 
relationships, and constraints. In software, several domain models exist that are capable of 
representing and assessing predefined sets of trustworthiness, e.g., PAS 754:2014, QualiPSo 
[171], and Boland et. al.[172]. All these domain models share a common, while informal (non-
machine-readable), structural representation of the trustworthiness they are assessing. This lack 
of formalism and semantics limits the possible reuse and instantiation for specific trustworthiness 
assessment contexts. 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
In summary, this chapter introduced OntTAM, a trustworthiness assessment model which is 
an instantiation of the SE-EQUAM assessment model. OntTAM takes advantage of the seamless 
integration of the SBSON, SEON, SEVONT, and MARKOS to provide an automated analysis 
and assessment of trustworthiness quality attributes. We further presented a concrete 
instantiation of our assessment model that not only provides a formal modeling of trustworthy 
quality attributes but can also be extended/customized to specific stakeholder needs. We also 
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illustrated how a concrete instantiation of OntTAM for a small subset of sub-factors, attributes, 
and measures related to the trustworthiness of reusable components can be created. The measures 
which we included in the study are: API breaking changes, security vulnerabilities, and license 
violations. 







Chapter 8  
8 Conclusions and Future Work 
In this dissertation, we hypothesized that leveraging build and dependency information in 
software tasks needs a technology-independent representation of build and dependency 
management system semantics, integrated with knowledge from other software artifacts. 
To validate our thesis, we developed a unified knowledge model for software build and 
dependency management systems (SBSON). We showed how the integration of additional 
knowledge sources with SBSON can be performed and illustrate the applicability of our 
approach in analyzing the impact of code reuse from a dependency management perspective. 
8.1 Contributions 
In this section we briefly summarize the main contributions of this dissertation compared to 
the current state of the art. 
 
Modelling Build and Dependency Semantics (Chapter 4). One of the challenges in 
software traceability is that knowledge about software artifacts is stored in specialized 
repositories (e.g., build management, versioning, issue trackers), which often have remained 
information silos – disconnected from each other. Information on how projects are built are 
stored in similar information silos (e.g., Maven Central, Ruby Gems, and NPM).  
In this research, the focus is on the dependency information specified in build systems due to 
their relevance to support code reuse and global code sharing. We present a formal unified 
ontological model (SBSON, Software Build System ONtology) which captures concepts and 
properties for software build systems (Chapter 4). This formal knowledge representation allows 
us to take advantage of inference services provided by the Semantic Web, providing additional 
flexibility and benefits such as: a standardized build knowledge representation; cross-artifact 
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analysis, which allows taking advantage of the information in build repositories; and the reuse 
and sharing of analysis result across artifact and project boundaries. 
 
A Novel Approach to Analyze the Impact of API Breaking Changes (Chapter 5). As 
discussed throughout the thesis, APIs are commonly used by software developers to reduce 
development complexity by reusing code developed by third parties or published by the open 
source community on the Internet. These APIs, however, undergo changes that may break 
already established contracts, leading to errors and requiring rework in client applications. 
Identifying the impact of these changes is difficult especially when dealing with transitive API 
usage across software projects.  
We conducted a user survey involving 53 open source developers to gain insights on how 
they manage API breaking changes. Based on the survey results, we presented a formal unified 
ontological model which integrates our SBSON model with knowledge about source code usage 
and changes within the Maven ecosystem. We use this model to identify the potential impact of 
breaking changes across project boundaries to support library consumers and producers in 
managing API breaking changes, by taking advantage of SW reasoning services. We present a 
case study to demonstrate the applicability and flexibility of our approach in supporting library 
consumers while managing the impacts of breaking changes. 
 
Impact Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities (Chapter 6). Software reuse has increased the 
threats of sharing software vulnerabilities across project boundaries. Developers are unaware of 
such security vulnerabilities in their projects, often until a vulnerability is either exploited by 
attackers or made publicly available by independent security advisory databases. We introduce 
an integrated dependency and vulnerability knowledge model, SV-AF, in Chapter 6. SV-AF 
integrates different ontologies such as builds systems ontologies, source code ontologies, version 
systems ontologies, and vulnerabilities ontologies. 
We showed that 750 Maven projects (0.062% of all Maven projects) contain known security 
vulnerabilities that have been reported in the NVD database [125]. Of these 750 projects, 48.8% 
suffer even from multiple security vulnerabilities. Our analysis also showed that the same 
vulnerability can affect multiple releases of a product. The approach presented in this thesis can 
also be used to identify if the vulnerable source code of a library is indeed being used by a client 
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[123].  Furthermore, we introduce a vulnerability measure (WVD) that can be used to compare 
two releases of the same project in terms of their vulnerability impact [147].  The thesis also 
highlights that this information can be used to guide system update decisions and help avoid the 
reuse of APIs/components that have known vulnerabilities or are prone to vulnerabilities.  
 
A Model for assessing the Trustworthiness of OSS libraries (Chapter 7). We introduce a 
novel Ontological Trustworthiness Assessment Model (OntTAM), an extension of the previous 
generic SE-EQUAM software assessment model [9] (Chapter 7). OntTAM is an integration of 
our build, source code, vulnerability and license ontologies which supports the automated 
analysis and assessment of quality attributes related to the trustworthiness of libraries and APIs 
in open source systems. The main contributions of this assessment model are: 
• We introduce new trustworthiness measures, which measure API breaking changes, 
security vulnerabilities, and license violations.  
• We perform several case studies to illustrate how our approach provides developers with 
additional insights on the potential impact of reused libraries and APIs on the quality and 
trustworthiness of their project. 
Impact Analysis of License Violations (Section 7.4.3). The reuse of libraries leads to 
hierarchies of libraries and license dependencies. These libraries’ licenses must be 
compatible and compliant with each other. License violations and incompatibilities are an 
often-overlooked factor when recommending APIs and therefore can significantly impact the 
trustworthiness of software systems. We extend the MARKOS license ontology [10] with 
semantic rules for three categories of license violations, and perform a study on the Maven 
ecosystem to identify direct and transitive license violations [147]. The study identified over 
131,000 simple violations and 943,000 transitive license violations.  Such findings suggest 





8.2 Future Work 
8.2.1 Current Limitations 
Quality of our Ontology Design. One of the major benefits of our approach is its ability to 
seamlessly integrate and reuse ontologies. However, assessing the quality of our ontology 
designs is an inherently difficult problem since what constitutes quality depends on different 
non-functional requirements (e.g., reuse, usability, extensibility, expressiveness and reasoning 
support). We partly address this threat by using existing reasoners (such as Pellet, Hermit, and 
JFact) and tools (OOPS!58 and the Neon Toolkit59) to check our ontology design for taxonomic, 
syntactical and consistency problems. To determine if our ontology constraints were sufficient to 
identify incorrect data, we incrementally populated the ontologies with facts during the 
evaluation process. While the reasoners did not report any inconsistencies in our ontologies, 
OOPS! reported a few problems in our ontologies which violated some of the design rules in 
OOPS! rule catalog. The identified violations were a result of missing license information and 
annotations (such as <rdfs:label> and <rdfs:comment>) for some of our ontology elements. 
Another potential threat to our approach is whether the set of concepts we considered is 
enough to capture the semantics of the analyzed domains. There is always a trade-off in the 
design of knowledge bases in terms of their expressivity and their usefulness; an equilibrium 
should be established between the amount of information that is sufficient to accomplish a task 
and the granularity of the knowledge that should be available to produce useful results. We 
addressed this threat by showing that our modeled concepts are enough to provide flexible 
analysis services through the described case study experiments.  
 
Generalizability. The case studies described in this thesis are limited in their scope to open 
source Java projects in the Maven repository, and the results obtained might not be applicable to 
other programming languages or build repositories. Given that our modeling approach is based 
on different levels of abstraction, we also abstract common aspects of source code and build 






programming languages, software vulnerabilities, software licenses, and build repositories as 
individual domains of discourse in the domain-specific layer of our knowledge model.  
8.2.2 Opportunities for Future Research 
The presented research involves different areas of computer science, including SW 
technologies, knowledge modeling, mining software repositories, and source code analysis. This 
diversity of topics also leads to multiple research directions in which the work presented in this 
thesis can be extended as part of future work. 
 
Integrating Crowd Based Knowledge Sources. Changes to the software development 
process (such as increased collaboration and agile work habits) have made the Internet a great 
source of information, documentation and explanations to support the work context of 
developers [189]. These crowd-based information sources (e.g., blogs, online video tutorials, 
Q/A forums) contain important information which are often fragmented.  One interesting avenue 
for future research is the mining, modeling, and integration of crowd cased knowledge related to 
code reuse.  
As part of our ongoing research we have already proposed an approach which integrates 
online screencasts with known security issues. More specifically, we leverage audio, video 
(textual cues in image frames) and metadata from screencasts published on YouTube and 
integrate this knowledge with software dependency and security related knowledge from our 
existing SV-AF approach. We establish bi-directional traceability links from screencasts to NVD 
security vulnerabilities and infer indirect traceability links between screencasts and Maven 
project dependencies, which takes advantage of our existing traceability links (in SV-AF) 
between NVD and Maven Central. We argue that these links can be used to provide practitioners 
with additional insights in comprehending the potential impact of using vulnerable projects in 
their projects or how screencasts address these known security issues. Traceability links between 
screencasts and vulnerability reports are inferred by (1) identifying vulnerability references such 
as the CVE ID and CWE ID in the title, description, speech, or image frames of the screencasts, 
and (2) using the BM25 probabilistic relevance model [190], a popular model used in 
Information Retrieval (IR), to rank a set of vulnerability reports based on their relevance to 
words in a given screencast. Our initial experiments on 48 selected vulnerability related 
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YouTube videos showed that our approach can successfully link relevant vulnerabilities and 
screencasts with an average precision of 98% and an average recall of 54% when vulnerability 
identifiers (CVE ID) are explicitly mentioned in the videos. When no direct reference to a CVE 
ID exists in the screencast, our approach was still able to link video-vulnerability descriptions, 
with up to 100% of the time relevant links being ranked in the 2nd position of our results set. 
Having this knowledge integration not only provides developers with direct access to 
vulnerability information described in a screencast content, but also allows us to link 
vulnerability descriptions to relevant screencasts and dependency information. In addition, our 
approach also allows developers to identify screencasts that demonstrate such attacks and 
provides developers who are indirectly using vulnerable libraries in their project (e.g., through 
Maven dependencies) with insights on how to reduce the potential impact of being directly or 
indirectly exposed to a vulnerability.  
As part of our future work, we plan to extend our modeling approach to integrate videos and 
their content with other software artifacts and to conduct larger case studies to further improve 
the generalizability of our approach. We also plan to include knowledge from other crowd-based 
information sources such as blogs and Q/A forums (e.g., StackOverflow). 
 
Build Quality and the Performance of Continuous Integration. Continuous integration 
(CI) platforms automate the process of building and testing these projects. Despite CI’s many 
benefits and wide popularity, CI’s process can take a very long time to complete and can be 
particularly problematic when builds fail. Research has tried to understand why builds fail [191], 
and even try to predict the build results [192]. However, very few studies tried to improve the 
efficiency of the CI process. We will work on extending our assessment framework [147] to 
evaluates the quality of a project’s build at commit time. Furthermore, to make the process fast 
and efficient, it is important for the approach to perform this analysis incrementally on only the 
new changes to the project. Other interesting aspects of build quality considered for future 
research include build clones and unused build configurations. 
 
Optimizing our Knowledge Model. An impending threat to knowledge-based systems using 
graph structures for information modeling are inefficient, slow query times compared to 
relational databases. If our knowledge base is expected to integrate the knowledge of existing 
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global (dependency related) software artifacts, a detailed study of different optimization 






[1] J. Z. Gao, C. Chen, Y. Toyoshima, and D. K. Leung, “Engineering on the Internet for global 
software production,” Computer (Long. Beach. Calif)., vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 38–47, May 1999. 
[2] Y. M. Mileva, V. Dallmeier, M. Burger, and A. Zeller, “Mining trends of library usage,” Proc. Jt. 
Int. Annu. ERCIM Work. Princ. Softw. Evol. Softw. Evol., pp. 57–62, 2009. 
[3] M. P. Robillard, “What Makes APIs Hard to Learn? Answers from Developers,” IEEE Softw., vol. 
26, no. 6, pp. 27–34, Nov. 2009. 
[4] M. A. Saied, A. Ouni, H. Sahraoui, R. G. Kula, K. Inoue, and D. Lo, “Improving reusability of 
software libraries through usage pattern mining,” J. Syst. Softw., vol. 145, pp. 164–179, Nov. 
2018. 
[5] S. van der Burg, E. Dolstra, S. McIntosh, J. Davies, D. M. German, and A. Hemel, “Tracing 
software build processes to uncover license compliance inconsistencies,” in Proceedings of the 
29th ACM/IEEE international conference on Automated software engineering - ASE ’14, 2014, pp. 
731–742. 
[6] S. Mcintosh, B. Adams, M. Nagappan, and A. E. Hassan, “Mining Co-change Information to 
Understand When Build Changes Are Necessary,” in 2014 IEEE International Conference on 
Software Maintenance and Evolution, 2014, pp. 241–250. 
[7] X. Xia, D. Lo, S. McIntosh, E. Shihab, and A. E. Hassan, “Cross-project build co-change 
prediction,” in 2015 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Software Analysis, Evolution, and 
Reengineering (SANER), 2015, pp. 311–320. 
[8] S. McIntosh et al., “Collecting and leveraging a benchmark of build system clones to aid in quality 
assessments,” Companion Proc. 36th Int. Conf. Softw. Eng. - ICSE Companion 2014, pp. 145–
154, 2014. 
[9] A. Hmood, I. Keivanloo, and J. Rilling, “SE-EQUAM - An evolvable quality metamodel,” Proc. - 
Int. Comput. Softw. Appl. Conf., pp. 334–339, Jul. 2012. 
[10] G. Bavota et al., “The market for open source: An intelligent virtual open source marketplace,” in 
2014 Software Evolution Week - IEEE Conference on Software Maintenance, Reengineering, and 
Reverse Engineering (CSMR-WCRE), 2014, pp. 399–402. 
[11] R. Abdalkareem, O. Nourry, S. Wehaibi, S. Mujahid, and E. Shihab, “Why do developers use 
trivial packages? an empirical case study on npm,” in Proceedings of the 2017 11th Joint Meeting 
on Foundations of Software Engineering - ESEC/FSE 2017, 2017, pp. 385–395. 
[12] F. L. de la Mora and S. Nadi, “An Empirical Study of Metric-based Comparisons of Software 
Libraries,” in Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Predictive Models and Data 
Analytics in Software Engineering - PROMISE’18, 2018, pp. 22–31. 
157 
 
[13] F. Thung, “API recommendation system for software development,” in Proceedings of the 31st 
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering - ASE 2016, 2016, pp. 
896–899. 
[14] M. M. Rahman, C. K. Roy, and D. Lo, “RACK: Automatic API Recommendation Using 
Crowdsourced Knowledge,” in 2016 IEEE 23rd International Conference on Software Analysis, 
Evolution, and Reengineering (SANER), 2016, pp. 349–359. 
[15] R. G. Kula, D. M. German, A. Ouni, T. Ishio, and K. Inoue, “Do developers update their library 
dependencies?,” Empir. Softw. Eng., vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 384–417, Feb. 2018. 
[16] C. Teyton, J. R. Falleri, and X. Blanc, “Mining library migration graphs,” Proc. - Work. Conf. 
Reverse Eng. WCRE, pp. 289–298, 2012. 
[17] G. Bavota, G. Canfora, M. Di Penta, R. Oliveto, and S. Panichella, “How the Apache community 
upgrades dependencies: an evolutionary study,” Empir. Softw. Eng., vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 1275–1317, 
2014. 
[18] C. Bogart, C. Kästner, J. Herbsleb, and F. Thung, “How to break an API: cost negotiation and 
community values in three software ecosystems,” in Proceedings of the 2016 24th ACM SIGSOFT 
International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering - FSE 2016, 2016, pp. 109–
120. 
[19] A. Decan, T. Mens, and M. Claes, “An empirical comparison of dependency issues in OSS 
packaging ecosystems,” in 2017 IEEE 24th International Conference on Software Analysis, 
Evolution and Reengineering (SANER), 2017, pp. 2–12. 
[20] A. Decan, T. Mens, and E. Constantinou, “On the impact of security vulnerabilities in the npm 
package dependency network,” in Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Mining 
Software Repositories - MSR ’18, 2018, pp. 181–191. 
[21] M. Cadariu, E. Bouwers, J. Visser, and A. Van Deursen, “Tracking known security vulnerabilities 
in proprietary software systems,” 2015 IEEE 22nd Int. Conf. Softw. Anal. Evol. Reengineering, 
SANER 2015 - Proc., pp. 516–519, 2015. 
[22] D. M. German, M. Di Penta, and J. Davies, “Understanding and Auditing the Licensing of Open 
Source Software Distributions,” in 2010 IEEE 18th International Conference on Program 
Comprehension, 2010, pp. 84–93. 
[23] R. G. Kula, D. M. German, T. Ishio, A. Ouni, and K. Inoue, “An exploratory study on library 
aging by monitoring client usage in a software ecosystem,” in 2017 IEEE 24th International 
Conference on Software Analysis, Evolution and Reengineering (SANER), 2017, pp. 407–411. 
[24] B. Motik, I. Horrocks, and U. Sattler, “Bridging the gap between OWL and relational databases,” 
Web Semant. Sci. Serv. Agents World Wide Web, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 74–89, Apr. 2009. 
[25] M. Würsch, G. Reif, S. Demeyer, and H. C. Gall, “Fostering Synergies – How Semantic Web 
Technology could influence Software Repositories,” Scenario, pp. 45–48, 2010. 
[26] J. RILLING, R. WITTE, P. SCHUEGERL, and P. CHARLAND, “BEYOND INFORMATION 
SILOS — AN OMNIPRESENT APPROACH TO SOFTWARE EVOLUTION,” Int. J. Semant. 
Comput., vol. 02, no. 04, pp. 431–468, Dec. 2008. 
[27] T. Berners-Lee, J. Hendler, and O. Lassila, “The Semantic Web,” Sci. Am., vol. 284, no. 5, pp. 34–
158 
 
43, May 2001. 
[28] B. Berendt, A. Hotho, D. Mladenic, M. Someren, M. Spiliopoulou, and G. Stumme, “Web Mining: 
From Web to Semantic Web: First European Web Mining Forum, EWMF 2003, Cavtat-
Dubrovnik, Croatia, September 22, 2003, Invited and Selected Revised Papers,” B. Berendt, A. 
Hotho, D. Mladenič, M. Someren, M. Spiliopoulou, and G. Stumme, Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 1–22. 
[29] T. Segaran, C. Evans, and J. Taylor, Programming the semantic web. “ O’Reilly Media, Inc.,” 
2009. 
[30] T. Heath and C. Bizer, “Linked Data: Evolving the Web into a Global Data Space,” Synth. Lect. 
Semant. Web Theory Technol., vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–136, Feb. 2011. 
[31] F. Baader, D. Calvanese, D. L. McGuinness, D. Nardi, and P. F. Patel-Schneider, The Description 
Logic Handbook: Theory, Implementation and Applications, vol. 32, no. 9/10. 2010. 
[32] G. Bavota, G. Canfora, M. Di Penta, R. Oliveto, and S. Panichella, “The evolution of project inter-
dependencies in a software ecosystem: The case of apache,” IEEE Int. Conf. Softw. Maintenance, 
ICSM, pp. 280–289, 2013. 
[33] D. Binkley, “Source Code Analysis: A Road Map,” in Future of Software Engineering (FOSE 
’07), 2007, pp. 104–119. 
[34] M. Würsch, G. Ghezzi, M. Hert, G. Reif, and H. C. Gall, “SEON: a pyramid of ontologies for 
software evolution and its applications,” Computing, vol. 94, no. 11, pp. 857–885, Nov. 2012. 
[35] B. Decker, E. Ras, J. Rech, B. Klein, and C. Hoecht, “Self-organized reuse of software 
engineering knowledge supported by semantic wikis,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on 
Semantic Web Enabled Software Engineering (SWESE), 2005, p. 76. 
[36] Y. Zhang, J. Rilling, and V. Haarslev, “An Ontology-Based Approach to Software Comprehension 
- Reasoning about Security Concerns,” in 30th Annual International Computer Software and 
Applications Conference (COMPSAC’06), 2006, pp. 333–342. 
[37] B. Wouters, D. Deridder, and E. Van Paesschen, “The use of ontologies as a backbone for use case 
management,” in European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2000), 
Workshop: Objects and Classifications, a natural convergence, 2000, vol. 182. 
[38] U. Nonnenmann and J. K. Eddy, “KITSS-a functional software testing system using a hybrid 
domain model,” in Proceedings Eighth Conference on Artificial Intelligence for Applications, 
2003, pp. 136–142. 
[39] A. Ankolekar, K. Sycara, J. Herbsleb, R. Kraut, and C. Welty, “Supporting online problem-solving 
communities with the semantic web,” in Proceedings of the 15th international conference on 
World Wide Web - WWW ’06, 2006, pp. 575–584. 
[40] H.-J. Happel, A. Korthaus, S. Seedorf, and P. Tomczyk, “KOntoR: An Ontology-enabled 
Approach to Software Reuse,” in In: Proc. Of The 18Th Int. Conf. On Software Engineering And 
Knowledge Engineering, 2006. 
[41] D. Jin and J. R. Cordy, “A Service Sharing Approach to Integrating Program Comprehension 
Tools,” in Proc. European Software Engineering Conference (ESEC) / ACM Symposium on the 
Foundations of Software Engineering (FSE) 2003 Workshop on Tool Integration in System 
159 
 
Development, 2003, pp. 73–78. 
[42] D. Hyland-Wood, D. Carrington, and S. Kaplan, “Toward a Software Maintenance Methodology 
using Semantic Web Techniques,” in 2006 Second International IEEE Workshop on Software 
Evolvability (SE’06), 2006, pp. 23–30. 
[43] M. F. Bertoa, A. Vallecillo, and F. García, “An Ontology for Software Measurement,” in 
Ontologies for Software Engineering and Software Technology, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006, 
pp. 175–196. 
[44] R. Witte, Y. Zhang, and J. Rilling, “Empowering software maintainers with semantic web 
technologies,” Eur. Conf. Semant. Web Res. Appl., pp. 37–52, 2007. 
[45] L. Yu, J. Zhou, Y. Yi, P. Li, and Q. Wang, “Ontology Model-Based Static Analysis on Java 
Programs,” in 2008 32nd Annual IEEE International Computer Software and Applications 
Conference, 2008, pp. 92–99. 
[46] C. Kiefer, A. Bernstein, and J. Tappolet, “Mining Software Repositories with iSPAROL and a 
Software Evolution Ontology,” in Fourth International Workshop on Mining Software 
Repositories (MSR’07:ICSE Workshops 2007), 2007, pp. 10–10. 
[47] A. Iqbal, G. Tummarello, M. Hausenblas, and O.-E. Ureche, “LD2SD: linked data driven software 
development,” in International Conference on Software Engineering & Knowledge Engineering, 
2009. 
[48] A. E. Hassan and R. C. Holt, “The top ten list: dynamic fault prediction,” in 21st IEEE 
International Conference on Software Maintenance (ICSM’05), 2005, pp. 263–272. 
[49] M. W. Godfrey et al., “Future of Mining Software Archives: A Roundtable,” IEEE Softw., vol. 26, 
no. 1, pp. 67–70, Jan. 2009. 
[50] A. Hassan, “Mining Software Repositories to Assist Developers and Support Managers,” in 2006 
22nd IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance, 2006, pp. 339–342. 
[51] A. E. Hassan, “The road ahead for Mining Software Repositories,” in 2008 Frontiers of Software 
Maintenance, 2008, pp. 48–57. 
[52] T. L. Graves, A. F. Karr, J. S. Marron, and H. Siy, “Predicting fault incidence using software 
change history,” IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng., vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 653–661, Jul. 2000. 
[53] R. Moser, W. Pedrycz, and G. Succi, “A comparative analysis of the efficiency of change metrics 
and static code attributes for defect prediction,” in Proceedings of the 13th international 
conference on Software engineering - ICSE ’08, 2008, p. 181. 
[54] P. C. Rigby and A. E. Hassan, “What can OSS mailing lists tell us? A preliminary psychometric 
text analysis of the Apache developer mailing list,” Proc. - ICSE 2007 Work. Fourth Int. Work. 
Min. Softw. Repos. MSR 2007, 2007. 
[55] C. Bird, A. Gourley, P. Devanbu, A. Swaminathan, and G. Hsu, “Open borders? Immigration in 
open source projects,” Proc. - ICSE 2007 Work. Fourth Int. Work. Min. Softw. Repos. MSR 2007, 
2007. 
[56]  a. Mockus, P. Z. P. Zhang, and P. L. Li, “Predictors of customer perceived software quality,” in 




[57] D. Mandelin, L. Xu, R. Bodík, and D. Kimelman, “Jungloid mining,” in Proceedings of the 2005 
ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation - PLDI ’05, 
2005, p. 48. 
[58] J. I. Maletic and M. L. Collard, “Supporting source code difference analysis,” in IEEE 
International Conference on Software Maintenance, ICSM, 2004, pp. 210–219. 
[59] R. W. Selby, “Enabling reuse-based software development of large-scale systems,” IEEE Trans. 
Softw. Eng., vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 495–510, Jun. 2005. 
[60] M. Ohira, “Empirical project monitor: a tool for mining multiple project data,” in “International 
Workshop on Mining Software Repositories (MSR 2004)” W17S Workshop - 26th International 
Conference on Software Engineering, 2004, vol. 2004, pp. 42–46. 
[61] M. Ohira, N. Ohsugi, T. Ohoka, and K. Matsumoto, “Accelerating cross-project knowledge 
collaboration using collaborative filtering and social networks,” in Proceedings of the 2005 
international workshop on Mining software repositories - MSR ’05, 2005, pp. 1–5. 
[62] R. J. Sandusky, “Bug report networks: varieties, strategies, and impacts in a F/OSS development 
community,” in “International Workshop on Mining Software Repositories (MSR 2004)” W17S 
Workshop - 26th International Conference on Software Engineering, 2004, vol. 2004, pp. 80–84. 
[63] J. Anvik, L. Hiew, and G. C. Murphy, “Who should fix this bug?,” Proceeding 28th Int. Conf. 
Softw. Eng. - ICSE ’06, vol. 2006, p. 361, 2006. 
[64] H. Kagdi, S. Yusuf, and J. I. Maletic, “Mining sequences of changed-files from version histories,” 
in Proceedings of the 2006 international workshop on Mining software repositories - MSR ’06, 
2006, p. 47. 
[65] A. T. T. Ying, G. C. Murphy, R. Ng, and M. C. Chu-Carroll, “Predicting source code changes by 
mining change history,” IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng., vol. 30, no. 9, pp. 574–586, Sep. 2004. 
[66] T. Zimmermann, A. Zeller, P. Weissgerber, and S. Diehl, “Mining version histories to guide 
software changes,” IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng., vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 429–445, Jun. 2005. 
[67] B. Livshits and T. Zimmermann, “DynaMine,” in Proceedings of the 10th European software 
engineering conference held jointly with 13th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on 
Foundations of software engineering - ESEC/FSE-13, 2005, p. 296. 
[68] C. C. Williams and J. K. Hollingsworth, “Recovering system specific rules from software 
repositories,” in Proceedings of the 2005 international workshop on Mining software repositories 
- MSR ’05, 2005, pp. 1–5. 
[69] F. Van Rysselberghe, “Mining version control systems for FACs (frequently applied changes),” in 
“International Workshop on Mining Software Repositories (MSR 2004)” W17S Workshop - 26th 
International Conference on Software Engineering, 2004, vol. 2004, pp. 48–52. 
[70] D. M. German, “An empirical study of fine-grained software modifications,” in 20th IEEE 
International Conference on Software Maintenance, 2004. Proceedings., 2004, pp. 316–325. 
[71] C. Görg and P. Weißgerber, “Error detection by refactoring reconstruction,” in Proceedings of the 
2005 international workshop on Mining software repositories - MSR ’05, 2005, pp. 1–5. 
161 
 
[72] A. Chen et al., “CVSSearch: Searching through source code using CVS comments,” in IEEE 
International Conference on Software Maintenance, ICSM, 2001, pp. 364–375. 
[73] M. Kim and D. Notkin, “Using a clone genealogy extractor for understanding and supporting 
evolution of code clones,” in Proceedings of the 2005 international workshop on Mining software 
repositories - MSR ’05, 2005, pp. 1–5. 
[74] M. Asaduzzaman, A. S. Mashiyat, C. K. Roy, and K. A. Schneider, “Answering questions about 
unanswered questions of stack overflow,” Proc. 10th Work. Conf. Min. Softw. Repos., pp. 97–100, 
2013. 
[75] S. M. Nasehi, J. Sillito, F. Maurer, and C. Burns, “What makes a good code example?: A study of 
programming Q&amp;A in StackOverflow,” in 2012 28th IEEE International Conference on 
Software Maintenance (ICSM), 2012, pp. 25–34. 
[76] B. Bazelli, A. Hindle, and E. Stroulia, “On the Personality Traits of StackOverflow Users,” in 
2013 IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance, 2013, pp. 460–463. 
[77] S. Wang, D. Lo, and L. Jiang, “An empirical study on developer interactions in StackOverflow,” 
in Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing - SAC ’13, 2013, p. 
1019. 
[78] A. Barua, S. W. Thomas, and A. E. Hassan, “What are developers talking about? An analysis of 
topics and trends in Stack Overflow,” Empir. Softw. Eng., vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 619–654, Jun. 2014. 
[79] S. McIntosh, M. Nagappan, B. Adams, A. Mockus, and A. E. Hassan, “A Large-Scale Empirical 
Study of the Relationship between Build Technology and Build Maintenance,” Empir. Softw. Eng., 
vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 1587–1633, 2014. 
[80] P. Smith, Software Build Systems – Principles and Experience, 1st ed. Addison Wesley, 2011. 
[81] B. Adams, K. De Schutter, H. Tromp, and W. De Meuter, “The Evolution of the Linux Build 
System,” Electron. Commun. EASST, vol. 8, 2007. 
[82] B. Adams, “Co-evolution of source code and the build system,” IEEE Int. Conf. Softw. 
Maintenance, ICSM, pp. 461–464, 2009. 
[83] Godfrey and Qiang Tu, “Evolution in open source software: a case study,” in Proceedings 
International Conference on Software Maintenance ICSM-94, 2000, pp. 131–142. 
[84] S. McIntosh, B. Adams, T. H. D. Nguyen, Y. Kamei, and A. E. Hassan, “An empirical study of 
build maintenance effort,” 2011 33rd Int. Conf. Softw. Eng., pp. 141–150, 2011. 
[85] S. Raemaekers, A. Van Deursen, and J. Visser, “Semantic versioning versus breaking changes: A 
study of the maven repository,” Proc. - 2014 14th IEEE Int. Work. Conf. Source Code Anal. 
Manip. SCAM 2014, pp. 215–224, 2014. 
[86] M. Gligoric, W. Schulte, C. Prasad, D. van Velzen, I. Narasamdya, and B. Livshits, “Automated 
migration of build scripts using dynamic analysis and search-based refactoring,” in Proceedings of 
the 2014 ACM International Conference on Object Oriented Programming Systems Languages & 
Applications - OOPSLA ’14, 2014, pp. 599–616. 
[87] J. Al-Kofahi, H. V. Nguyen, and T. N. Nguyen, “Fault localization for build code errors in 
makefiles,” in Companion Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Software 
162 
 
Engineering - ICSE Companion 2014, 2014, pp. 600–601. 
[88] A. Tamrawi, H. A. Nguyen, H. V. Nguyen, and T. N. Nguyen, “Build code analysis with symbolic 
evaluation,” Proc. - Int. Conf. Softw. Eng., pp. 650–660, 2012. 
[89] C. Dietrich, R. Tartler, and W. S. D. Lohmann, “A Robust Approach for Variability Extraction 
from the Linux Build System,” pp. 21–30, 2012. 
[90] T. Berger, S. She, R. Lotufo, K. Czarnecki, and A. Wąsowski, “Feature-to-Code Mapping in Two 
Large Product Lines,” 2010, pp. 498–499. 
[91] S. Nadi and R. Holt, “The Linux kernel : a case study of build system variability,” 2013. 
[92] S. Zhou, J. Al-Kofahi, T. N. Nguyen, C. Kastner, and S. Nadi, “Extracting Configuration 
Knowledge from Build Files with Symbolic Analysis,” 2015 IEEE/ACM 3rd Int. Work. Release 
Eng., pp. 20–23, 2015. 
[93] B. Motik, A. Maedche, and R. Volz, “A Conceptual Modeling Approach for Semantics-Driven 
Enterprise Applications,” Move to Meaningful Internet Syst. 2002 CoopIS, DOA, ODBASE, vol. 
2519, pp. 1082–1099, 2000. 
[94] T. R. Gruber, “Toward principles for the design of ontologies used for knowledge sharing,” Int. J. 
Hum. Comput. Stud., vol. 43, no. 5–6, pp. 907–928, 1995. 
[95] N. Noy and D. McGuinness, “Ontology Development 101: A Guide to Creating Your First 
Ontology,” 2001. 
[96] P. E. van der Vet and N. J. I. Mars, “Bottom-up construction of ontologies,” IEEE Trans. Knowl. 
Data Eng., vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 513–526, 1998. 
[97] M. Uschold and M. Gruninger, “Ontologies: principles, methods and applications,” Knowl. Eng. 
Rev., vol. 11, no. 02, p. 93, Jun. 1996. 
[98] S. S. Alqahtani, E. E. Eghan, and J. Rilling, “SE-GPS,” 2015. [Online]. Available: 
http://aseg.encs.concordia.ca/segps/. [Accessed: 05-Jan-2019]. 
[99] W. Wu, Y.-G. Guéhéneuc, G. Antoniol, and M. Kim, “AURA: a hybrid approach to identify 
framework evolution,” in Proceedings of the 32nd ACM/IEEE International Conference on 
Software Engineering - ICSE ’10, 2010, vol. 1, p. 325. 
[100] G. Brito, A. Hora, M. T. Valente, and R. Robbes, “Do Developers Deprecate APIs with 
Replacement Messages? A Large-Scale Analysis on Java Systems,” in 2016 IEEE 23rd 
International Conference on Software Analysis, Evolution, and Reengineering (SANER), 2016, pp. 
360–369. 
[101] A. Hora, R. Robbes, M. T. Valente, N. Anquetil, A. Etien, and S. Ducasse, “How do developers 
react to API evolution? A large-scale empirical study,” Softw. Qual. J., Oct. 2016. 
[102] R. Robbes, M. Lungu, and D. Röthlisberger, “How do developers react to API deprecation?,” in 
Proceedings of the ACM SIGSOFT 20th International Symposium on the Foundations of Software 
Engineering - FSE ’12, 2012, p. 1. 
[103] M. Kim, D. Notkin, and D. Grossman, “Automatic Inference of Structural Changes for Matching 
across Program Versions,” in 29th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE’07), 
163 
 
2007, pp. 333–343. 
[104] P. Weissgerber and S. Diehl, “Identifying Refactorings from Source-Code Changes,” in 21st 
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE’06), 2006, pp. 
231–240. 
[105] B. Dagenais and M. P. Robillard, “Recommending Adaptive Changes for Framework Evolution,” 
ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol., vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1–35, Sep. 2011. 
[106] T. Schäfer, J. Jonas, and M. Mezini, “Mining framework usage changes from instantiation code,” 
in Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Software engineering - ICSE ’08, 2008, p. 
471. 
[107] L. Xavier, A. Brito, A. Hora, and M. T. Valente, “Historical and impact analysis of API breaking 
changes: A large-scale study,” in 2017 IEEE 24th International Conference on Software Analysis, 
Evolution and Reengineering (SANER), 2017, pp. 138–147. 
[108] W. Wu, F. Khomh, B. Adams, Y.-G. Guéhéneuc, and G. Antoniol, “An exploratory study of api 
changes and usages based on apache and eclipse ecosystems,” Empir. Softw. Eng., vol. 21, no. 6, 
pp. 2366–2412, Dec. 2016. 
[109] J. Singer, S. E. Sim, and T. C. Lethbridge, “Software Engineering Data Collection for Field 
Studies,” in Guide to Advanced Empirical Software Engineering, London: Springer London, 2008, 
pp. 9–34. 
[110] D. Movshovitz-Attias, S. E. Whang, N. Noy, and A. Halevy, “Discovering Subsumption 
Relationships for Web-Based Ontologies,” in Proceedings of the 18th International Workshop on 
Web and Databases - WebDB’15, 2010, pp. 62–69. 
[111] Y. Wang et al., “Do the dependency conflicts in my project matter?,” in Proceedings of the 2018 
26th ACM Joint Meeting on European Software Engineering Conference and Symposium on the 
Foundations of Software Engineering - ESEC/FSE 2018, 2018, pp. 319–330. 
[112] R. Lämmel, E. Pek, and J. Starek, “Large-scale, AST-based API-usage analysis of open-source 
Java projects,” in Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing - SAC ’11, 
2011, pp. 1317–1324. 
[113] J. Businge, A. Serebrenik, and M. G. J. van den Brand, “Eclipse API usage: the good and the bad,” 
Softw. Qual. J., vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 107–141, Mar. 2015. 
[114] B. E. Cossette and R. J. Walker, “Seeking the Ground Truth: A Retroactive Study on the Evolution 
and Migration of Software Libraries,” Proc. ACM SIGSOFT 20th Int. Symp. Found. Softw. Eng., 
pp. 55:1--55:11, 2012. 
[115] P. Kapur, B. Cossette, and R. J. Walker, “Refactoring references for library migration,” ACM 
SIGPLAN Not., vol. 45, no. 10, p. 726, 2010. 
[116] D. Dig and R. Johnson, “How do APIs evolve? A story of refactoring,” J. Softw. Maint. Evol. Res. 
Pract., vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 83–107, Mar. 2006. 
[117] S. Raemaekers, A. Van Deursen, and J. Visser, “Measuring software library stability through 
historical version analysis,” IEEE Int. Conf. Softw. Maintenance, ICSM, pp. 378–387, 2012. 
[118] A. Decan, T. Mens, M. Claes, and P. Grosjean, “When GitHub Meets CRAN: An Analysis of 
164 
 
Inter-Repository Package Dependency Problems,” in 2016 IEEE 23rd International Conference on 
Software Analysis, Evolution, and Reengineering (SANER), 2016, pp. 493–504. 
[119] C. Artho, K. Suzaki, R. Di Cosmo, R. Treinen, S. Zacchiroli, and A. P. S. Distributions, “Why Do 
Software Packages Conflict ?,” pp. 141–150, 2012. 
[120] J. Williams and A. Dabirsiaghi, “The unfortunate reality of insecure libraries,” Asp. Secur. Inc, pp. 
1–26, 2012. 
[121] OWASP, “Top 10-2017 A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities,” 2018. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10-2017_A9-
Using_Components_with_Known_Vulnerabilities. [Accessed: 05-Jul-2019]. 
[122] B. Liu, L. Shi, Z. Cai, and M. Li, “Software Vulnerability Discovery Techniques: A Survey,” in 
2012 Fourth International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking and Security, 2012, 
pp. 152–156. 
[123] S. S. Alqahtani, E. E. Eghan, and J. Rilling, “Recovering Semantic Traceability Links between 
APIs and Security Vulnerabilities: An Ontological Modeling Approach,” in Proceedings - 10th 
IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation, ICST 2017, 
2017, pp. 80–91. 
[124] S. S. Alqahtani, E. E. Eghan, and J. Rilling, “SV-AF - A Security Vulnerability Analysis 
Framework,” in IEEE 27th International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), 
2016, pp. 219–229. 
[125] S. S. Alqahtani, E. E. Eghan, and J. Rilling, “Tracing known security vulnerabilities in software 
repositories - A Semantic Web enabled modeling approach,” Sci. Comput. Program., vol. 121, pp. 
153–175, Feb. 2016. 
[126] N. McNeil, R. A. Bridges, M. D. Iannacone, B. Czejdo, N. Perez, and J. R. Goodall, “PACE: 
Pattern Accurate Computationally Efficient Bootstrapping for Timely Discovery of Cyber-security 
Concepts,” in 2013 12th International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications, 2013, 
pp. 60–65. 
[127] S. S. Alqahtani, “Enhancing Trust–A Unified Meta-Model for Software Security Vulnerability 
Analysis,” Concordia University, 2018. 
[128] M. Potamias, F. Bonchi, A. Gionis, and G. Kollios, “k-nearest neighbors in uncertain graphs,” 
Proc. VLDB Endow., vol. 3, no. 1–2, pp. 997–1008, Sep. 2010. 
[129] A. Kimmig, S. Bach, M. Broecheler, B. Huang, and L. Getoor, “A short introduction to 
probabilistic soft logic,” in Proceedings of the NIPS Workshop on Probabilistic Programming: 
Foundations and Applications, 2012, pp. 1–4. 
[130] NIST, “National Vulnerability Database,” 2007. . 
[131] V. H. Nguyen, S. Dashevskyi, and F. Massacci, “An automatic method for assessing the versions 
affected by a vulnerability,” Empir. Softw. Eng., Dec. 2015. 
[132] H. Plate, S. E. Ponta, and A. Sabetta, “Impact assessment for vulnerabilities in open-source 




[133] Y. M. Mileva, V. Dallmeier, and A. Zeller, “Mining API popularity,” Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 
(including Subser. Lect. Notes Artif. Intell. Lect. Notes Bioinformatics), vol. 6303 LNCS, pp. 173–
180, 2010. 
[134] M. Hirzel, D. Von Dincklage, A. Diwan, and M. Hind, “Fast online pointer analysis,” ACM Trans. 
Program. Lang. Syst., vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 11–66, Apr. 2007. 
[135] S. Mancoridis, B. S. Mitchell, Y. Chen, and E. R. Gansner, “Bunch: A clustering tool for the 
recovery and maintenance of software system structures,” in Software Maintenance, 
1999.(ICSM’99) Proceedings. IEEE International Conference on, 1999, pp. 50–59. 
[136] J.-D. Choi, M. Burke, and P. Carini, “Efficient flow-sensitive interprocedural computation of 
pointer-induced aliases and side effects,” in Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT 
symposium on Principles of programming languages - POPL ’93, 1993, pp. 232–245. 
[137] D. Mitropoulos, V. Karakoidas, P. Louridas, G. Gousios, and D. Spinellis, “The bug catalog of the 
maven ecosystem,” in Proceedings of the 11th Working Conference on Mining Software 
Repositories, 2014, pp. 372–375. 
[138] C. V Saini, Vaibhav and Sajnani, Hitesh and Ossher, Joel and Lopes, “A dataset for maven 
artifacts and bug patterns found in them,” in Proceedings of the 11th Working Conference on 
Mining Software Repositories, 2014, pp. 416--419. 
[139] A. Pletea, Daniel and Vasilescu, Bogdan and Serebrenik, “Security and emotion: sentiment 
analysis of security discussions on GitHub,” in Proceedings of the 11th Working Conference on 
Mining Software Repositories, 2014, pp. 348–351. 
[140] T. Gegick, Michael and Rotella, Pete and Xie, “Identifying security bug reports via text mining: 
An industrial case study,” in Mining Software Repositories (MSR), 2010 7th IEEE Working 
Conference on, 2010, pp. 11--20. 
[141] S. Neuhaus, T. Zimmermann, C. Holler, and A. Zeller, “Predicting vulnerable software 
components,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications 
security - CCS ’07, 2007, pp. 529–540. 
[142] F. Thung, D. Lo, and J. Lawall, “Automated library recommendation,” Proc. - Work. Conf. 
Reverse Eng. WCRE, no. October, pp. 182–191, 2013. 
[143] A. Hora, A. Hora, and M. T. Valente, “apiwave : Keeping Track of API Popularity and 
Migration,” no. JANUARY, pp. 321–323, 2015. 
[144] F. McCarey, M. Ó. Cinnéide, and N. Kushmerick, “Rascal: A Recommender Agent for Agile 
Reuse,” Artif. Intell. Rev., vol. 24, no. 3–4, pp. 253–276, Nov. 2005. 
[145] D. L. Parnas, “Software aging,” in ICSE ’94 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on 
Software engineering, 1994, pp. 279–287. 
[146] F. S. Foundation, “Various Licenses and Comments About Them,” GNU Project, 2014. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/license-list.en.html. 
[147] E. E. Eghan, S. S. Alqahtani, C. Forbes, and J. Rilling, “API trustworthiness: an ontological 
approach for software library adoption,” Softw. Qual. J., pp. 1–46, 2019. 
[148] O. S. Initiative, “The Open Source Definition,” Open Source Software, 2007. [Online]. Available: 
166 
 
https://opensource.org/osd. [Accessed: 06-Jul-2019]. 
[149] G. M. Kapitsaki, F. Kramer, and N. D. Tselikas, “Automating the license compatibility process in 
open source software with SPDX,” J. Syst. Softw., vol. 131, pp. 386–401, Sep. 2017. 
[150] I. GitHub, “Choose a License,” 2008. [Online]. Available: http://creativecommons.org/license/. 
[Accessed: 06-Jul-2019]. 
[151] O. Seneviratne, L. Kagal, D. Weitzner, H. Abelson, T. Berners-Lee, and N. Shadbolt, “Detecting 
creative commons license violations on images on the world wide web,” WWW2009, April, 2009. 
[152] L. An, O. Mlouki, F. Khomh, and G. Antoniol, “Stack Overflow: A code laundering platform?,” in 
2017 IEEE 24th International Conference on Software Analysis, Evolution and Reengineering 
(SANER), 2017, pp. 283–293. 
[153] Software Freedom Law Center, “Best Buy, Samsung, Westinghouse, And Eleven Other Brands 
Named In SFLC Lawsuit,” 2009. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/news/2009/dec/14/busybox-gpl-lawsuit/. [Accessed: 06-Jul-
2019]. 
[154] Software Freedom Law Center, “Motion Against Westinghouse Digital Electronics in GPL 
Compliance Lawsuit,” 2010. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.softwarefreedom.org/news/2010/jun/07/motion-against-westinghouse-digital-
electronics-gp/. [Accessed: 06-Jul-2019]. 
[155] B. A. Kitchenham and J. G. Walker, “A quantitative approach to monitoring software 
development,” Softw. Eng. J., vol. 4, no. 1, p. 2, 2010. 
[156] B. Kitchenham and S. L. Pfleeger, “Software quality: the elusive target,” IEEE Softw., vol. 13, no. 
1, pp. 12–21, 1996. 
[157] D. Hoyle, “Chapter 2 - Defining and Characterizing Quality,” in ISO 9000 Quality Systems 
Handbook - updated for the ISO 9001:2008 standard (Sixth Edition), Sixth Edit., D. Hoyle, Ed. 
Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2009, pp. 23–37. 
[158] J. A. McCall, P. K. Richards, and G. F. Walters, “Factors in Software Quality. Volume I. Concepts 
and Definitions of Software Quality,” 1977. 
[159] A. Bergel et al., “SQUALE - Software QUALity Enhancement,” in 2009 13th European 
Conference on Software Maintenance and Reengineering, 2009, pp. 285–288. 
[160] A. Hmood, Philipp Schugerl, J. Rilling, and Philippe Charland, “OntEQAM – A Methodology for 
Assessing Evolvability as a Quality Factor in Software Ecosystems,” in Defence R&D Canada - 
Valcartier, Valcartier QUE (CAN), 2010, p. 8. 
[161] S. Seedorf and F. F. I. U. Mannheim, “Applications of Ontologies in Software Engineering,” in In 
2nd International Workshop on Semantic Web Enabled Software Engineering (SWESE 2006), 
2006. 
[162] H. Kagdi, M. L. Collard, and J. I. Maletic, “Comparing Approaches to Mining Source Code for 
Call-Usage Patterns,” in Fourth International Workshop on Mining Software Repositories 
(MSR’07:ICSE Workshops 2007), 2007, pp. 20–26. 
[163] T. Kamiya, S. Kusumoto, and K. Inoue, “CCFinder: a multilinguistic token-based code clone 
167 
 
detection system for large scale source code,” IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng., vol. 28, no. 7, pp. 654–
670, Jul. 2002. 
[164] Y. Zhang, R. Witte, J. Rilling, and V. Haarslev, “Ontological approach for the semantic recovery 
of traceability links between software artefacts,” IET Softw., vol. 2, no. 3, p. 185, 2008. 
[165] I. Keivanloo, C. Forbes, J. Rilling, and P. Charland, “Towards sharing source code facts using 
linked data,” Proceeding 3rd Int. Work. Search-driven Dev. users, infrastructure, tools, Eval. - 
SUITE ’11, pp. 25–28, 2011. 
[166] L. A. Zadeh, “The concept of a linguistic variable and its application to approximate reasoning-
III,” Inf. Sci. (Ny)., vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 43–80, Jan. 1975. 
[167] I. E. Commission, “Programmable Controllers - Part 7: Fuzzy Control Programming,” 2000. 
[168] P. Cingolani and J. Alcala-Fdez, “jFuzzyLogic: a robust and flexible Fuzzy-Logic inference 
system language implementation,” in 2012 IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy Systems, 
2012, pp. 1–8. 
[169] I. Samoladas, G. Gousios, D. Spinellis, and I. Stamelos, “The SQO-OSS Quality Model: 
Measurement Based Open Source Software Evaluation,” in Open Source Development, 
Communities and Quality, Boston, MA: Springer US, 2008, pp. 237–248. 
[170] B. M. Kuhn, A. K. Sebro, and D. Gingerich, “Chapter 10 The Lesser GPL,” Free Software 
Foundation & Software Freedom Law Center, 2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://copyleft.org/guide/comprehensive-gpl-guidech11.html. 
[171] V. del Bianco, L. Lavazza, S. Morasca, and D. Taibi, “Quality of Open Source Software: The 
QualiPSo Trustworthiness Model,” 2009, pp. 199–212. 
[172] T. Boland, C. Cleraux, and E. Fong, “Toward a Preliminary Framework for Assessing the 
Trustworthiness of Software,” Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol., no. September, pp. 1–31, 2010. 
[173] H. Jiang, J. Zhang, Z. Ren, and T. Zhang, “An Unsupervised Approach for Discovering Relevant 
Tutorial Fragments for APIs,” in 2017 IEEE/ACM 39th International Conference on Software 
Engineering (ICSE), 2017, pp. 38–48. 
[174] W. Maalej and M. P. Robillard, “Patterns of Knowledge in API Reference Documentation,” IEEE 
Trans. Softw. Eng., vol. 39, no. 9, pp. 1264–1282, Sep. 2013. 
[175] M. Di Penta, D. M. German, Y.-G. Guéhéneuc, and G. Antoniol, “An Exploratory Study of the 
Evolution of Software Licensing,” Proc. 32nd ACM/IEEE Int. Conf. Softw. Eng. - ICSE ’10, vol. 
1, pp. 1–10, 2010. 
[176] Y. Wu, Y. Manabe, T. Kanda, D. M. German, and K. Inoue, “A Method to Detect License 
Inconsistencies in Large-Scale Open Source Projects,” in 2015 IEEE/ACM 12th Working 
Conference on Mining Software Repositories, 2015, pp. 324–333. 
[177] H. Zhong and H. Mei, “An Empirical Study on API Usages,” IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. (Early 
Access), pp. 1–1, 2017. 
[178] A. Monden, S. Okahara, Y. Manabe, and K. Matsumoto, “Guilty or Not Guilty: Using Clone 




[179] A. Hemel, K. T. Kalleberg, R. Vermaas, and E. Dolstra, “Finding software license violations 
through binary code clone detection,” in Proceeding of the 8th working conference on Mining 
software repositories - MSR ’11, 2011, pp. 63–72. 
[180] D. M. German and A. E. Hassan, “License integration patterns: Addressing license mismatches in 
component-based development,” in 2009 IEEE 31st International Conference on Software 
Engineering, 2009, pp. 188–198. 
[181] D. Taibi, “Defining an Open Source Software Trustworthiness Model,” Proc. 3rd Int. Dr. Symp. 
Emperical Softw. Eng., p. 4, 2008. 
[182] D. Larson and K. Miller, “Silver bullets for little monsters: making software more trustworthy,” IT 
Prof., vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 9–13, Jan. 2005. 
[183] T. Tan, M. He, Y. Yang, Q. Wang, and M. Li, “An Analysis to Understand Software 
Trustworthiness,” in 2008 The 9th International Conference for Young Computer Scientists, 2008, 
pp. 2366–2371. 
[184] S. L. Pfleeger, “Measuring software reliability,” IEEE Spectr., vol. 29, no. 8, pp. 56–60, Aug. 
1992. 
[185] Y. Yang, Q. Wang, and M. Li, “Process Trustworthiness as a Capability Indicator for Measuring 
and Improving Software Trustworthiness,” 2009, pp. 389–401. 
[186] T. Rhodes, F. Boland, E. Fong, and M. Kass, “Software Assurance using Structured Assurance 
Case Models,” J. Res. Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol., vol. 115, no. 3, 2010. 
[187] R. Land, D. Sundmark, F. Lüders, I. Krasteva, and A. Causevic, “Reuse with Software 
Components - A Survey of Industrial State of Practice,” Form. Found. Reuse Domain Eng., pp. 
150–159, 2009. 
[188] C. Ayala, X. Franch, R. Conradi, J. Li, and D. Cruzes, “Developing Software with Open Source 
Software Components,” in Finding Source Code on the Web for Remix and Reuse, New York, 
NY: Springer New York, 2013, pp. 167–186. 
[189] P. Moslehi, B. Adams, and J. Rilling, “On mining crowd-based speech documentation,” in 
Proceedings of the 13th International Workshop on Mining Software Repositories - MSR ’16, 
2016, pp. 259–268. 
[190] C. D. Manning, P. Raghavan, and H. Schütze, An Introduction to Information Retrieval. 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
[191] H. Seo, C. Sadowski, S. Elbaum, E. Aftandilian, and R. Bowdidge, “Programmers’ build errors: a 
case study (at google),” Proc. 36th Int. Conf. Softw. Eng. - ICSE 2014, no. Section 2, pp. 724–734, 
2014. 
[192] A. E. Hassan and Z. Ken, “Using decision trees to predict the certification result of a build,” Proc. 











Appendix A: Referenced Ontologies 
The following table provides the ontology description and namespaces used in this 
dissertation, as well as their corresponding URIs. 




Our general layer 
ontology 
MARKOS markos http://www.markosproject.eu/ontologies/osslicenses 
The MARKet for Open 













assessment ontology  
OWL owl http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl# 
Web Ontology 
Language 







































Appendix B: User Survey Questionnaire 
Part I: Background 
1. How best would you describe yourself? 
a. Undergraduate Student 
b. Graduate Student 
c. Academic Researcher 
d. Industrial Researcher 
e. Industrial Developer 
f. Freelance Developer 
g. Other: __________________ 
2. How many years of software development or maintenance experience do you have? 
a. < 1 year 
b. 1 -2 years 
c. 2 -5 years 
d. 5 -10 years 
e. 10 – 20 years 
f. > 20 years 
3. How many years have you been contributing to open source (in any way)? 
a. < 1 year 
b. 1 -2 years 
c. 2 -5 years 
d. 5 -10 years 
e. 10 – 20 years 




Part II: Background on Ecosystem 
1. Please choose ONE software ecosystem in which you frequently publish a package/library. If 
you have not published any packages/libraries, then pick an ecosystem whose packages/libraries 
you frequently use. Note: For the “Maven ecosystem”, we are interested in the development of 
frameworks and libraries in Java, Scala, and other languages that share artifacts through Maven 
Central or other Maven repositories (for example through build systems or tools like gradle, sbt, 
ivy, or Maven itself). 
a. Bower 
b. Composer  
c. Maven  
d. Node.js/NPM  
e. NuGet 
f. Perl/CPAN 
g. PHP/Packagist  
h. Python/PyPi 
i. R/CRAN  
j. Other __________________ 
2. Which best describes your role in this ecosystem 
a. I am a core contributor 
b. I have submitted a patch or pull request 
c. I use packages/libraries of the ecosystem in my systems. 
3. How many years have you been using the chosen ecosystem in any way? 
a. < 1 year 
b. 1 -2 years 
c. 2 -5 years 
d. 5 -10 years 
e. 10 – 20 years 




NB: If you identified yourself primarily as a publisher/developer of packages/libraries in the 
above section, please proceed to Part III. Otherwise, if you identified yourself primarily as a 
someone who reuses packages/libraries in the chosen ecosystem, please proceed to Part IV. 
Part III: (Optional) Breaking Changes – Developer’s Perspective 
1. How often do you introduce breaking changes to packages/libraries you develop or 
contribute to? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a year 
c. Several times a year 
d. Several times a month 
e. Several times a week 
f. Several times a day 
2. How often do you face breaking changes from upstream dependencies? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a year 
c. Several times a year 
d. Several times a month 
e. Several times a week 
f. Several times a day 
3. What is your opinion on the following cost-sharing strategies for breaking changes (Strongly 
agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree) 
a. Developers of components should invest extra work and effort to reduce impact of 
breaking changes on client applications      
b. Developers should make changes without caring about the amount of rework required for 
clients      
c. 3rd parties should take some of the burden reviewing changes, curating a selection of 
recommended libraries for clients, etc.        
4. Which of these existing strategies do you (or the organization for which you work) adopt to 
delay/reduce the costs of braking changes for clients (multiple selections allowed)? 
a. Maintaining old interfaces (deprecation) 
b. Parallel releases 
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c. Release planning 
d. Communication with users 
e. Other __________________ 
5. How do you decide on an adoption strategy, and what measures (if any) are used when 
deciding on a strategy decision? (e.g.  feedback from clients/users on proposed changes)  
 
Part IV: (Optional) Breaking Changes – Client’s Perspective 
1. How do you declare the package/library versions that your project depends on? 
a. I specify an exact version number 
b. I specify a range of version numbers 
c. I specify only the name and always get the latest version 
d. Other __________________ 
2. Rank how these factors contribute to your decision when adding a dependency to your 
project. Assign a number from 1 to 8, with 1 being the highest ranked factor. 
a. The popularity of the package. ___ 
b. How current the package is (latest release?)  ___ 
c. The quality of the package.  ___ 
d. The quality of the package contributors.  ___ 
e. The value added to your project by the dependency.  ___ 
f. The number of breaking changes in the dependency.  ___ 
g. The historical stability of the dependency (history of bugs, breaking changes, etc.)  ___ 
h. Other __________________:   ___ 
3. How often do you face breaking changes from packages/libraries you use in your projects? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a year 
c. Several times a year 
d. Several times a month 
e. Several times a week 
f. Several times a day 
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4. For most of the packages/libraries I reuse, I become aware of breaking changes by: 
a. reading about them on the dependency project’s internal sources (not general public 
announcements) 
b. reading about them on the dependency projects external media (public announcements, 
social media) 
c. receiving a notification from a tool 
d. trying to build my project 
e. Other __________________ 




6. If your answer to question 6 is Yes, can you briefly describe the experience: how did you 
detect and resolve the issue? __________________ 
7. What would be the most important feature you would like to have in a tool that detects 
possible direct impacts of breaking changes? __________________ 
8. What would be the most important feature you would like to have in a tool that detects 
possible indirect impacts of breaking changes? __________________ 
 
 
